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ABSTRACT
HUMAN FREEDOM IN A WORLD FULL OF PROVIDENCE:
AN OCKHAMIST—MOLINIST ACCOUNT OF THE COMPATIBILITY OF
DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND CREATURELY FREE WILL
FEBRUARY 2010
CHRISTOPHER J. KOSCIUK, B.A., ST. BONAVENTURE UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Lynne R. Baker

I defend the compatibility of the classical theistic doctrine of divine providence,
which includes infallible foreknowledge of all future events, with a libertarian
understanding of creaturely free will. After setting out the argument for
theological determinism, which purports to show the inconsistency of
foreknowledge and freedom, I reject several responses as inadequate and then
defend the ‚Ockhamist‛ response as successful. I further argue that the theory of
middle knowledge or ‚Molinism‛ is crucial to the viability of the Ockhamist
response, and proceed to defend Molinism against the most pressing objections.
Finally, I argue that a proper understanding of the Creator-creature relationship
accounts for why no explanation can be given for how God’s middle knowledge
comes about.

v

CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................. iv
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... v
CHAPTER
PREFACE .......................................................................................................................... 1
1. THE PROBLEM OF THEOLOGICAL DETERMINISM ......................................... 6
1.1. Providence and Foreknowledge ......................................................................... 6
1.2. Perfect Being Theology and Foreknowledge .................................................... 9
1.3. The Libertarian Conception of Creaturely Freedom ..................................... 11
1.4. Formulating the Argument for Theological Determinism............................ 18
1.5. Theological Determinism and the Fixity of the Past ...................................... 24
1.6. The Saga of Smith the Sniper............................................................................. 28
2. HOW NOT TO RESPOND TO ATD ....................................................................... 35
2.1. Open Theism ........................................................................................................ 35
2.2. The Frankfurtian Objection to (PAP) ............................................................... 39
2.3. Considerations on Logical Determinism ......................................................... 50
2.4. Eternal Propositions and Eternal Knowledge................................................. 59
2.5. Against Eternalism (Part 1)................................................................................ 66
3. OCKHAMISM AND THE RECONCILIATION QUESTION.............................. 77
3.1. Against Eternalism (Part 2)................................................................................ 77
3.2. The Past Isn’t Quite So Fixed............................................................................. 84
3.3. Causal Power and Counterfactual Power ....................................................... 88
3.4. The Bare Truth About the Future ..................................................................... 94
3.5. How Would You Like Your Facts? ................................................................... 97
3.6. Ockhamism Applied to ATD ............................................................................ 99
3.7. Are God’s Beliefs Hard or Soft Facts? ............................................................ 103
3.8. Just Another Kind of Compatibilism?............................................................ 122

vi

4. MOLINISM AND THE SOURCE QUESTION .................................................... 126
4.1. The Source of God’s Foreknowledge ............................................................. 126
4.2. The Role of the Divine Will ............................................................................. 130
4.3. The Theory of Middle Knowledge ................................................................. 141
4.4. The Reconciliation Question Revisited .......................................................... 153
4.5. Objections to Molinism .................................................................................... 160
4.5.1. ‚Not True Soon Enough‛ .......................................................................... 161
4.5.2. The Grounding Objection ......................................................................... 169
4.5.3. Hasker’s Anti-Molinist Argument........................................................... 184
5. THE MYSTERY OF MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE ..................................................... 200
5.1. Middle Knowledge and Individual Essences ............................................... 202
5.2. Molina’s Problematic Approach ..................................................................... 208
5.3. Idea-Models ....................................................................................................... 216
5.4. The Suarezian Solution .................................................................................... 220
5.5. The Metaphysics of Participation ................................................................... 225
5.6. Entitative Participation and Supercomprehension ...................................... 234
5.7. Objections and Replies ..................................................................................... 239
NOTES ........................................................................................................................... 244
APPENDIX: MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE AND THE SUFFERING OF CHRIST .... 248
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................... 253

vii

PREFACE
Almighty God, whose never-failing providence governeth all things both in heaven and
earth, hath so wisely and mercifully ordered the course of this world (Book of Common
Prayer).1
When God, in the beginning, created man, he made him subject to his own free choice
(Sirach 15.14).2
One of the beliefs that must certainly be considered essential, indeed central,
to the major traditions of Western theistic religion3 is the conviction that God has
an ultimate plan for creation4 and, further, is in some mysterious way in control
of things as that plan unfolds toward full realization. All too often the events in a
person’s life as well as in the world at large appear either utterly chaotic and
purposeless on the one hand, or on the other hand seem wholly determined by
the self-interests of the privileged and powerful. Yet faith in the notion that these
same events have been foreordained by and remain in the hands of God, the one
true Power, whose justice is perfect and whose love is inexhaustible, is without
doubt a supreme motivating factor in the decision of believers to press onward in
the hope that truth and goodness will ultimately prevail over falsehood and evil.5
In addition to the belief that ‘the work of the gods is full of Providence’
(Marcus Aurelius, 1989, p. 10), Western religion has also maintained that not
everything is entirely ‚the work of the gods.‛ Put in terms of our prevailing
monotheism, God is not the only one responsible for what takes place in our
world. Instead, God has ordained that human beings, made in the imago Dei and
1

thus endowed with rational intellect and freedom of choice, are to be cooperators
and co-creators with the Deity.6 Rather than being mere instruments for God’s
use in bringing creation to fulfillment, humans have been blessed (and perhaps
cursed; cf. Deuteronomy 11.26) with the responsibility of bringing about genuine
novelty in the world through their own freely chosen actions, whether for good
or ill.7 Providence is thus not an all-embracing Fate, but rather allows for a
genuinely contingent future, a ‚garden of forking paths‛ through which humans
may choose among alternative courses of action, for which choices they may be
held morally praiseworthy or blameworthy. Paradoxically, while the theistic
religious believer must hold that the divine plan will in the end be fulfilled, since
its author is the almighty, all-knowing and benevolent God, who has already
‘overcome the world’ (cf. John 16.33), its being so fulfilled is, in some real sense,
also up to the decisions and actions of God’s free creatures, namely us. This
apparent paradox is nicely captured in the oft-quoted maxim: Pray as though
everything depended on God. Work as though everything depended on you.
The question that has exercised philosophers, theologians, and even ordinary
believers through the ages is whether this apparent paradox is symptomatic of a
deeper incoherence in the classical theistic scheme. How can the world be ‚full of
providence,‛ that is, known to the divine mind and subject to the divine will in
even its smallest details,8 while yet having a contingent future, being an arena in
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which humans may freely and responsibly decide among alternative courses of
action.9 How can humans freely contribute to the course of history if that very
history is subject to the comprehensive providence of an absolutely sovereign
Deity, whose intentions cannot possibly be frustrated? Likewise, how could God,
in creating the world, have known that his designs would prevail if the free,
undetermined choices of human beings were to play a part (indeed a crucial
part) in their fulfillment?
I will argue in this essay that the classical theistic scheme, at least in the
foregoing respects, is not incoherent, so that the theistic believer is not irrational
in maintaining that the world is both full of providence while yet having a
contingent future, one in which humans can freely decide among genuine
alternatives. A very quick argument towards establishing this conclusion might
go something like this:
[A]

(1)
(2)

God is fully provident.
Humans are able to act freely.

(3)

God is fully provident and humans are able to act freely.

The justification for each premise is the same: the authority of classical theism, as
indicated by the quotes given at the outset.10 Wherefore, if one wants to count
oneself a classical theist, one had better accept these two premises.
Of course, from the standpoint of rational reflection, argument [A] counts for
nothing, and so the way of philosophy will involve the much longer route of
3

looking at various arguments for why (1) and (2) are not compatible and showing
that such arguments are unsuccessful. Central to my endeavor will be the
defense of a particular theory of divine providence first proposed in the 16th
century by the Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina, known as the theory of scientia
media (‚middle knowledge‛), or Molinism, in honor of its initial proponent.
However, my task will not involve merely a defense of Molinism, for I will argue
that Molina’s own efforts are to some extent vitiated. Instead, using Alfred
Freddoso’s helpful distinction between two questions within the problem of
God’s providential knowledge—viz. the question of how that knowledge comes
about (the ‚source question‛) and the question of reconciling that knowledge with
human freedom (the ‚reconciliation question‛) (Freddoso, 1988, p. 1)—I will
argue that Molinism is indeed the best answer to the source question, while
Ockhamism (so-called after the 14th century Franciscan William of Ockham)
represents an adequate answer to the reconciliation question. In addition to
defending these two theories against the most powerful criticisms, I will also
offer my own approach to dealing with a question that I believe has not been
adequately answered by the advocates of Molinism, viz. if God has middle
knowledge, how does such knowledge come about? What, in other words, is the
source of God’s middle knowledge?

4

The order of this essay will be to tackle the reconciliation question first, since
it seems to be the most natural starting point for reflection upon this issue. I will
then go on to argue that an answer to the reconciliation question is not sufficient
and that the source question must be answered as well. The end result, it is
hoped, will be to show that reason, unaided by faith, if it cannot go so far as to
affirm (1) and (2) of argument [A], can at least go as far as maintaining that there
is no rationally compelling argument against affirming them both.
By way of arriving at such arguments against the compatibility of (1) and (2),
we need in the first chapter to look at the two key notions involved, namely
providence and freedom, in order to see how conceptual conflicts seem to arise.
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CHAPTER 1
THE PROBLEM OF THEOLOGICAL DETERMINISM
1.1. Providence and Foreknowledge
As mentioned at the outset, the classical theist believes that we exist in a
world created and sustained by an intelligent and free Creator (as opposed to,
say, a world that emanates necessarily from an impersonal metaphysical
principle) in accordance with a universal plan or purpose or economy. God’s
directing the world toward the realization of this plan is called providence (quite
literally ‚looking out for‛). The classical understanding of God’s providence has
been described by Alfred Freddoso as follows:
As traditionally expounded, the doctrine of divine providence involves
the thesis that God, the divine artisan, freely and knowingly plans, orders,
and provides for all the effects that constitute His artifact, the created
universe with its entire history, and executes His chosen plan by playing
an active causal role sufficient to ensure its exact realization. Since God is
the perfect artisan, not even the most trivial details escape His
providential decrees. Thus, whatever occurs is properly said to be
specifically decreed by God; more precisely, each effect produced in the
created universe is either specifically and knowingly intended by Him
(providentia approbationis) or, in concession to creaturely defectiveness,
specifically and knowingly permitted by Him, only to then be ordered
toward some appropriate good (providentia concessionis) (Freddoso, 1988,
pp. 2-3).
Freddoso here describes what I will call the thesis of maximal divine providence:
(MDP) For any state of affairs p, if p obtains, then p’s obtaining is either
intended by God or permitted by God.1
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For example, Abraham’s act of faith (cf. Genesis 15.6), being a virtuous act, was
something the occurrence of which God intended, while David’s murder of
Uriah (cf. ii Samuel 11), being a vicious act, while not something intended by God,
was at least permitted by God, presumably because God knew a greater good
would come of it (say, David’s marriage to Bathsheba and the birth of Solomon).
One consequence of this maximal view that I want to focus on presently is
that it entails that God have complete knowledge of each and every event that
occurs in creation prior to its occurrence, which is to say that God must have
comprehensive foreknowledge.2 If God either intends or permits a certain state of
affairs to obtain, then he must as a result know that it will obtain before it
actually obtains. This, it seems to me, belongs to the very concepts of intention
and permission. It seems true in general that if S intends that p obtain or S
permits p to obtain, then S must have some epistemic attitude toward p’s
obtaining prior to its actually doing so. One cannot be presented with a fait
accompli and then intend that it happen or allow it to happen. One may intend,
perhaps, that it continue, or permit it to continue, but then its continuance is again
subsequent to one’s intention or permission. But the only ‚epistemic attitude‛
that may be appropriately ascribed to God is knowledge. Therefore, since (MDP)
holds that whatever happens is either intended or permitted by God, and since
God’s intending or permitting something to happen entails God’s knowing that it
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will happen before it actually does so, it follows that the thesis of maximal divine
providence also involves the thesis of maximal divine foreknowledge:
(MDF) For any state of affairs p and any time t, if p obtains at t, then God
knows at all times before t that p will obtain at t.3
Divine foreknowledge, therefore, is a consequence of the maximal view of
divine providence. If one wants to hold a traditional view of God’s governance of
the world, then one must also hold that God has complete foreknowledge of
what will happen in the world. If for some reason God’s knowledge cannot be
seen to extend to such futurabilia, then one’s understanding of God’s providence
must be modified and correspondingly weakened. Freddoso is thus surely right
to emphasize the close connection between divine foreknowledge and the
doctrine of divine providence.4
I must add a caveat to the foregoing conclusion. Notice that (MDF) refers to
God’s knowing something at all times. An important viewpoint to be found
among traditional theists, most notably St. Thomas Aquinas, holds that God
exists not in time but in timeless eternity, and so temporal predicates such as
knowing something at this or that time, or even at all times, may not be ascribed
to God. Instead, such theists will insist that (MDF) be reformulated along the
following lines:
(MDF*) For any state of affairs p and any time t, if p obtains at t, then
God eternally knows that p obtains at t.
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Notice that in (MDF*), any allusion to something’s being true of God at a time has
been removed and the tensed ‘p will obtain at t’ in (MDF) has been replaced with
the tenseless ‘p obtains at t’ in (MDF*), in accordance with the view that God
does not exist in time but in timeless eternity. I will have a great deal more to say
about this view in the next chapter, so let me just posit at this point that, with
respect to the problem of reconciling God’s providence and human freedom, it
matters not whether one favors (MDF) or (MDF*): the same problem arises for
both formulations.

1.2. Perfect Being Theology and Foreknowledge
Yet another consideration which points us toward the view that God has
comprehensive foreknowledge comes from the Anselmian idea that God is that
than which nothing greater can be conceived. A theology which takes this Anselmian
conception of the divine as its starting point is often called Perfect Being Theology,
and begins from the axiom that God is a supremely perfect being, a being who
possesses a maximal (and consistent) configuration of ‚great-making properties‛
(what in former times were often called ‚pure perfections‛). As Thomas Morris
tells us, ‘A great-making property is any property, or attribute, or characteristic, or
quality which it is intrinsically good to have, any property which endows its
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bearer with some measure of value, or greatness, or metaphysical stature,
regardless of external circumstances’ (Morris, 1991, p. 35).
Perfect Being Theology first stipulates that God has every such property:
(PBT)

If F is a great-making property, then God has F.

Of course, should it turn out that two great-making properties, say F and G, are
inconsistent, so that no one entity may possess both F and G, then the perfect
being theologian will have some work to do in sorting out whether God has F
and lacks G or vice versa. But taking (PBT) as a heuristic starting point, I think it
plausibly entails that God has comprehensive foreknowledge. For certainly
having complete foreknowledge gives one a certain ‚greatness‛ or ‚metaphysical
stature‛ that one would lack were one ignorant, either wholly or in part, of what
the future holds. So even apart from considerations of God’s providence, we
have good reason to think that God has maximal foreknowledge based simply
upon God’s maximal greatness.
Indeed, God’s maximal greatness seems to entail not only that he has
complete foreknowledge, but furthermore that he is completely and perfectly
omniscient. The theistic tradition is unanimous in maintaining God’s absolute and
essential cognitive perfection, so that there can be no truth of which God is not
aware. In the language of the tradition, ‚God is Truth,‛ which may be plausibly
interpreted as saying that for any proposition p, if p is true, then God knows that
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p is true. Since the converse obviously holds as well, we may say that p’s being
true is strictly equivalent to God’s knowing that p is true.5 Thus, if there are truths
about what will happen in the future, then the doctrine of divine omniscience
would require that God again be credited with foreknowledge.

1.3. The Libertarian Conception of Creaturely Freedom
As previously mentioned, the theistic tradition (along with almost everyone
else) maintains that humans are, in some sense or other, free creatures.6 But in
what sense? What does human freedom amount to? The sort of freedom we are
here concerned with is a rather narrow but nonetheless profound one, which St.
Augustine called liberum arbitrium or, as it is often translated, ‚free choice of the
will.‛ In other words, we want to know the conditions under which a particular
human choice or decision amounts to a free choice or decision, one for which the
person may be rightly considered morally responsible. For it is by his choices
that a person shows himself to be a genuine cooperator with God (or, perhaps, a
genuine adversary against God) in the work of creation as a whole and in the
work of his own personal destiny. So if one’s alignment with God or against God
is established by one’s choices,7 and if one is ultimately to be judged on the basis
of one’s alignment with or against God, then at least some of our choices must be
free choices, for which we may be rightly held morally accountable.
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The philosophical terrain concerning free will has been well-plowed indeed,
and it is well-known that there are alternative conceptions of human freedom
(Alston, 1985) in the above mentioned sense of free choice of the will. It will not
be my endeavor in this essay to adjudicate among them. Rather, it will be to
argue that the robust or ‚maximal‛ conception of divine providence previously
outlined is consistent with the most robust and ‚maximal‛ conception of human
freedom, that being the libertarian or incompatiblist conception. If maximal divine
providence is consistent with the libertarian understanding of human freedom,
then it is consistent with any understanding of human freedom, but not vice
versa. Why this is so becomes apparent when we observe with Lynne Rudder
Baker the difference between the libertarian and the contrary compatibilist
understandings of human freedom:
Let us say that an account of free will is libertarian if and only if it entails
that a condition of a person S’s having free will with respect to an action
(or choice) A is that A is not ultimately caused by factors outside of S’s
control. Let us say that an account of free will is compatibilist if and only if
it entails that a person S’s having free will with respect to an action (or
choice) A is compatible with A’s being caused ultimately by factors
outside of S’s control (Baker, 2003, p. 460).
Assume, therefore, that God providentially knows that S will choose to do A and,
furthermore, that S’s choice to do A is free in the libertarian sense. It then follows
that God’s foreknowledge of S’s choice to do A either (a) does not causally
contribute to S’s choice to do A or (b) is not a causal factor over which S has no
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control (which is to say that it is a causal factor over which S has control). In
either case, God’s foreknowledge of S’s choice to do A is consistent with S’s
choice being free in the compatibilist sense. For according to the latter sense, an
action (or choice), if it is caused ultimately by factors outside of the agent’s
control, can still be free, and so in this case we would have the following true
conditional: if S’s choice to do A is caused ultimately by God’s providential
knowledge that S would choose to do A, with such knowledge being outside of
S’s control, then S’s choice can still be free. The conditional would be true because
(again, assuming libertarianism) the antecedent would be false: S’s choice is
either not caused by God’s providential knowledge or such knowledge is a
causal factor over which S has control. In short, the libertarian account of human
freedom places more conditions on free choice than does the compatibilist
account. It thus follows that if an action or choice that is foreknown by God can
still be free in the libertarian sense, then a fortiori it can still be free in the
compatibilist sense. That the converse—viz. that God’s providential
foreknowledge is consistent with human freedom in the libertarian sense if it is
consistent with human freedom in the compatibilist sense—does not hold
should, I think, be evident.
So it seems worth the theologian’s while to attempt a reconciliation between
the maximal views both of divine providence and of human freedom before
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resorting to a weakening of one’s position on either front. It so happens that I
think the maximal view of human freedom, viz. the libertarian conception, is the
correct one, and so aside from being an interesting academic exercise in trying to
reconcile to apparently conflicting beliefs, I think it is incumbent upon the theist
to do so. But before we discuss this reconciliation, we must first discuss in
greater depth the libertarian conception and then see why it appears to conflict
with divine providence.
Luis de Molina, to whose work we shall be referring a great deal more and
who will indeed emerge as the hero of this essay, describes the libertarian notion
of freedom in this way:
But freedom can be understood in another way, insofar as it is opposed to
necessity. In this sense that agent is called free which, with all the
prerequisites for acting posited, is able to act and is able not to act, or is
able to do one thing in such a way that it is also able to do some contrary
thing (Freddoso, 1988, pp. 24-25).
The notion of freedom that Molina here gives expression to is closely allied to the
so-called ‚Principle of Alternative Possibilities‛ (PAP), a principle with which, as
the passage just quoted indicates, he would surely agree:
(PAP)

An agent S does an action A at time t freely only if S could have
done something other than A at t.

What is more, Molina thinks that S’s ability to do A at t or not do A at t must both
be present in identical causal circumstances. He remarks:
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< a given future state of affairs is called contingent in a second sense,
because it rules out not only the necessity that has its source in the natures
of the terms, but also the fatalistic and extrinsic necessity that results from
the arrangement of causes. So given this universe of things which we see
around us and given that all the causes are arranged in just the way that
they are now in fact arranged, such a state of affairs is still indifferent as to
whether it is or is not going to obtain by virtue of the same causes through
which it ordinarily obtains (Molina, 1988, pp. 86-87).
According to Molina, the causes through which such contingent states of affairs
ordinarily obtain are the free choices of human agents. It is human freedom that
introduces into the created order these sorts of radically contingent states of
affairs which, given the very same ‚arrangement of causes,‛ can still either
obtain or fail to obtain. A free human action, in other words, is one for which
there are no antecedent causal circumstances (involving causes other than the
agent himself) sufficient for the action’s being performed. Hence the label
incompatibilist, as such a view has it that an action’s being performed freely is
incompatible with its being causally determined. In other words, there can be no
such thing as a free action the occurrence of which logically follows from the
prior state of the world together with the laws of nature, which is to say that
freedom and determinism are incompatible.
Although Molina’s own formulation of libertarian freedom is quite
perspicuous as it stands, we might, for the sake of fixing ideas, employ the
apparatus of possible worlds to understand it as follows:
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(LF)

An agent S freely does A at t in w only if (i) S does A at t in w, and
(ii) for some world w*, w* shares the same causal history as w up to
t, and (iii) S refrains from doing A at t in w*.

It will be convenient for my purposes to introduce the concept of an ‚accessible‛
world. I owe this notion to Fred Feldman, who says the following:
Although others have used the term to express other relations, I use
‘accessible’ to express a relation that holds among a person, a time, and
two possible worlds. That is, a world, w', will be said to be accessible to an
agent, s, at a time, t, from a world, w.< Roughly, a world is accessible to a
person at a time if and only if it is still possible, at that time, for the person
so see to it that the world occurs, or is actual.
In a most simple case, accessibility is relatively easy to understand.
Suppose s is the only person in the world, and suppose his only remaining
interesting choice as of some time, t, is a choice between some state of
affairs, p, and its negation. Suppose all the other facts are already settled,
as far as possible. Now we can consider two possible worlds, quite alike
up to t, and pretty much alike after t. They differ in that in one of them, p
occurs, whereas in the other, p occurs.<
Since it is still up to s to determine whether p will occur or not, we can
say that at least one possible world in which p occurs is accessible to s at t,
and at least one possible world in which p occurs is also accessible to s at
t.< If some state of affairs, q, is impossible for s as of t, then no q-world is
accessible to s at t (Feldman, 1986, pp. 16-17).
So a world w is accessible to an agent S at a time t iff S can ‚see to it‛ or can
intentionally bring it about at t that w is actual. Not all possible worlds are
accessible, of course. The set of accessible worlds is a proper subset of the set of
all possible worlds. I have no access to a world in which I move faster than the
speed of light, even though such a world is logically possible. In other words, it’s
true in all accessible worlds that I move slower than the speed of light. Thus with
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the concept of accessibility we can define a certain restricted kind of necessity,
that of truth in all accessible worlds. I will make heavy use of this notion later on.
We can therefore restate (LF) by talking about freedom in terms of accessible
worlds and then giving a libertarian criterion on which worlds are accessible, as
follows:
(FA) An agent S freely does A at t in w only if (i) S does A at t in w, and
(ii) for some world w*, S has access from w to w* at t, and (iii) S
refrains from doing A at t in w*.
(LA) S has access from w to w* at t only if w* shares the same causal
history as w up to t.
This is a robust, ‚maximal‛ conception of freedom indeed. It has it that a
necessary condition for one’s doing something freely is that the world could
have been exactly the way it actually was in all causal respects up to the very
moment of one’s action, and yet one could have done something else instead.
That is to say, the antecedent causal circumstances do not determine that an
agent perform one action as opposed to another. One has alternative possibilities
that branch off from the same past history of the world. This sense of freedom
certainly seems sufficient to account for moral responsibility, for if I perform
some action A freely, then there is no cause other than myself which accounts for
the fact that I did A, as the activity of all causes other than myself is consistent
both with my doing A and with my not doing A.
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1.4. Formulating the Argument for Theological Determinism
Having come to some preliminary understanding of the notions of divine
providence (as involving divine foreknowledge) and human freedom, it remains
to see how putting these two notions together seems to lead to a problem,
namely that of theological determinism. Determinism in general is the view
according to which everything that happens must happen or is determined to
happen. Underneath the umbrella of determinism we may distinguish between
three kinds, depending on the reason given for why everything that happens
must happen, or in what way things are determined to occur as they do.
According to logical determinism, it’s merely being true that something will
happen is sufficient for it’s being necessary that it will happen. In other words, if
it is true that some event will occur, then that event is thereby determined to
occur, for it’s impossible for it to be true that an event will occur and yet that event
not occur. So for the logical determinist, an event is determined to occur if it is
true that it will occur.
According to causal determinism, if we take a complete description of the
world at a given time (what is often called a ‚time slice‛ of the world or a state of
the world at a time), that state of the world together with the laws of nature entail
the state of the world at any other time. Thus, any event that occurs is causally
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necessitated; that event must occur, given the way the world was at a given time
and given the way the laws of nature ‚connect‛ one event with another.
According to theological determinism, any event the occurrence of which is
foreknown by God is determined to occur. Given that every event is foreknown by
God, it follows that every event is determined to occur. I will have more to say
about logical and causal determinism later on, so for now I will concentrate on
laying out the case for theological determinism. That there is a genuine problem
here was noted at least as far back as the time of St. Augustine who, writing in
book III of his dialogue On Free Choice of the Will, expressed the problem through
the mouth of his interlocutor Evodius:
EVODIUS: I very much wonder how God can have foreknowledge of
everything in the future, and yet we do not sin by necessity. It would be
an irreligious and completely insane attack on God’s foreknowledge to
say that some thing could happen otherwise than as God foreknew. So
suppose that God foreknew that the first human being was going to sin.<
[S]ince God foreknew that he was going to sin, his sin necessarily had to
happen. How, then, is the will free when such inescapable necessity is
found in it?
AUGUSTINE: You have knocked powerfully on the door of God’s mercy;
may it be present and open the door to those who knock (Augustine, 1993,
p. 73).
The argument as Evodius states it demands careful and pious scrutiny. It may, I
think, be seen as beginning with the following enthymeme:
[A]

(1)

God foreknew Adam’s sin.

(2)

Adam’s sin necessarily happened,
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wherein the conclusion predicates an absolute de re necessity of Adam’s sin;8
Adam’s sin, in other words, was an event that neither Adam nor anyone else
could have avoided. Every possible world is a world in which Adam sins, in
which case Adam’s sin could not have been a free action. For according to LF, an
action is free only if there is at least one possible world that is causally identical
to the actual world up to the time of the action and in which the action is not
performed. If there simply is no possible world in which Adam does not sin, then
Adam cannot be held to have sinned freely (and so cannot really be said to have
sinned at all).
Being enthymematic, the suppressed major premise must be the universal
claim that whatever God foreknows necessarily happens, yielding the following
argument:
[B]

(3)
(1)

Whatever God foreknows necessarily happens.
God foreknew Adam’s sin.

(2)

Adam’s sin necessarily happened.

On its face it seems to be a valid argument, but is it sound?
The minor premise (1) seems unproblematic, at least on the assumption that
God is fully omniscient and that the future is something that can be known as
future.9 If, therefore, (3) can be justified, we then end up with the unpalatable
deterministic conclusion that all events that occur do so necessarily, as Adam’s
sin is a thoroughly arbitrary event for which any actual event whatsoever may be
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substituted. The world could not have gone otherwise than how it has in fact
gone, for there are no possible worlds in which an event that occurs in the actual
world does not occur.
Although Augustine took a different approach in his reply to Evodius, I will
note with St. Thomas Aquinas that (3) is in fact ambiguous, and depending on
how we resolve the ambiguity we end up with an argument that is either invalid
or unsound. As St. Thomas points out,
Hence also this proposition, Everything known by God must necessarily be, is
usually distinguished, for it may refer to the thing or to the saying [quia
potest esse de re vel de dicto]. If it refers to the thing it is divided and false;
for the sense is, Everything which God knows is necessary. If understood of
the saying, it is composite and true, for the sense is, This proposition, ‘that
which is known by God is’ is necessary (Summa Theologiae [=ST] IaIæ, 14, 13,
ad. 3).10
In other words, on the de re reading, the ‚scope‛ of the necessity operator is
restricted to the predicate-term, and so we may parse (3) in the de re mode as
(3.1)

Whatever God foreknows necessarily-happens.

But there’s no good reason to think that (3.1) is true, as it makes the implausible
claim that events that fall within the purview of God’s foreknowledge are in and
of themselves characterized by a kind of necessity. It’s to say that because, as a
matter of fact (in the actual world), God knows that something will be the case, it
therefore will, as a matter of necessity (in all possible worlds), be the case. But this
doesn’t seem true. To use an example from Christian theology, God knows as a
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matter of fact (in the actual world) that Christ will return. Does it therefore
follow that Christ returns in all possible worlds, even in those worlds in which
God chooses not to create a cosmos at all? So if (3) is understood in the sense of
(3.1) it is false and so argument [B] is unsound.
On the other hand, parsed in the de dicto mode, (3) reads as
(3.2)

Necessarily, whatever God foreknows happens,

wherein the necessity operator governs the entire dictum or proposition. This is
clearly the correct reading of (3), expressing as it does the necessary connection
between God’s foreknowing something and that thing’s happening. In other
words, there’s no possible world in which God foreknows something and yet
that thing fails to happen. However, if (3) is understood in the sense of (3.2),
giving us a true premise, the resulting argument,
[C]

(3.2)
(1)
(2)

Necessarily, whatever God foreknows happens.
God foreknew Adam’s sin.
Adam’s sin necessarily happened.

is easily shown to be invalid, to wit:
Necessarily, whatever is square is four-sided.
This table is square.
This table is necessarily four-sided.
The fallacy in Evodius’s argument is perhaps brought out even more clearly if
we move from the categorical mode to the hypothetical mode. (3) is equivalent to
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the conditional
(4)

If God foreknows event e, then e necessarily happens,

where the necessity expressed therein is the necessity of the consequent. (4) says
that God’s having foreknown that e was going to happen is, in and of itself,
sufficient for the necessity of the consequent, that it, for e’s necessary occurrence.
But this is clearly implausible. Just because God knew in the actual world that e
was going to happen, that alone gives us no reason to think that e must therefore
occur in all possible worlds. The more plausible claim would be
(5)

Necessarily, if God foreknows event e, then e happens,

where the necessity is this time the necessity of the consequence or of the
conditional as a whole, instead of just the consequent of the conditional. With
only (5) at our disposal, we are unable to validly infer e’s necessary occurrence, for
God’s having foreknown that e was going to occur does not, prima facie, seem
necessary; God could have known the opposite. A necessary conclusion cannot
be validly inferred on the basis of a conditional, even a necessary conditional,
with a contingent antecedent; that is to say, the following inference is invalid:
[D]

(5)
(1)

Necessarily, if God foreknows event e, then e happens.
God foreknew Adam’s sin.

(2)

Adam’s sin necessarily happened.

Thus, we see that Evodius’s argument fails to establish the necessary occurrence
of an event on the basis of God’s foreknowledge of that event.
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1.5. Theological Determinism and the Fixity of the Past
As Linda Zagzebski has remarked (Zagzebski, 1991, p. 9), if the problem of
theological determinism could be resolved in terms of the simple distinctions
between de re and de dicto necessity or between necessity of the consequent and
necessity of the consequence discussed above, then there would hardly be an issue
worth mentioning. Furthermore, I don’t believe that Evodius’s argument, in
either form, really gets at the heart of the foreknowledge problem. Evodius
seems to see God’s infallibility as the main concern: because God cannot possibly
be mistaken, what he knows will happen, must happen. But the real issue would
instead seem to be the fact that God’s infallible knowledge is secured before the
events themselves happen. It is precisely because it is infallible foreknowledge
that the issue of fatalism arises. How could Adam have had the ability not to sin
given that God already knew from all eternity that he was going to sin? That, in a
nutshell, is the problem. Let's crack open the nutshell and examine its contents.
This stronger argument that will be the focus of the remainder of this chapter
was discussed by St. Thomas Aquinas as the second objection to the thesis that
God has knowledge of future contingents and was in like manner taken up again
by Molina in the Concordia. Here is Molina’s formulation of the argument:
[I]f a conditional is true and its antecedent is absolutely necessary, then its
consequent is likewise absolutely necessary; otherwise, in a valid
consequence the antecedent would be true and the consequent false—
which is in no way to be admitted. But the conditional ‘If God knew that
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this was going to be, then it will so happen’ is true, or else God’s
knowledge would be false; and the antecedent is absolutely necessary,
both because it is eternal and because it is past-tense and there is no
power over the past. Therefore, the consequent will be absolutely
necessary as well, and hence no future thing foreknown by God will be
contingent (Molina, 1988, pp. 164-65).
What Molina means here by ‘conditional’ is not the material conditional
symbolized by the ‘ ’ of modern logic, but rather what we would call a strict
conditional or a necessary implication:  (

). Now if the antecedent

is itself

‚absolutely necessary‛ (as opposed to being necessary ex suppositione or merely a
necessary consequence of a given hypothesis), so that we have ˹ ˺, then the
consequent

is itself absolutely necessary, so that we have ˹ ˺ as well. Thus

far we have nothing more remarkable than the axiom of the weakest system of
modal logic, the so-called ‚system K‛ (Hughes & Cresswell, 1996, pp. 24f.).
But let us return to the second formulation (albeit slightly revised) of
Evodius’s argument against the compatibility of God’s foreknowledge and
future contingency. There we have the strict conditional
(6)

 (God foreknew that Adam was going to sin
sin).

Adam was going to

What is claimed in the argument under consideration is that the antecedent of
(6), that God foreknew that Adam was going to sin, is itself necessary in some
sense. Not, to be sure, in the same sense in which (6) itself is necessary, for (6) is
metaphysically necessary: there is no metaphysically possible world in which the
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antecedent of (6) is true and the consequent of (6) is false. Rather,
(7)

God foreknew that Adam was going to sin

is understood to be necessary ‘because it is past-tense and there is no power over
the past.’ The notion of not having power over the past is absolutely crucial here.
The insight, expressed in terms of our ‚accessible worlds‛ idiom, is that no one
has access, as of a given time t, to a world that has a past different from the actual
past. For example, given that Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 BC, no one
thereafter has access to a world in which Caesar did not cross the Rubicon in 49
BC. Granted that it’s not metaphysically necessary that Caesar cross the Rubicon in
49 BC, insofar as there are worlds in which he does not do so (say, those worlds
in which he doesn’t exist), but those worlds cease to be accessible as soon as he
actually does so.
So the kind of necessity were talking about here is necessity as of a time, which
we may symbolize by ˹t ˺ which says that

is true in all possible worlds that

are accessible as of t (as distinguished from ˹ ˺, which says that

is true in all

possible worlds tout court). Medieval philosophers called this ‚necessity per
accidens‛ or ‚accidental necessity‛ since it is a kind of necessity that characterizes
a proposition as a result of the passage of time. The proposition in a sense
‚becomes‛ necessary after a certain time, in as much as a certain set of possible
worlds becomes inaccessible after that time. So again, prior to 49 BC, the
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proposition Caesar crosses the Rubicon in 49 BC is not necessary per accidens
because Caesar may or may not do so; there are worlds in which he does not
cross the Rubicon that are, as of then, still accessible to him. But if t is any time
after 49 BC, then
(8)

t (Caesar crosses the Rubicon in 49 BC)

is true, because no agent (including God) has access as of t to any world in which
Caesar does not cross the Rubicon in 49 BC, which is before t. We can enshrine all
this in the form of a principle, that of the Fixity of the Past:
(FP)

If p obtains at t, then for any time t* after t, t* p,

which in effect says that there is no accessible world having a past that differs
from the actual past. Any world accessible to you now will have a past history
identical to that of the actual world.
Returning to our argument, since the state of affairs God foreknows that Adam
will sin obtains at all times prior to Adam’s sin. So if t is any such time, it follows
from (FP) that
(7.1)

t (God foreknew that Adam was going to sin),

again because God is eternal (understood here in the sense of ‘existing at all
times’) and omniscient: since Adam sinned, it was always true beforehand that
he was going to sin, and hence God always knew beforehand that he was going
to sin. We can think of (7.1) as saying that (7) is true in all worlds that are
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accessible (to anyone) as of t. No one can, as of t, ‚see to it‛ that a world obtains
in which (7) is not true. Putting (6) and (7.1) together yields the following
argument:
[E]

(6)
(7.1)
(9)

 (God foreknew that Adam was going to sin Adam was going
to sin).
t (God foreknew that Adam was going to sin).
t (Adam was going to sin).

The conclusion has it that the same sort of necessity that attaches to God’s
knowledge by virtue of its being past also attaches to Adam’s sin by virtue of its
being a necessary consequence of God’s knowledge. In the language of accessible
worlds, (9) tells us that ‘Adam was going to sin’ is true in all worlds that are
accessible (to anyone) as of t, and so no one (including Adam) can, as of t, see to
it that a world obtains in which ‘Adam was going to sin’ is not true. But as
already stipulated, t is any time up to and including the time of Adam’s sin. So at
the time of Adam’s sin, Adam could not have seen to it that a world obtains in
which ‘Adam was going to sin’ was not true, which is to say that Adam could
not have not sinned. It then follows from (LF) that Adam was not free in sinning.

1.6. The Saga of Smith the Sniper
I want to put all the foregoing together into a simple story in order to have a
fixed reference point for the remainder of this essay. I will then formulate the
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argument for theological determinism in such a way as to make each step of the
argument explicit. Let’s say that Smith is a hit-man who’s been hired out to
knock off some pesky town councilman, Jones, who constantly votes against
awarding contracts to a certain family-owned sanitation company. So Smith sets
himself up in an empty third-floor apartment across the street from Jones’s office,
sniper rifle at the ready for when Jones leaves his office at 5pm and walks to his
car parked down the street. The clock strikes 5pm, Jones walks out, Smith pulls
the trigger, and soon enough the bosses have their new contract.
We assume that Smith is morally responsible for the murder he committed.
But let’s say that, for whatever reason, Smith couldn’t have done anything but
pull the trigger and kill Jones. There was just nothing else he could have done,
not if he wanted to get paid for the job, not if he wanted to move up the hit-man ranks,
not because of any condition whatsoever. Smith simply had no other options; his
only ‚choice,‛ if you can call it such, was to shoot Jones. For some reason, that
was the only ‚option‛ available to him. There was no possible world ‚accessible‛
to Jones at 5pm in which he doesn’t kill Jones. I should think that if this
admittedly bizarre situation were to obtain, then we would have to say that
Smith wasn’t really responsible for what he did. He simply had no other choice.
Having a choice, after all, seems to imply that there are other alternative courses of
action that can be taken. If Smith could have sat on his hands, intentionally
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missed, shot himself instead, or whatever, then we could rightly hold him
morally responsible for the murder, because he had the ability to do something
other than what he actually did; he had alternative possible courses of action,
other than the murderous one he actually took. As Bertrand Russell once wrote
(Russell, 1957, p. 40), we don’t hold a car responsible for not running when its
gas tank is empty; it just can’t run when its tank is empty. It has no ‚choice‛ but
to sit there and do nothing. Likewise, we can’t hold someone morally responsible
for doing something if they weren’t free to do anything else, if what they did was
the only possible thing they could have done.
All of this is simply an intuitive re-presentation of what was earlier stated in
our discussion of freedom in terms of accessible worlds. Moral responsibility
requires freedom of choice, and freedom of choice requires that we have genuine
alternatives open to us; that is to say, accessible worlds in which we do otherwise
than what we actually do. But it seems that God’s being omniscient, and hence
prescient (i.e., possessed of foreknowledge) rules out our ever having such
alternative possibilities open to us. For if Smith murdered Jones and God is
omniscient, then it seems that Smith had to kill Jones, that he had no real choice
in the matter. Likewise, if Smith is going to kill Jones and God is omniscient, then
it seems that Smith must kill Jones. He can’t do anything else, according to the
following argument.
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Suppose Smith will kill Jones at 5pm tomorrow. Then there’s a true
proposition to that effect, viz. ‘Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm.’ But God,
being omniscient, knows all true propositions, so it follows that God knows that
Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm. Furthermore, God isn’t just omniscient
today; he was omniscient yesterday, yesteryear, yester-millennium, and so on. In
fact, since God is eternal (understood here in the sense of existing at all times)
he’s eternally omniscient, so whatever he knows now, he has always known, as
far back into the past as you care to go. So God has always known that Smith will
kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm, but let’s pick an arbitrary time and say that 1,000
years ago, God knew that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow. In other words, there’s
a certain attribute, knowing that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm, that God had
1,000 years ago.
But what God was like 1,000 years ago is not something that anyone, even
God, can now do anything about. The past is over and done with; it’s fixed,
immutable, and outside of anyone’s control. There are no ‚accessible worlds‛
with past histories that differ from the actual past. So the fact that God knew
1,000 years ago that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow is a fact that’s fixed,
immutable, and outside of anyone’s control. There’s nothing that anyone,
including Smith, can ever do about it. There’s no world accessible to Smith in
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which God didn’t already know 1,000 years ago that he (Smith) will kill Jones
tomorrow at 5pm.
Moreover, God’s having known 1,000 years ago that Smith will kill Jones
tomorrow at 5pm entails that Smith will indeed kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm. So
there’s no accessible world (and, a fortiori, no world accessible to Smith) in which
Smith does not kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm. Therefore, in not having any genuine
alternatives Smith is not free, according to (LF) and hence he is not morally
responsible, in killing Jones tomorrow at 5pm.
Set out schematically, the argument for theological determinism (hereafter
‚ATD‛) goes something like this:
[ATD] (1)

Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm [assumption].

(2)

God knew 1,000 years ago that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at
5pm [from (1) and God’s omniscience+.

(3)

No one can do anything about what things were like 1,000 years
ago [Fixity of the Past].

(4)

No one can do anything about the fact that God knew 1,000 years
ago that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm [from (3) and (2)].

(5)

God’s having known 1,000 years ago that Smith will kill Jones
tomorrow at 5pm entails that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm
[from the definition of knowledge].

(6)

No one can do anything about the fact that Smith will kill Jones
tomorrow at 5pm [from (5) and (4)].

(7)

Smith can do nothing about the fact that he will kill Jones
tomorrow at 5pm [from (6)].
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(8)

Therefore, Smith is not free in killing Jones tomorrow at 5pm [from
(7) and (LF)].

To bring out the underlying formal structure: let ‘p’ be ‘Smith will kill Jones
tomorrow at 5pm’, ‘Gt*p’ be ‘God knew at t* that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow
at 5pm’, where t* is 1,000 years ago, let t be any time after t*, and let ‘t p’ be
read ‘p is true in all worlds accessible at t ’:
[ATD*] (1.1)
(2.1)
(4.1)
(5.1)
(6.1)

p
:. Gt*p
:. t Gt*p
 (Gt*p p)
:. t p

[Assumption]
*From (10.1) and God’s omniscience]
[From (11.1) and (FP)]
[From the definition of knowledge]
[From (13.1) and (14.1)]

From (6.1) it follows that Smith has no access at t (which, being any time after
1,000 years ago, includes tomorrow at 5pm) to a world in which he doesn’t kill
Jones, and hence he is not free in doing so.
Here we can clearly see that there is no straightforward modal fallacy as in
the first two arguments discussed earlier. Furthermore, I think the argument as
I’ve presented it avoids any entanglements concerning the so-called ‚Transfer
Principle‛ which has been much discussed since its use by Peter Van Inwagen in
his An Essay on Free Will (Van Inwagen, 1983, pp. 93-94). There he what he calls
the ‚Consequence Argument‛ against the compatibility of human freedom, not
with divine foreknowledge, but with causal determinism, wherein he invokes the
following rule of inference: Given that (a) p is the case and no one has, or ever had, a
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choice about whether p is the case, and (b) p entails q, one may infer that q is the case and
no one has, or ever had, a choice about whether q is the case.11
Looking at (4.1)-(6.1), one can see that something like Van Inwagen’s Transfer
Principle is at work. However, the questions that have been raised about whether
Van Inwagen’s principle is valid should find no purchase against the inference
involved in ATD, framed as it is in terms of accessible worlds.12 (4.1) has it that a
certain proposition, Gt*p, is true in a subset of possible worlds, those that are
accessible as of t. (5.1) has it that any possible world whatsoever in which Gt*p is
true is one in which p is true. Hence, we infer (6.1), which has it that p also is true
in the set of all worlds accessible as of t. Whether this is a sound inference is what
will be discussed henceforth, but that it is a valid inference should, I think, be
without question.
Now, we can of course replace Smith and his killing Jones tomorrow at 5pm
with anyone else and with any other action done at any other time and we will
get a similar conclusion. So it seems that nothing that anyone does is done freely if
God is omniscient. Since God’s being omniscient, and therefore possessed of
foreknowledge, is a necessary condition of his being maximally provident, then it
seems, on the basis of this argument, that the traditional understanding of divine
providence is inconsistent with our belief that we are morally responsible agents.
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CHAPTER 2
HOW NOT TO RESPOND TO ATD
2.1. Open Theism
Numerous rejoinders have been offered to the Argument for Theological
Determinism (ATD) presented in the previous chapter. I will go through several
of them in turn, showing why I think each is inadequate, and in the next chapter
I will discuss the one I think is adequate and defend it against objections.
To begin with, one may simply grant that ATD is sound and therefore give
up either on libertarianism or on divine foreknowledge. The former alternative
actually has an impressive pedigree and is characteristic of the Augustinian
tradition within Christian theism. Lynne Rudder Baker has argued (2003) that
this tradition has been under-represented in the recent literature on the
foreknowledge problem, wherein most discussants have tended to assume that
libertarianism is the default conception of human freedom for theists (Baker,
2003, p. 460). Since I have already mentioned the compatibilist alternative in the
previous chapter, I will say no more about it other than to repeat that the project
of this essay is to attempt a reconciliation of libertarian freedom with
comprehensive divine providence. Should that project fail, then the compatibilist
view may warrant reconsideration.
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The second reply to ATD, that of giving up on divine foreknowledge, was
simply unheard of until relatively recently in the discussion, but it has been
proposed on the basis of both biblical as well as philosophical reflection by the
school of Open Theism. The name seems a bit paradoxical, for according to the
open theist, the future is actually closed to God’s (or anyone else’s) knowledge,
but the open theist sees this as a necessary condition for the future to remain
open to alternative possibilities. One of the foremost exponents of Open Theism,
William Hasker, says,
< we would affirm God’s comprehensive and exact knowledge of the
possibilities of the future—and < of the gradually changing likelihood of
each of the possibilities’ being realized. And as the probability of a
choice’s being made in a certain way gradually increases toward certainty,
God knows that also; often, no doubt, before the agent herself is aware of
it (Hasker, 1989, p. 189).
But when it comes to definite and infallible knowledge of future contingent events,
in particular human choices and actions that are free in the libertarian sense
(Hasker is himself a libertarian), Hasker denies that God can have any such
knowledge. As a result, God is to be seen as a ‚risk-taking‛ God (Hasker, 1989, p.
197) who, in creating the world with free creatures, cannot be certain that history
will proceed exactly in accordance with the divine plan. Events may occur that
God did not foresee precisely because he cannot foresee them. He can only know
that such events might or might not occur and with what probability they are
likely to occur or not occur.
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The classical theist will instinctively recoil at this apparent repudiation of the
doctrine of divine omniscience. However, on this point Hasker has a viable reply.
Just as the doctrine of divine omnipotence cannot be understood to imply that God
can do anything whatsoever, but instead that God can do anything that it is
logically possible for him to do,1 so too, Hasker argues, the doctrine of divine
omniscience ought to be similarly qualified. He proposes the following definition
of omniscience:
God is omniscient =df It is impossible that God should at any time believe
what is false, or fail to know any true proposition such that his knowing
that proposition at that time is logically possible (Hasker, 1989, p. 187).
Now, according to Hasker, it is logically impossible for God to know the future
actions of his creatures on the assumption (which, again, Hasker accepts) that
those actions are free in the libertarian sense. Interestingly enough, Hasker’s
argument for the logical impossibility of God’s knowing future contingents is
nothing other than ATD, coupled with his purported refutation of the various
responses that have been put forward to ATD.
At this point, I can only emphasize that Hasker’s Open Theism represents a
radical break from traditional philosophical theology. As already mentioned, I
know of no one among the classical or medieval auctoritates who seriously
considered the view that God may lack infallible and comprehensive knowledge
of the contingent future. This, of course, is not a knock-down argument but it
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does suggest that Open Theism ought to be only a last, desperate move that
should be embraced only if it is conclusively shown that the traditional view of
providence is untenable. The main effort of this essay, of course, is to defend the
traditional view as a quite tenable one, and will partly involve showing that
Hasker has failed to demonstrate the inadequacy of all responses to ATD,
namely the Ockhamist and Molinist responses.
Furthermore, the extent to which Open Theism parts ways with Classical
Theism does, I think, count against it, for not only does it weaken the doctrine of
divine providence but also strikes at the traditional conception of the divine
nature itself. Open Theism effectively abandons the divine attributes of
eternality, immutability and aseity, and instead immerses God within the
temporal flux of the created order, so that God is constantly coming to know
what he previously did not know and therefore constantly undergoing change as
the world changes. It seems to me that we would no longer be talking about the
One God but instead simply one god, not all that different, metaphysically
speaking, from the gods of Olympus. Such a God is a far cry from the God of
Classical Theism, who is understood to be completely sovereign, thoroughly
perfect and hence changeless (because requiring no change and having no
potentiality thereto) and dependent upon nothing outside of the divine nature
itself, not even for knowledge of things other than himself.

38

Now, one may think, ‘So much the worse for the God of Classical Theism.
Why bother with such a God anyway?’ Well, there are many reasons, most of
which I can’t go into at present. But suffice it to say, again, that the main
motivation behind Open Theism is the claim that genuine human freedom and a
contingent future are incompatible with the existence of God as conceived by
classical theism; the very argument, that is, that we’re grappling with. So if one
can show that such incompatibility is more apparent than real, then a major
thesis upholding the open theist’s doctrine will have been undercut.

2.2. The Frankfurtian Objection to (PAP)
Let us now move on to consider some proposed rebuttals of ATD. One reply
has it that the inferences from (1) through (7) are just fine, but that the last step
from (7) to (8) is where the argument breaks down. The inference from (7) to (8)
is, of course, enthymematic, involving as it does the assumption that
(9)

No agent S is free in doing A at t who can do nothing about the fact
that S does A at t.

This notion of being able to do nothing about a given state of affairs is fairly vague,
so we’ll need to get a bit clearer about it before we can appreciate the force of the
reply we’re currently considering. Fortunately, we already went a good distance
toward doing so in the foregoing discussion, where it was mentioned several
times over that freedom requires other possible choices or alternative possible courses
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of action. So when I say that Smith can do nothing about the fact that he will do A,
I mean that Smith has no course of action open to him other than doing A; he
can’t do anything else but A; his options are limited to one: doing A. What (9)
says is that no agent who finds himself in such a situation is free. It is, in other
words, simply a re-statement of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP)
which was mentioned in the previous chapter:
(PAP)

An agent S does an action A at time t freely only if S could have
done something other than A at t.

I think (PAP) is true, and intuitively so, but it has not gone unchallenged. Harry
Frankfurt has offered a well-known and impressive purported counterexample to
(PAP) (Frankfurt, 1969), arguing that the ‚ability to do otherwise‛ or having
alternative possibilities is not a necessary condition for an action’s being
performed freely. One may do something freely even though one could have
done nothing else, or so Frankfurt claims. Furthermore, and apropos of our topic,
Linda Zagzebski has claimed that Frankfurt’s counterexample to (PAP) offers a
way around the problem of theological determinism. She says,
If [Frankfurt] is right, it has some interesting implications for the
foreknowledge problem. First, it shows that even if God’s foreknowledge
is a condition obtaining at the time of my choice that is incompatible with
my choosing otherwise, this fact is not sufficient to show that I do not
have free will in a sense that is incompatible with determinism
(Zagzebski, 1991, p. 156).
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The last point is crucial. Frankfurt’s case is not any kind of argument for
compatibilism (again, the view that an action can be free despite being
necessitated by antecedent causal conditions). Rather, it purports to show that an
action can be free in a very robust sense, such that the agent alone is the primary
cause of his or her action, despite the fact that she can do nothing other than that
action. So even if God’s knowing that Smith will kill Jones rules out the
possibility of Smith doing otherwise, Smith may still be free in doing so, if
Frankfurt is correct.
What follows is in all essentials Frankfurt’s case, albeit adapted to our current
story of Smith and Jones. Imagine that the bosses that hired Smith are far more
sinister than your garden variety, small-time mobsters. They actually comprise a
circle of evil geniuses who have massive amounts of complex and powerful
technology at their disposal (why they’re so concerned with getting contracts for
local garbage collection routes is anyone’s guess). Instead of risking that Smith
might have a crisis of conscience at the moment he’s supposed to eliminate Jones
and thus failing to do what they hired him to do, they’ve had a device implanted
in Smith’s brain that will allow them a certain degree of control over the
situation. It functions as follows: if Smith goes about his business as he’s
supposed to and successfully kills Jones, then things are fine as far as the bosses
are concerned. The device does nothing, and it’s as if it isn’t even there.
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However, if Smith at any point shows the slightest inclination that he may drop
the ball and let Jones live, if at the last moment he pulls his finger off the trigger,
then the device in Smith’s brain kicks into operation, manipulates his brain in the
appropriate ways and makes him pull the trigger and kill Jones.
Now let us suppose that things go exactly as described previously. Smith sets
up his gear in the empty third floor apartment, waits patiently, cold as ice with
ne’er a pang of guilt in sight, for Jones to leave his office at 5pm, and finally does
what the bosses hired him to do. Is there anything to make us think that Smith
wasn’t free, and hence morally responsible, in committing this murder, even
though he couldn’t have done otherwise? After all, every move that Smith made,
from taking the job to finishing it, was initiated by him. He was acting under no
external compulsion. There were no causal factors other than Smith himself that
brought about his murdering Jones. It seems that he was entirely responsible for
his action, and so entirely free, even though he couldn’t have acted otherwise.
Had he shown the slightest inclination to do so, the device would have forced
him to finish the job. Certainly, had the device been activated, then Smith would
not have acted freely in killing Jones. Something exterior to Smith’s own
decision-making faculty would have made Smith kill Jones. But in the actual
course of events, nothing caused or made Smith do it. He seems to have done it ‚of
his own free will,‛ as we say. But if that’s so, then alternative possibilities aren’t
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necessary for free action; having the power to do otherwise than what we
actually do isn’t required for our being genuinely free in doing what we do. All
of which is to say that (PAP) is false. An agent S may do A freely even though S
couldn’t have done anything but A. So goes Frankfurt’s argument.
If Frankfurt is correct, then the inference from (7) to (8) in ATD is unsound. It
assumes that alternative possibilities are indeed a necessary condition for free
action. Failing that assumption, there’s no reason why we can’t say that Smith
can do nothing about the fact that he will kill Jones at 5pm tomorrow, à la (7),
and yet still deny (8), the claim that he will not have done so freely. In which
case, there’s no reason why we can’t say that Smith is free in killing Jones
tomorrow at 5pm even though he can’t do otherwise as a result of God’s
foreknowing that that’s what he will do. God may already know what Smith is going
to do, and he may not be able to do anything else as a result, but he may still be
perfectly free in doing what he does, if Frankfurt’s argument holds water. But
does it?
Yes and no. Frankfurt’s scenario does, it seems to me, show that in one sense
alternative possibilities are not necessary for free, morally responsible action.
However, in another sense Frankfurt’s counterexample fails, and this second
sense is sufficient to generate an argument against the compatibility of God’s
omniscience and human freedom that is as compelling as our original argument.7
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I think it’s fairly clear, at least upon reflection, that not everything we do
counts as a genuine action. Consider the last time you blinked. That was certainly
something you did, but it was hardly an action that you performed, unlike, say,
the last time you picked up a good book to read. The latter involved an intention
to do something (namely, to read a book) and then the overt behavior of actually
picking up the book and reading it. The ‚act‛ of blinking, on the other hand,
involved no such intention. We don’t intend to blink each time we actually do so;
it just happens (most of the time, for we could, of course, blink intentionally on a
given occasion, and in such a case we would be performing a genuine action).
Medieval philosophers talked about this as the distinction between a ‚human
action‛ (actus humanus) and a mere ‚act of a human‛ (actus hominis).2 The former
involves both a decision (an ‚elicited act‛) of the will to do such-and-such as well
as an attempt (not always successful) to carry out what the will has elected or
decided upon (a ‚commanded act‛). The latter, however, involves no decision of
the will, neither an elicited act nor a commanded act, but simply some kind of
exterior behavior (like blinking or sneezing or digesting) that happens apart from
any intention to engage in such behavior.
In the case of genuine human action, the actus humanus, both the elicited act
and the commanded act are generally found together. I decide to read a good
book and then I attempt to carry out my decision by selecting a book from the
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bookshelf. In fact, it seems that if the elicited act is to do A, then the commanded
act must also be to do A. Whatever I attempt to do necessarily follows upon what I
have decided to do. How can I decide to read a good book and then go about
getting drunk? I could, of course, change my mind, but that only means that I
elicited a new act of will, namely, to get drunk instead of reading a book, and the
commanded act of going about getting drunk follows in due course.
Two further points are worth mentioning. First, the commanded act does not
always succeed in carrying out the elicited act. I may decide to do A, try to do A,
but utterly fail in doing anything like A. Take, for example, the case of Smith and
Jones that we’ve been considering. Imagine that, at the very moment that Smith
is to pull the trigger and shoot Jones, the device implanted in his brain
malfunctions and causes Smith to become totally paralyzed from the neck down.
When Smith tries to pull the trigger, he finds himself completely frozen and
unable to do so. Nevertheless, Smith’s decision, his elicited act, was to shoot
Jones, and his commanded act, his attempt, was also to shoot Jones. So, ceteris
paribus, we wouldn’t hesitate to say that Smith is just as morally guilty as he
would have been had he actually succeeded in killing Jones. But for unforeseen
external circumstances, that’s exactly what he would have done and exactly what
he intended to do.
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The second point worth mentioning has to do with where Smith’s moral
responsibility is to be located. It obviously can’t be in his overt behavior because
he didn’t engage in any overt behavior; he was paralyzed. So it was either in his
elicited act or in his commanded act. But as was said above, the commanded act
necessarily accords with the elicited act. It’s not possible to decide to do A and
then try to do not-A (not, at least, without a subsequent elicited act to do not-A).
So it seems that Smith’s moral responsibility in the above scenario resides in the
fact that he elected (or decided or formed the intention) to shoot Jones. It’s over
his own decisions that Smith has direct and autonomous control, and so it’s in
what he decides to do, not in what he actually does in terms of overt behavior, that
Smith’s (or any agent’s) moral responsibility is grounded.
Returning now to the original Frankfurt scenario, what I want to argue is that,
as it has been described, either Smith really isn’t free, or if he is free, then he
actually does have alternative possibilities open to him, viz. alternative possible
decisions. Here’s how the scenario was described: if Smith goes about his business
as he’s supposed to and kills Jones, then the device does nothing. But if Smith at
any point shows the slightest inclination to refrain from shooting Jones, then the
device intervenes and makes Smith shoot Jones. Once again, in the actual course
of events, the device is never activated as Smith actually goes ahead and shoots
Jones, and given the presence of the device he couldn’t have done otherwise. But
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could he have decided otherwise? There’s no good reason not to think so. The implant
is programmed to intervene only if Smith shows some inclination toward
deciding not to shoot Jones, but on a libertarian view of freedom such as was
described several sections ago, inclinations are not causally sufficient for
decisions. As David Widerker says, the Frankfurtian strategy
is sound only if we assume that
(2) *Smith’s+ showing an inclination to decide to [refrain from shooting
Jones] is (in the circumstances) a causally necessary condition for
his deciding to [refrain from shooting Jones].
Otherwise, there is the distinct possibility of *Smith’s+ deciding to *refrain
from shooting Jones], even if he previously was inclined to [shoot Jones].
After all, as libertarians emphasize, free agents can sometimes choose or
decide contrary to their inclinations. And in such a case the mechanism
would not operate. But (2) implies that
(3) *Smith’s+ not showing an inclination to decide to [refrain from
shooting Jones] is (in the circumstances) causally sufficient for his
not deciding to [refrain from shooting Jones.
Moreover, since [Smith] in fact did not show an inclination to decide to
[refrain from shooting Jones+, we are led to the conclusion that *Smith’s+
not deciding to [refrain from shooting Jones] was causally determined
(Widerker, 1995, pp. 114-15).
Furthermore, since a decision not to refrain from doing X is equivalent to a
decision to do X, it follows that Smith’s decision to shoot Jones was causally
determined. Therefore, if the Frankfurtian objector grants that Smith has the
power to decide otherwise, even though he does not have the power to do
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otherwise, then we may hold that Smith is free precisely because he has such
alternative possible decisions open to him.
On the other hand, if the Frankfurtian objector denies that Smith can decide to
do otherwise, on the grounds that he must show a prior inclination toward that
very decision, then that is tantamount to begging the question against the
libertarian, for whom there are no antecedent conditions that are causally
sufficient for free decisions. Of course, Smith’s being inclined to shoot Jones may
make it more probable that he will do so, but it does not (according to the
libertarian) guarantee it. It’s therefore possible both that the device may detect no
inclination on Smith’s part to refrain from shooting Jones and that Smith may
nevertheless make that very decision, contrary to his previous inclinations.
Perhaps at the last instant Smith has a brief memory of his mother praying for
him to grow up and be a good boy, and he decides to honor his mother’s
memory by letting Jones live. In which case, Smith really does have alternative
possibilities, namely the possibility of deciding to refrain from shooting Jones,
even though he doesn’t have the power to actually not shoot Jones, since once
the device detects his decision to refrain, it intervenes and makes him shoot
Jones. But by then it’s too late and the proverbial damage has been done. A
genuine alternative possibility would have been realized, one that is sufficient to
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ground our judgment that Smith is indeed free in deciding to shoot Jones, and
hence he is morally responsible for doing so.
Now if Frankfurt’s scenario is modified so that the implant functions not only
when Smith shows an actual inclination to refrain from shooting Jones but also
intervenes in such a way that it actually prevents any intention to do so from ever
forming in the first place, then it seems to me that Smith can no longer be
considered free in such a situation. The device has gone from being a
counterfactual intervener, which would function only if Smith were to indicate
that he may fail to shoot Jones, to an actual controller of Smith’s decisions,
actively manipulating his mental states in such a way as to prevent any contrary
inclination from even beginning to form. But in that case the causal activity of the
mechanism becomes a causally sufficient condition for Smith’s deciding to shoot
Jones, in which case Smith cannot be considered free in the libertarian sense.
Consequently, the Frankfurtian scenario ends up not being a genuine
counterexample to the (PAP); it’s not a scenario in which Smith is both free and
yet lacking in alternative possibilities. For either Smith really does have
alternative possibilities open to him, insofar as he has the power to decide
otherwise, or he isn’t really free, but is actually controlled by the implant.
The upshot of all this is that (PAP) emerges unscathed, and so the inference
from (7) to (8) in the original argument against the compatibility of God’s
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omniscience and libertarian freedom, ATD, remains secure, so long as we recast
the argument in terms of Smith’s deciding to kill Jones at 5pm tomorrow instead
of his actually killing Jones at that time. If Smith cannot but decide to kill Jones,
then he cannot be considered free in actually deciding to do so. Although I will,
for the sake of ease of expression, continue to talk in terms of what Smith does
instead of what he decides to do, the reader should keep in mind, apropos of the
foregoing discussion, that the locus of Smith’s (or any agent’s) responsibility, and
hence freedom, lies in his having alternative possible choices or decisions, not
necessarily in his having alternative possible actions. In any case, another
response to ATD needs to be sought out.

2.3. Considerations on Logical Determinism
Since starting at the end of ATD didn’t lead us out of the problem, perhaps
beginning at the beginning and trying to find a misstep there will produce better
results. As a matter of fact, no less a philosopher than Aristotle himself would
have had us stop with the very first premise. Although there is some scholarly
debate concerning the Stagirite’s views here, my reading of his discussion of
future contingent propositions (such as premise (1) of ATD) in chapter 9 of his De
Interpretatione considers Aristotle as denying any truth value to such
propositions. For he says,
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With regard to what is and what has been it is necessary for the
affirmation or the negation to be true or false.< But with particulars that
are going to be it is different. For if every affirmation or negation is true or
false it is necessary for everything either to be the case or not be the case
(De Interpretatione [=DI] 9, 18a28-35).3
It is beyond my purposes to go into a detailed exegesis of Aristotle here, but I
take him to be saying that even though past- and present-tensed propositions
must have a truth-value (‘X happened’ is either true or false; ‘X is happening’ is
either true or false), the same does not hold for future-tensed propositions, at
least for those dealing with contingent matters (‘X will happen’ is neither true
nor false, where ‘X’ concerns what Aristotle calls ‚particulars‛ or matters of
contingent fact). According to Richard Gaskin, Molina himself interprets
Aristotle in this way. Gaskin says,
Molina first states that the teaching of Aristotle in DI 9 is that in the case of
a disjunction of contradictory FDSs [i.e., future contingent statements+ <
neither disjunct is determinately true or false, but one disjunct is
indeterminately true and the other indeterminately false; whereas in the
case of antiphases whose subject matter is the present or the past, one
disjunct is determinately true and the other determinately false.
According to the antirealist interpretation of Aristotle, his point in DI 9 is
that while the Law of Excluded Middle obtains unrestrictedly (i.e., we
have, utterly generally, v ¬ ), the disjuncts of a [future contingent
disjunction] do not themselves have (simple) truth-values (Gaskin, 1994b,
p. 558).
Aristotle’s motive for adopting this view (if indeed it is his view) seems to be the
worry that if a future-tensed proposition such as There will be a sea battle tomorrow
(Aristotle’s example) or Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm (our example) is
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taken to be either true or false, then it seems to follow that it is necessarily true or
necessarily false that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or that Smith will kill
Jones tomorrow at 5pm.
That, at least, seems to be Aristotle’s claim, and if it is correct then ATD never
gets off the ground. The very first premise, that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at
5pm, is neither true nor false but indeterminate. There are actually two arguments
that this is the correct view of things, Aristotle’s own from De Interpretatione 9
and the so-called ‚Master Argument‛ of Diodorus Cronus. Let’s take Aristotle’s
first. He says,
If [something] is white now it was true to say earlier that it would be
white; so that it was always true to say of anything that has happened that
it would be so. But if it was always true to say that it was so, or would be
so, it could not not be so, or not going to be so. But if something cannot
not happen it is impossible for it not to happen; and if it is impossible for
something not to happen it is necessary for it to happen. Everything that
will be, therefore, happens necessarily (DI 9, 18b10-15).
Using Aristotle’s own example of the sea battle, I take him to be arguing along
the following lines:
[ALD] (10) It’s true that there will be a sea battle tomorrow.
(11) Therefore, it was always true in the past that there will be a sea
battle tomorrow.
(12) Therefore, it is necessary that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow.
(13) Therefore, no one can do anything about the fact that there will be a
sea battle tomorrow.
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The questionable step is the one from (11) to (12), but given Aristotle’s views
about modal logic, it’s actually a valid inference. Briefly, where a modern modal
logician would interpret modal talk as being about possible worlds, the domain of
discourse in Aristotle’s modal semantics is the set of times. So while modern
modal logic interprets ‘Necessarily p’ as ‘p is true at all possible worlds,’ Aristotle
interprets it as ‘p is true at all times’ or ‘p is always true.’ Again, ‘Possibly p’ on
the modern view means ‘p is true at some possible world,’ while for Aristotle it
means ‘p is true at some time’ or ‘p is sometimes true.’ Finally, to say that p is
contingent is, for us, to say that it is true at some worlds and false at others,
whereas for Aristotle it is to say that p is sometimes true and sometimes false.
Therefore, to say that There will be a sea-battle tomorrow was always true in the
past, or true at all past times, is virtually equivalent to saying that it is necessarily
true, especially given the eternally existing universe that Aristotle understood
himself to be dwelling in.
The forgoing is an argument for logical determinism, as it proceeds from the
mere truth of a statement about what will be the case to the necessity that it will
be the case. Of course, (13) is a conclusion Aristotle rejects. He was no fatalist,
holding as he did that we indeed have real power over what the future holds.
Otherwise, he argues, ‘There would be no need to deliberate or to take trouble,’
for what’s the point of deliberating about things if we can’t really do anything
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about what’s going to happen?4 But as we recently noted, (12) follows from (11)
on Aristotle’s temporal interpretation of modal logic, and (11) certainly seems to
follow from (10). If it’s true today that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow, then
the same was true yesterday and the day before and so on, ad infinitum.
So, Aristotle concludes, the problem must lie with premise (10). We have no
choice but to deny that there are any truths about what will happen in regard to
contingent matters. Likewise, we have no choice but to deny that there are any
falsehoods about what will happen as well, for if we say that it’s now false that
there will be a sea battle tomorrow, we seem, by the same process of reasoning,
to end up with the conclusion that no one can do anything about the fact that
there will not be a sea battle tomorrow. So try as they might, the naval captains
just won’t be able to pick a fight. Therefore, says Aristotle, (10) is neither true nor
false. It simply has no truth-value, or its truth-value is indeterminate. There may be
a sea battle tomorrow, and there may not be one, but as of now it’s neither true
nor false simpliciter that there will be one.
In regard to matters of natural necessity, like the sun rising tomorrow or
Mount Vesuvius erupting tomorrow, it’s a different story. Of course it’s true now
that the sun will rise tomorrow, and of course no one can do anything about that
fact, since it’s a necessity of nature. So there are some propositions about the
future that have truth-values, namely the ones that correspond to states of affairs

54

that are causal consequences of present or past states of affairs. But given the
indeterministic or libertarian picture of human freedom that we have assumed,
future states of affairs involving free human actions cannot be causal
consequences of present or past states of affairs. Since Smith’s killing Jones is not
now ‚present in its causes,‛ i.e., since there is no presently obtaining state of
affairs that is causally sufficient for, say, Smith’s killing Jones tomorrow at 5pm,
the proposition Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm is not true. Nor is it false, as
there is no presently obtaining state of affairs that is a causally sufficient for
Smith’s refraining from killing Jones. If Aristotle is correct, then the so-called
‚Principle of Bivalence,‛ the semantic principle according to which, for every
proposition p, either p is true or p is false (as distinguished from the syntactic
Principle of Excluded Middle mentioned earlier, viz. for every proposition p,
either p or ~p) must be restricted in such a way as to exclude future contingent
propositions.
If I am correct in seeing Aristotle’s argument for logical determinism as
depending on his temporal interpretation of modality, then Aristotle’s seemingly
desperate response, that of restricting the principle of bivalence and denying
truth-values to future contingent statements, appears wholly unnecessary. Why
not instead simply reject his modal theory, allowing that some statement may
always be true and yet be so contingently, and thereby preclude the inference from
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(11) to (12)? Indeed, I would concur with this response. However, there is yet
another argument for logical determinism that does not depend on a
questionable interpretation of modal logic. Instead, it relies upon the principle of
the Fixity of the Past and as such it is quite similar to the argument from the
previous chapter, ATD. This is the so-called Master Argument of Diodorus
Cronus, and comes to us in its most complete form by way of Epictetus:
The Master Argument seems to have been formulated with some such
starting points as these. There is an incompatibility between the three
following propositions, ‚Everything that is past and true is necessary‛,
‚The impossible does not follow from the possible‛, and ‚What neither is
nor will be is possible‛. Seeing this incompatibility, Diodorus used the
convincingness of the first two propositions to establish the thesis that
nothing is possible which neither is nor will be true (Kneale & Kneale,
1962, p. 118).
Diodorus’s thesis, contraposed, is the deterministic one that whatever is or will
be true is necessary. As the passage indicates, this is supposed to follow from the
Fixity of the Past (‘everything that is past is true and necessary’) and from what
could plausibly be interpreted as the Transfer Principle (‘the impossible does not
follow from the possible’ = ‘if q is impossible and q follows from p, then p is
impossible’). Thus, the Master Argument takes the following form:
[MA] (10) It’s true that there will be a sea battle tomorrow.
(11) Therefore, it was always true in the past that there will be a sea battle
tomorrow.
(14) No one can do anything about what was true in the past.
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(13) Therefore, no one can do anything about the fact that there will be a
sea battle tomorrow.
The similarities between MA and ATD are striking. Indeed, the first premise can
be replaced with ‘God knows that there will be a sea battle tomorrow’ and the
argument simply becomes ATD. This isomorphism between MA and ATD will
prove immensely significant insofar as plausible replies to MA will lead to
analogous (and arguably equally plausible) replies to ATD. But first let us note
that an Aristotelian reply to MA would again be to reject the first premise,
denying that future contingent propositions are either true or false but are
instead indeterminate, and thereby avoid the fatalistic conclusion. As Richard
Gaskin describes the Aristotelian solution, future contingents ‘lack as yet, but
will in due course possess, one of the two standard truth-values.< [A] future
contingent statement < is either-true-or-false, but not yet either true, or false’
(Gaskin, 1994a, p. 85).
Three considerations weigh against this Aristotelian solution. First of all, our
ordinary linguistic practice concerning predictions seems to assume that future
contingents can be true (or false). For instance, if I now predict that the Yankees
will win the 2009 World Series, and if they do end up winning, then anyone who
heard my prediction would say that I was correct; that when I said, ‘The Yankees
will win the 2009 World Series,’ I said something true. But when? It certainly
seems strange to say that the prediction will come to be true. Rather, it seems more
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accurate to that it was true at the time I made it. When I boast about it (assuming
I’ll be able to do so), I’ll say, ‘You see, I was right!’
Gaskin (1994a) points out that such an argument was offered by Cicero in his
De Fato, and I think it is sound. However, Gaskin has suggested a possible
response. He retorts, ‘We can say that predictions become true or false, rather than
that they are already true or false at the time the prediction is made’ (Gaskin,
1994a, p. 86). But this reply doesn’t hold water, for the prediction in question is a
token-utterance, a datable event that occurs in a specific context at a definite
time. Such an event surely ceases to exist once it has occurred, and all that
remains are its causal consequences. Let us say, therefore, that I utter the
prediction ‘The Yankees will win the 2009 World Series,’ which utterance ceases
to exist immediately upon its being made, say at time t. If it were to become true
when the Yankees win, then we have the impossible situation of an entity that
ceases to exist at t acquiring the property of being true at some time after t. If one
finds the notion of an utterance being true or false objectionable, insisting that
utterances express propositions, which are themselves true or false, a similar
problem arises. If the utterance expresses a truth at all, it can only do so at the
time it is made, for it no longer exists afterward.
Again, consider our conventions concerning promises. If I promise my friend
that I will be at her birthday party, it seems highly counterintuitive to say that I
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really can’t make such a promise because the promise that I will be at my friend’s
birthday party is neither true nor false; that at most I can promise that I might be at
her party. Again, if I fail to show up at the party, I can justly be accused of having
made a false promise.
Finally, the Aristotelian solution is unacceptable from the standpoint of
classical Christian belief as well. For example, the Nicene Creed of orthodox
Christianity contains the assertion that Christ ‘will come again to judge the living
and the dead.’ Is that dogma of faith something that is, as of now, of
indeterminate truth-value? Are Christians asserting this merely as something
that will come to be true instead of as something that is true?5 That seems, again,
highly counterintuitive.

2.4. Eternal Propositions and Eternal Knowledge
Aristotle’s own solution either to the argument for logical determinism that
he considered in DI 9 or to the Master Argument seems, therefore, to be
unconvincing. Consequently, the analogous Aristotelian response to ALD goes
unsupported, for we have no good reason to think that future contingent
statements cannot be true and thus subject to divine knowledge.
It will be instructive to consider another objection to the same arguments. Is
Aristotle (as I have interpreted him) not guilty of a confusion in speaking of

59

propositions being true ‚in the past‛? Instead, ought we not to evaluate sentences
as true or false relative to a context (which includes the time of utterance) by virtue
of expressing propositions that are true or false simpliciter? William and Martha
Kneale make the point as follows,
< it is possible to show where Aristotle made his mistakes in the De
Interpretatione. The argument in chapter 9 is faulty because he thinks of the
predicates ‘true’ and ‘false’ as applicable to something (probably a
sentence) at a certain time.< We mislead ourselves, however, when we
speak, as Aristotle does, of its being true now that there will be a naval
battle tomorrow, for we thereby induce ourselves to supposed that this
will not be true tomorrow evening, when the battle is over, but something
else will, i.e. ‘There has been a naval battle today’. Two different sentences
are plainly involved here, but they both express the same proposition
(Kneale & Kneale, 1962, p. 51).
On this view, a sentence of the form ˹It will be the case that x ’s˺ expresses a
true proposition in a context C (where C includes the time of utterance t) iff for
some time t* later than t, x ’s at t*. The proposition that x ’s at t* is considered
to be timelessly true (or timelessly false) while it is expressed at certain times by
this or that utterance of a sentence in a given context. Therefore, it would make
no sense to speak of it as having always been true ‚in the past‛ that there will be
a sea-battle tomorrow, anymore than it would make sense to speak of it as being
true ‚everywhere‛ or as being true ‚in Greece.‛ Tense, in other words, is not a
primitive feature of propositions but is a feature of the sentences which express
them. Again, as the Kneales put it,
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The system of tenses in a language is a device whereby we indicate the
temporal relation of our spoken or written sentence (i.e. token-sentence) to
the events of which we speak or write. A verb with tense is, therefore, like
the demonstratives, a ‘token-reflexive’ word, i.e. on each occasion of use it
indicates the object of discourse by relating it to the token of itself which is
then uttered or written (Kneale & Kneale, 1962, p. 51).
Thus, the same timelessly true proposition that a sea-battle occurs on 2 Jan 2009 is
expressed by an utterance on 1 January 2009 of the sentence ‚There will be a seabattle tomorrow‛ as well as by an utterance on 3 January 2009 of the sentence
‚There was a sea-battle yesterday.‛ The response to ALD and MA, therefore,
would be that premise (10) is ill-formed; it makes no sense to say that something
(i.e., a proposition) is true ‚in the past,‛ and so our powerlessness over the past is
simply not relevant to the truth or falsity of a given proposition.
This suggests an analogous response to ATD, where the corresponding
premise would be (1), namely ‘Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm.’ A major
strand of thought within the classical theistic tradition (perhaps the dominant
strand), going back at least to Boethius and receiving its most complete
expression in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, has it that God himself exists not
in time but in eternity. Not eternity in the everyday sense that we might normally
think of, like ‚everlasting‛ or ‚existing forever and ever‛ or ‚being always there
infinitely into the past and infinitely into the future.‛ These are all temporal
notions and therefore predicate of God a temporal mode of existence, albeit an
everlasting temporal existence. According to St. Thomas, however, God is
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timelessly eternal. God exists wholly apart from time, so that for him there is no
past, present or future. God exists in an eternal, ever-present nunc stans or
‚enduring now.‛
Following Boethius, St. Thomas says that eternity in the strict sense is ‘the
simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life’ (ST IaIæ, 10,
1). In other words, God’s existence is not spread out along a temporal continuum
the way yours and mine are. Our life is had over the course of a certain number
of years. God’s life is had ‚all at once‛ in the ever-present now of eternity. God
doesn’t remember what he ‚was‛ like in the past. He never ‚was‛ in the past. He
simply ‚is‛ eternally. Likewise, God doesn’t anticipate what he ‚will be‛ like in
the future. He never ‚will be‛ in the future. Again, he simply ‚is‛ eternally.
Furthermore, nothing ever was or will be for God; everything that was, is or will
be in this temporal flux that we experience simply is for God in the eternal nunc
stans.
Therefore, since God exists eternally (i.e., timelessly), affirming any temporal
predicate of God amounts to a kind of category mistake. It makes no more sense
to say that such-and-such was true of God, or will be true of God, or even is now
(in the temporal present) true of God, than it does to say that Tuesday was found
loitering on the street corner. Tuesday is just not the sort of thing that can loiter,
and God is just not the kind of thing of which anything can have been true, and so
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on. Rather, if anything is true of God, it is eternally true of God. And so, instead
of saying that God knew that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow, as does ATD’s
second premise, we ought instead to say that God eternally knows, or knows in the
eternal present, that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow.
But even that is not quite correct on this view. Crucially, Smith’s killing Jones
tomorrow is not future with respect to God, for again, nothing is future with
respect to God, for whom everything is eternally present. What for us is future,
and hence asserted by means of a sentence in the future tense, is for God eternally
present, and hence we ought to say that God eternally knows that Smith kills
Jones on 2 January 2009 (assuming that today is 1 January 2009). Aquinas says,
God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own
being, as we do, but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge
is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity, being
simultaneously whole, comprises all time, as was said above. Hence all
things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because
He has the essences of things present within Him, as some say, but
because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in
their presentiality (ST IaIæ, 14, 13).
He also borrows from Boethius a well-known metaphor in talking of the way in
which God’s eternity ‚encompasses‛ the whole of the temporal continuum all at
once: ‘Just as he who goes along the road does not see those who come after him;
whereas he who sees the whole road from a height sees at once all those
traveling on it’ (ST IaIæ, 14, 13, ad. 3). To expand a bit, imagine someone
standing atop a mountain and looking down at a road running through the
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valley, and imagine a caravan moving along that road. Our situation in time is
like someone in the caravan. We know where we are, can remember the road
we’ve been traveling along but can’t see it directly anymore, and we can sort of
peer off into the distance and catch barely a glimpse of what’s coming, but right
now it’s all pretty dim and indistinct. We really have no idea of what we’re
heading into along this road. The person on top of the mountain, on the other
hand, sees it all in one sweeping, comprehensive vision—where the caravan was
along the road, where it is now, and where it will be—but from that perspective
it’s all taken in at once. Now if we understand ‚where the caravan was‛ as an
analogous to our temporal past, ‚where the caravan is‛ as our temporal present,
and ‚where the caravan will be‛ as our temporal future, then the person atop the
mountain takes it all in—past, present, and future—in one comprehensive vision.
It’s all ‚present‛ before him in a single apprehension. Of course, the person’s
situation atop the mountain is supposed to be analogous to God’s situation vis-àvis time. Since God is wholly ‚above‛ and ‚outside‛ the temporal continuum, all
of time is as if present before him in the nunc stans of eternity.
I should add at this point that the theory just outlined is not simply an ad hoc
maneuver to avoid theological determinism. Rather, it arises within a broader
metaphysical framework and stems from the very first of St. Thomas’s proof for
God’s existence, the via ex motu according to which God is shown to exist as the
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first Unmoved Mover, or the ultimate and changeless principle that accounts for
all change and becoming in the created world. St. Thomas follows Aristotle in
thinking of time as the measure of change or becoming (the transition from
potentiality to actuality). So if God is the utterly changeless source of all change,
being himself fully actual and lacking any potentiality, then time, the measure of
change, simply doesn’t measure God. God must be wholly outside of time, and
hence timelessly eternal.
To reiterate the implications of this theory for our problem, St. Thomas would
say that Smith's killing Jones tomorrow is not seen by God as something future,
as something that will happen, but as something that (tenselessly) happens at a
certain point along the temporal continuum, the whole of which God grasps all
at once. Therefore, God's knowledge of Smith's killing Jones tomorrow is not
situated in the past relative to Smith's killing Jones, and so the unalterability of
the past does not apply to such knowledge. We can't say that God always knew or
knew 1,000 years ago that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow. We must say, rather,
that God knows in the eternal present that Smith kills Jones on (say) 2 January 2009.
God's knowledge of the fact is neither earlier than nor later than the fact itself;
rather the fact of Smith's killing Jones tomorrow is eternally present before God
in the timeless now of his existence. God’s knowledge of Smith’s killing Jones is
eternally simultaneous with that event. Since the relation between God's

65

knowledge and what he knows is one of eternal presentness and not of temporal
precedence, then the issue of the fixity of the past becomes moot. Just as it was
argued, with respect to the Master Argument for logical determinism, that the
fixity of the past just does not apply to a proposition’s being true (because it’s
true simpliciter and not true in the past), so too God's knowledge isn't in the
temporal past, and hence the fixity of the past imposes no fatalistic necessity
upon what God knows.

2.5. Against Eternalism (Part 1)
Although I am quite sympathetic with St. Thomas’s eternalist view, especially
insofar as it respects the classical theistic view of the divine nature as pure and
immutable actuality, I think both it and the eternal propositions approach to
dealing with the Master Argument are ultimately inadequate. Let us recall, as I
mentioned at the outset, that there are two questions that need answering:
whether God’s knowledge of the future is consistent with human freedom (the
reconciliation question), and how God knows future contingent events such as
freely performed human actions (the source question). I will argue in the next
chapter that the eternalist’s way of dealing with the reconciliation question does
not succeed. For the remainder of this chapter, I will try to show that the same
approach is unsuccessful in regard to the source question as well.
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To risk a bit of anthropomorphism, the Boethian-Thomistic model is a
perceptual one: God ‚sees‛ future events because God’s eternity encompasses
the temporal continuum—past, present, and future—so that such events are
present to him in the nunc stans of eternity. Even though in the temporal
‚reference frame‛ I have not yet eaten tomorrow’s breakfast, in the eternal
‚reference frame‛ my eating breakfast tomorrow is present to the divine
epistemic activity. God perceives future events in a way that is analogous to the
way in which we perceive present events. So to the question, how does God
know future contingent events, the Boethian-Thomistic answer is that he knows
them because such events are present to him in eternity, event though they are
not yet present in time. God does not have foreknowledge of such events, but
instead has eternally present knowledge of them.
There are many things about the Boethian-Thomistic theory that I find very
hard to understand. First of all, what is this relation of being present to that is
constantly employed? Temporal events, such as Smith’s killing Jones tomorrow,
are supposed to be present to God in eternity, but I’m not entirely sure as to what
‚being present to‛ is supposed to amount. Aquinas’s illustration from the Summa
Contra Gentiles (I, 66) is that of the points along the circumference of a circle being
present to the center point.6 The analogy is supposed to be that as each point
along the circumference is just as present to the midpoint (and vice versa) as any
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other point along the circumference (i.e., as all the points along the circumference
are equally present to the midpoint) so to are all points in time equally present to
the eternal nunc stans. But again, this just doesn’t help me to understand the being
present to relation. The relation between the midpoint of a circle and the
circumferential points is one of spatial distance. The circumferential points are all
‚equally present‛ to the midpoint insofar as they are all spatially equidistant
from it. Are all times somehow ‚equidistant‛ from eternity? What can that
possibly mean?
Let’s try another approach. I am currently sitting in a cafe, and the person
sitting across the room from me is talking on her cell phone. I suppose we can
say that the event of her talking on her cell phone is present to the event of my
seeing her talking on her cell phone; the two events are simultaneous, and one
involves a ‚being aware‛ of the other. A few minutes ago she was writing in her
address book, but that event is not present to the event of my remembering that
she wrote in her address book. There’s some temporal ‚distance‛ between her
writing in her address book and my memory of her doing so. Likewise, I can
imagine with a kind of ‚foresight‛ (fallible though it be) that she will get up from
her seat and leave the cafe, but again, there’s some temporal distance between by
anticipating her getting up and the actual event of her doing so. My memories
and anticipations are not ‚present to‛ the events they are about, but my
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‚seeings,‛ my direct epistemic contacts with this or that event, are present to
those events, insofar as they are simultaneous with them. So perhaps the being
present to relation is best understood as a kind of simultaneity. Not just
simultaneity, of course. We wouldn’t want to say that the event of my typing
these words is present to some event taking place right now in Kathmandu. So
let’s stipulate a definition: event x is present to event y just in case x and y are
simultaneous and x involves a direct epistemic contact with y. So, since I have no
direct epistemic contact with any event now occurring in Kathmandu, nothing
that I am now doing is present to anything now happening in Kathmandu.
However, since I am now directly aware of the conversation taking place at the
table across the cafe, my awareness of that conversation is not only simultaneous
with but also present to that conversation, and vice versa.
So I think we can make some sense of the being present to relation, at least as it
may hold between temporal events. But how is it to be understood as holding
between a temporal event and the one and only eternal ‚event,‛ the divine
epistemic activity? Since God, and hence God’s epistemic activity, does not exist
in time, how can it occur at the same time as (or be simultaneous with) any
temporal event? The relation between time and eternity is perplexing and is not
one into which I can enter at any length, so let’s just agree that there can be some
relation of simultaneity between events in time and the eternal nunc stans, albeit
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a different sort of simultaneity from the one that holds between temporal events
alone.
E. Stump and N. Kretzman (1981) have given what may be the most
sophisticated definition of this sort of simultaneity, what they appropriately refer
to as ‘eternal-temporal simultaneity’ or ‘ET-simultaneity’:
Let ‘x’ and ‘y’ range over entities and events. Then
(ET)
For every x and every y, x and y are ET-simultaneous iff
(i) either x is eternal and y is temporal, or vice versa; and
(ii) for some observer, A, in the unique eternal reference frame, x and
y are both present—i.e., either x is eternally present and y is
observed as temporally present, or vice versa; and
(iii) for some observer, B, in one of the infinitely many temporal
reference frames, x and y are both present—i.e., either x is
observed as eternally present and y is temporally present, or vice
versa (Stump & Kretzman, 1981, p. 439).
We can see how this definition avoids one of the more pressing objections to the
Boethian-Thomistic theory, one raised by John Duns Scotus (cf. Langston, 1986,
pp. 17f.), having to do with the ontological status of the objects of God’s eternal
knowledge. Take Smith’s shooting Jones tomorrow. Is that event present to God
with its own proper existence? In other words, is the event itself, the very one
that you or I would witness were we at the scene of the crime tomorrow,
eternally present to God? If so, then it’s hard to see how the future is not already
actual, at least ‚for God‛ if not ‚for us.‛ If the event of Smith’s killing Jones
tomorrow stands in the relation of being eternally present to God’s epistemic
awareness, then it (along with every other actually occurring future event) must
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exist, and so the future ends up being ontologically on a par with the present (as
does the past, for that matter). The Boethian-Thomistic solution seems to end up
reducing the prima facie ontological distinction between past, present and future
(the present now exists, the past once existed but no longer does, the future does
not yet exist but will) to a mere perspectival distinction. We experience the past,
present and future as ontologically distinct, but from the divine perspective
(which, of course, has to be considered the absolute perspective or ‚reference
frame‛) they are all existent, as they are all eternally present to God. What we
end up with is a B-theory of time (or, in current parlance, a four-dimensional
ontology), according to which there are no ‚real‛ relations of past, present and
future among temporal events, since there is no ‚privileged‛ point in time that
can be considered ‚real‛ and hence present; all points are equally real. The only
real relations that exist among temporal events (or times) are those of before and
after, holding among equally real times.
However, taking into account the Stump-Kretzman definition of ETsimultaneity, we can see how they would point out the flaw in the foregoing
reasoning. They would argue that we are conflating the temporal and eternal
reference frames. We are led to the (absurd) conclusion that Smith’s killing Jones
is temporally actual (or exists now in time, or occurs at a time that is simultaneous
with the temporal present) because it is simultaneous with the eternal present,
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which in turn is simultaneous with the temporal present. In other words, because
the eternal nunc stans is simultaneous with both the temporal present and (say)
the future time at which Smith kills Jones, it follows that the temporal present
and the said future time are simultaneous with each other. But if the simultaneity
relation that holds between the eternal nunc stans and temporal events is as the
Stump-Kretzman definition describes it, then that inference is fallacious.
Granted, the eternal nunc stans is ET-simultaneous with the temporal present,
and it is also ET-simultaneous with the future time at which Smith kills Jones, it
does not follow that the temporal present is ET-simultaneous with the future
time at which Smith kills Jones because no two temporal points can be ETsimultaneous with each other. That relation holds only between a temporal
event/time and the eternal nunc stans.
So the Scotistic objection that the Boethian-Thomistic theory of how God
knows the contingent future threatens the reality of temporal becoming is not
conclusive. But the theory poses another threat to a different metaphysical
doctrine, this one concerning the divine nature itself, and this problem I think
proves fatal to the theory. The doctrine I am referring to is that of the divine
aseity, that God can in no way be dependent upon anything outside of his own
nature. The relation of dependence between God and creation is thoroughly
‚one-way‛; the world is utterly dependent upon God, and God is utterly
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independent of the world. Aquinas went so far as to maintain that any relations
whatsoever between God and the world are one-way, that God is not really
related to the world at all, even though the world is really related to God in all
sorts of ways. Regardless of the intelligibility of this claim, the overarching point
is hard to miss. God stands in need of nothing other than himself, even for his
knowledge of things other than himself. A fortiori, since an effect depends upon
its cause, God can in no way be acted upon causally by anything other than
himself, and so nothing other than God can cause God to know what he knows.
This is quite the opposite of how things are for finite cognizers like human
beings. We know things by and large because they causally affect us in the
appropriate ways. If I know that p, it’s because the state of affairs that p presents
itself to my properly functioning cognitive apparatus (whether through sense
experience, ratiocination, testimony, or what have you) and I come to hold the
belief that p, which belief (for whatever other reason) counts as knowledge. But
through all this I am a patient, being acted upon in various ways, which is most
clearly illustrated in the case of sense experience. When I come to see that the
coffee mug is on the table, it’s because the visual information acts upon my
passive receptors of such information (even those who postulate a cognitive a
priori à la Kant will grant that such knowledge originates with passive sensory
intuitions, even if it is not wholly constituted by them).
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By now the problems with the model of divine knowledge of the contingent
future as a kind of perceptual ‚seeing‛ of future events should be apparent.
Regardless of the fact that they are understood to be ‚seen‛ as present, God is
thereby understood, to all appearances, to be a passive recipient of information
regarding the contingent future, much in the same way as we are vis-à-vis objects
that are present to our sensory apparatus. The Boethian-Thomistic story places
God in the role of an eternal ‚observer,‛ passively surveying events within the
temporal continuum, rather like that man atop the high mountain looking down
upon the caravan as it passes through the valley. But God cannot be such an
observer, as that implies that he is being acted upon by the things he observes. It
implies that the source of his knowledge of things other than himself is not his
own nature, as required by the doctrine of divine aseity, but the things
themselves, making God causally dependent upon such things. So to summarize,
if the Boethian-Thomistic theory of how God knows the contingent future is true,
then God is not entirely causally independent of creation, as the perceptual
model of divine knowledge implies that God is causally affected by his creatures.
But God, classically conceived, is entirely causally independent of creation, and
therefore the Boethian-Thomistic theory is untrue.
A further problem plagues the Boethian-Thomistic theory, one that arises
even if we put the issue of divine aseity on the back burner. The problem is that
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the knowledge God acquires via his eternal vantage point affords him no
providential control over what happens in the world. God is presented with a fait
accompli. If it is indeed Smith’s actually killing Jones tomorrow that is present to
God in eternity, then there’s nothing God can do about it. It’s simply what will
happen and God must simply adapt his plans accordingly. But to what extent
can he adapt his plans at all? If everything that God sees from the standpoint of
eternity is what actually happens, then the scope of his providence is reduced to
the decision to create that world or not to create that world. In fact, it’s reduced
to even less than that. If what God ‚sees‛ is what actually happens, then in effect
his creative decisions have already been made and he must simply accept what
will be. God can’t providentially intervene to change the course of history in a
direction that better suits his purposes if the course of history is already eternally
present to him. William Hasker has stated the objection forcefully:
Whether or not there are creatures endowed with libertarian free will, it is
impossible that God should use a foreknowledge derived from the actual
occurrence of future events to determine his own prior actions in the providential
governance of the world.
If we replace ‚foreknowledge‛ in this statement with ‚timeless
knowledge,‛ and understand ‚future‛ and ‚prior‛ to refer to temporal
relations that hold between events in the world but do not apply to God,
we have a precise statement of the situation as it results from the theory of
divine timelessness.< The doctrine of divine timelessness affords us no help
whatsoever in understanding God’s providential governance of the world
(Hasker, 1989, p. 176).
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On the other hand, what God ‚sees‛ can’t simply be what might happen, or what
will possibly be the case, as that affords him no prescience whatsoever. The
doctrine of eternal knowledge was supposed to explain how God knows what,
from our standpoint in time, will actually happen, not just what might actually
happen.
I’ve given so much attention to the Boethian-Thomistic theory for two
reasons. First, because St. Thomas is one of the monumental figures in the history
of philosophical theology and needs to be taken into account. Several of the most
important treatments of the problem in the later middle ages (e.g., Molina and
Bañez) were written as commentaries on St. Thomas’s discussion in Summa
Theologiae IaIæ, 14, 13. Second, because in almost every conversation I’ve had
with non-philosophers concerning the present topic, the response has been to
invoke the idea that God is ‚outside‛ or ‚above‛ time, and that is supposed to
take care of the issue. For whatever reason, there seems to be a kind of intuitive
appeal to the eternalist solution, and so I think it needs to be emphasized that it
ultimately offers no solution at all to the problems associated with divine
providence and prescience. Even though I think that God must be conceived of
as timelessly eternal, I do not think that such a conception provides any
explanation whatsoever for how God knows the contingent future or how God
exercises providential control over the created order.
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CHAPTER 3
OCKHAMISM AND THE RECONCILIATION QUESTION
3.1. Against Eternalism (Part 2)
The previous chapter focused to a great degree on the parallel between logical
determinism and theological determinism, discussing theories that exploit this
parallel in order to generate a response to the Argument for Theological
Determinism (ATD) based upon an analogous response to the Master Argument
for Logical Determinism (MA). The Aristotelian theory, which we might call
‚anti-realist‛ in regard to the future since it denies that future contingent
statements have determinate truth-values, was argued to be both implausible in
itself and inconsistent with Classical Theism. On the other hand, I argued that
the theory of eternal propositions, which denies that propositions are true or false
at a time, and the corresponding Boethian-Thomistic theory of eternal divine
knowledge, which denies that God can be said to know at a time, does not offer a
viable resolution of the source question concerning divine knowledge of the
contingent future. I must now fulfill the promissory note I made in the previous
chapter as to whether the eternalist approach represents an adequate solution to
the reconciliation question. I will argue that it does not and then go on to discuss
and defend what I consider to be a successful answer thereto.
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Alvin Plantinga has raised an interesting objection to St. Thomas’s move vis-àvis ATD, saying,
Concede for the moment that it makes no sense to say of a proposition that
it was true at a time; it nonetheless makes good sense, obviously, to say of
a sentence that it expressed a certain proposition at a time. But it also
makes good sense to say of a sentence that it expressed a truth at a time.
Now eighty years ago the sentence
(5)

God knows (eternally) that Paul mows in 1995

expressed the proposition that God knows eternally that Paul mows in
1995.< But if in fact Paul will mow in 1995, then (5) also expressed a truth
eighty years ago. So eighty years ago (5) expressed the proposition that
Paul will mow in 1995 and expressed a truth; since what is past is now
necessary, it is now necessary that eighty years ago (5) expressed that
proposition and expressed a truth (Plantinga, 1989, pp. 183-184).
In other words, even though the Fixity of the Past may not be applicable to God’s
epistemic state, since (according to St. Thomas) it is an timelessly eternal state and
not a temporal one and hence cannot be said to be situated at any point in time
(including the past), why should this also hold of a sentence that expresses a truth
about God’s epistemic state? There seems to be no good reason to think that a
sentence’s expressing a true proposition should also be considered eternal.
Therefore, that a sentence expressed a truth seems to be something that, once
posited, cannot be undone.
To apply this to ATD, recall that St. Thomas would object to
(2)

God knew 1,000 years ago that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm

on the grounds that God is eternal and cannot be said to know things at this or
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that point in time. He would instead replace (2) with
(2.1)

God eternally knows that Smith kills Jones at t,

where t is tomorrow. Since (2.1) is not about something past, it is not subject to
the Fixity of the Past principle, and so the deterministic conclusion is blocked.
But Plantinga’s point is that (2.1) can be rewritten as
(2.2)

The sentence God eternally knows that Smith will kill Jones at t
expressed a truth 1,000 years ago.

Since (2.2) is both about something past and entails (indeed, is equivalent to) that
Smith will kill Jones tomorrow, the temporal necessity that attaches to (2.2) also
attaches to Smith’s killing Jones tomorrow. Hence, even granting the theory of
eternal divine knowledge, ATD remains a problem.
However, Linda Zagzebski (1991) has offered an intriguing response to
Plantinga’s argument. She objects to the notion that a sentence’s expressing a
proposition is something to which temporal (‚accidental‛) necessity can apply.
Rather, she reminds us that the notion of accidental necessity is one that
developed out of the Aristotelian metaphysic of potency and act:
< the concept of the necessity of the past originated in connection with
the Aristotelian act/potency distinction. There is not now a potency in
things for anything other than the actual past, even though there is a
potency in things now for any number of different futures. This is said to
give the past a kind of necessity lacked by the future. Accidental necessity
is the necessity of lack of potency.< The concept of accidental necessity
does not make it now necessary that 80 years ago a certain proposition
was true, nor does it make it now necessary that 80 years ago a certain
sentence expressed a true proposition (Zagzebski, 1991, pp. 45-46).
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Zagzebski seems to be arguing that the act/potency distinction, which she takes
to be essential to the concept of temporal necessity, is a distinction that applies
only to concrete, primary substances, Aristotle’s ousiai. A substance x is in
potency to becoming F, and when x becomes actually F it is thereafter
accidentally necessary that x became F. For instance, a rose bud is in potency
toward blooming into a rose flower and when it blooms (when its potency has
been actualized) it is thereafter accidentally necessary that it has become a rose
flower. However, a sentence is not a substance and therefore cannot be said
(coherently) to be in potency toward expressing a proposition. There is never a
point at which a sentence s potentially expresses a proposition p, and therefore
there is never a point at which the actualization of such a potency becomes
accidentally necessary. Therefore, it’s just not the kind of thing to which
temporal necessity can apply, and so Plantinga’s (2.2) cannot be said to be
necessary with the necessity of the past.
Unfortunately, I think Zagzebski has been misled by Plantinga’s somewhat
inexact manner of making his point. Plantinga talks about a sentence expressing a
proposition, and Zagzebski is clearly correct to point out that a sentence has no
such potency toward doing so. However, a more perspicuous analysis would
involve the recognition that it is a speaker who expresses a proposition by means of
a sentence. In other words, a speaker uses a sentence to expresses a proposition,
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but what does the expressing is the speaker, not the sentence. Furthermore, it
makes perfect sense to talk about a speaker potentially expressing a proposition
and actually doing so.
This way of looking at the issue was put forward by Richard Gaskin (1994a)
in regard to the problem of logical determinism. Recall that the Master Argument
went as follows:
[MA] (10) It’s true that there will be a sea battle tomorrow.
(11) Therefore, it was always true in the past that there will be a sea battle
tomorrow.
(14) No one can do anything about what was true in the past.
(13) Therefore, no one can do anything about the fact that there will be a
sea battle tomorrow.
Once again, the theorist of Eternal Propositions denies (11), arguing that the
notion of ‚true in the past‛ is incoherent. What is true simpliciter is the
proposition that a sea battle occurs at t, which is expressed by a particular
utterance (or inscription or even a gesture) of a sentence the verb tense of which
indicates whether t is past, present or future relative to the context of utterance.
But Gaskin has this to say:
Some philosophers have thought that the fatalist could be stopped in his
tracks by simply pointing out that truth attaches timelessly to
propositions, so that the fatalist’s assertion that it is now true, or in
advance, that I will go swimming is simply ill-formed. If it is true that I
will go swimming on a particular day, then it is so timelessly.< [But] the
attempt to block the fatalist fails for the simple reason that he can rephrase
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his initial premiss from ‘It is true that I will go swimming tomorrow’ to
‘Were anyone to utter the sentence ‘R. G. will go swimming tomorrow’, he
would thereby express a truth.’ The expression of a truth, whether that
truth be timeless or not, is undoubtedly in time; and that is enough for the
fatalist (Gaskin, 1994a, p. 88).
In other words, MA can be recast in the following way:
[MA*] (10) There will be a sea battle tomorrow.
(15) Yesterday someone said, ‘There will be a sea battle two days
hence.’
(16) Therefore, yesterday it was truly asserted that there will be a sea
battle tomorrow.
(14) No one can do anything about what was true in the past.
(17) It’s having been truly asserted yesterday that there will be a sea
battle tomorrow entails that there will be a sea battle tomorrow.
(13) Therefore, no one can do anything about the fact that there will be a
sea battle tomorrow.
Here it seems that the EP theorist’s response to MA does not count against MA*,
for although an abstractly existing proposition may be a timeless entity, an
assertion is certainly an event in time and can therefore be said to be, as in this
case, in the past. Therefore, the problem re-emerges. If an event (say, someone’s
having truly asserted, ‘There will be a sea battle two days hence’) occurred in the
past, no one can thereafter do anything about that event’s having occurred.
Therefore, no one can do anything about what necessarily follows from that
event’s having occurred, and it necessarily follows from someone’s having truly
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asserted, ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow’ that there will be a sea battle
tomorrow.
Now this same reasoning applies mutatis mutandis to the Eternalist’s response
to ATD. As Zagzebski herself says, ‘*T+he necessity of the past is primarily an
intuition about past events’ (Zagzebski, 1991, p. 30). But surely a speaker’s
having expressed 1,000 years ago the proposition that God eternally knows that
Smith kills Jones at T is an event, and therefore something subject to the necessity
of the past. Therefore, instead of Plantinga’s (2.2), we have
(2.3)

A token of the sentence God eternally knows that Smith will kill Jones
at t was used by a speaker to express a truth 1,000 years ago.

Since (2.3) refers to an event in the past, then such an event is accidentally
necessary, and so too (the argument goes) is whatever follows from that event’s
having occurred.
But what if there was no speaker who made such an assertion? As Zagzebski
argued, the necessity of the past only applies where a potency has been
actualized, and so if no speaker ever made an actual assertion concerning God’s
eternal knowledge, then it seems there’s no actual event or state of affairs to be
considered accidentally necessary. However, here we need to be aware of further
distinctions within the Aristotelian doctrine of potency and act, for there is no
such thing as potentiality simpliciter. Rather, there are first and second potentiality.
Where F denotes an ability, then a being in first potentiality with respect to F has
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the ability to acquire F, whereas a being in second potentiality with respect to F
actually has F but is not using F. For example, someone who has learned French
but is not now speaking French is in second potentiality with respect to speaking
French; she can speak French but is not now actually doing so. But that ability
(potency) is itself a kind of actuality, viz. an active potency.
Now, even if there was no speaker who actually asserted 1,000 years ago (or
even yesterday) the proposition that God eternally knows that Smith will kill
Jones tomorrow, surely there was a speaker who could have asserted it. In other
words, the state of affairs Some speaker’s having been in second potentiality toward
asserting the proposition that God eternally knows that Smith kills Jones at t obtained
in the past. This seems to be a perfectly unremarkable state of affairs involving
an Aristotelian primary substance (a speaker) having an active potency, and
Zagzebski herself insists that it is to states of affairs such as these that the
necessity of the past is supposed to apply.

3.2. The Past Isn’t Quite So Fixed
Looking once again at the Master Argument for logical determinism, we
notice that one premise has been thus far left unquestioned, namely the Fixity of
the Past principle. This principle is supposed to enshrine our pre-analytic
intuitions concerning our lack of power to affect the past. The past, unlike the
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future, is supposed to be ‚fixed,‛ ‚unalterable,‛ ‚immutable,‛ and something
that no agent whatsoever, even God, can do anything about. As Aristotle says,
‘*N+o one deliberates about the past, but about what is future and contingent,
while what is past is not capable of not having taken place; hence Agathon is
right in saying, For this alone is lacking even to God/To make undone things that have
once been done’ (Nicomachean Ethics IV, 2; 1139b6-10).
Recall how we formulated the principle:
If p is true at t, then for any time t* after t, t* p,

(FP)

which we interpreted as saying that there is no accessible world having a past
that differs from the actual past. Any world accessible to you now will have a
past history identical to that of the actual world. To illustrate this intuition,
consider a situation in which an agent S has three options open to her at t*: she
can do either A, B or C. (FP) says that if p was true at t (where t is earlier than t*),
which I will abbreviate as ‘*p, t+’, then no matter what S does at t*, it will still be
the case that [p, t]. This gives us the following picture:
t

t*
/---------- S does A & [p, t]

/
------- |------------------------- |------------- S does B & [p, t]
p
\
\---------- S does C & [p, t]
Each ‚branch‛ can be interpreted as a possible world that is accessible to S as of
t*, and by doing either A, B, or C at t*, S ‚sees to it‛ or ‚brings it about‛ that the
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respective world is actual. But since p was true at t in the actual world, each
world that branches off at t* must be one in which p was true at t. S, therefore,
cannot bring it about that p was not true at t; no matter what S does, it will still be
the case that p was true at t.
However, one of the more prominent schools of thought in the discussion of
logical and theological determinism, taking its cue from William of Ockham
(although he was not the first to put forward this solution1), has it that the past is
not as closed or as fixed as it may at first appear. I won’t spend any time looking
at what the historical Ockham had to say on the matter,2 but will instead focus on
‚Ockhamism‛ as it has come to be discussed in the recent literature. So, as far as
the Ockhamist is concerned, (FP) is simply too strong if it is understood to apply
to any past-tense statement whatsoever. According to Ockhamism, not every
true past-tense statement is ‚accidentally necessary.‛ In other words, even if p
was in fact true at some past time t, it doesn’t follow straightaway that p is true at
t in all worlds accessible thereafter.
By way of explicating this view, consider the following scenario. Imagine
once again that Smith will in fact kill Jones at t (say, tomorrow at 5pm). Imagine
also that at an earlier time t* (say, earlier today) the Boss expressed some doubts
about whether Smith will carry out his orders, but Brown (the Boss’s consigliere)
assured the Boss that Smith would go ahead and do the job. Brown, therefore,
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correctly believed at t* that Smith will kill Jones at t. What, then, does Smith have
it in his power to do at t? Does he have it in his power to refrain from killing
Jones, even though Brown correctly believed at t* that he would kill Jones?
In one sense no, but in another sense yes. William Lane Craig (1992) has
pointed us to the medieval distinction between the ‚composite‛ sense (in sensu
composito) and the ‚divided‛ sense (in sensu diviso) of a proposition like
(18)

Smith could refrain from killing Jones at t even though Brown
correctly believed at t* that he would kill Jones at t.

In the composite sense, that statement says
(18.1) Possibly, Brown correctly believed at t* that Smith would kill Jones
at t and Smith does not kill Jones at t,
which is obviously false. For S to correctly believe that p means that S believes p
and that p is true, whereas (18.1) asserts that Brown could correctly believe
something to be true which is in fact false, or that Smith could bring it about that
Brown correctly holds a false belief. Hence, if (18) must be read à la (18.1) in sensu
composito, then Smith does not have the power to refrain from killing Jones.
In the divided sense, on the other hand, the statement says
(18.2) Brown correctly believed at t* that Smith would kill Jones at t and,
possibly, Smith does not kill Jones at t.
In this sense, even though Brown in fact (in the actual world) correctly believed
that Smith would kill Jones, Smith could have (in another possible world) not
done so. Of course, those possible worlds in which Smith refrains from killing
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Jones are worlds in which Brown does not correctly believe that he would kill
Jones (either he holds a false belief, suspends judgment or simply doesn’t
consider the matter).
Now if, in order to maintain the possibility of Smith’s acting freely, we read
(18) à la (18.2), in sensu diviso, then we are committed to the view that there are
possible worlds accessible to Smith at t that in some way have pasts that differ
from the actual past. For if Smith were to refrain from killing Jones at t, then it
would be the case that Brown did not correctly believe at t* (before t) that Smith
would kill Jones. Therefore (18.2) commits us to restricting (FP), for the
proposition that Brown correctly believed at t* that Smith would kill Jones at t is both
true and past-tense, and should, in light of FP, be accorded the necessary of the
past. Yet there is at least one world, w, accessible to Smith at t (namely, the
world(s) in which he refrains from killing Jones at t) such that, in w, Brown did
not correctly believed at t* that Smith would kill Jones at t, whereas he did
correctly believe so at t* in the actual world.

3.3. Causal Power and Counterfactual Power
Is this problematic? Does this not ascribe to Smith the power to ‚bring about
the past‛ and does this in turn not violate our intuitions concerning the
inviolability of the past? That depends on what we mean by ‚bringing something
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about‛. Recall from chapter 1 that we understood a world, w, to be accessible to
an agent at a time if that agent can ‚bring it about‛ or ‚see to it‛ that w is actual,
so now is the time to get clear on what it means to bring something about.
There seem to be at least two senses in which an agent can be said to bring
something about. One is a causal sense, so that Smith can be said to bring about
causally the death of Jones by pulling the trigger on his rifle and initiating a
causal sequence that would eventuate in Jones’s death. In this sense of ‚bring
about‛ it seems clear that no agent can bring about the past. If an event e1
causally brings about an event e2, then by all accounts e1 must come before (or
perhaps be simultaneous with) e2. We would all agree that an effect cannot
temporally precede its cause.
But there is another, non-causal sense of bringing something about. To adapt
an example from Jaegwon Kim and cited by Hasker (1989, p. 107) by causing
Jones’s death Smith also brings it about that Jones’s wife becomes a widow. But
does he cause her widowhood? That doesn’t so much as make sense. Causal
relations hold between concrete entities, like Jones’s finger and the trigger of his
gun, the trigger and the firing pin, the firing pin and the bullet primer, and so on.
So how can there be a causal relation between anything Smith does and an
abstract state like the widowhood of Jones’s wife? Rather, her widowhood is a
logical consequence of what Smith does rather than a causal consequence.
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Ockhamists express this latter sense of ‚bringing something about‛ in the
form of a counterfactual construction: Smith has the ability to bring about the
widowhood of Jones’s wife because there’s something he can do (namely, kill
Jones) such that, were he to do it, then Jones’s wife would be a widow. Therefore,
we can call this sort of ability to bring something about counterfactual power as
opposed to causal power. But it cannot be true in general that an agent S has
counterfactual power over p just in case there’s something S can do such that
were S to do it, then p would be true. For that would mean that S has
counterfactual power, or can counterfactually ‚bring it about‛, that 2+2=4. But
it’s counterintuitive in the extreme to say that we have any power whatsoever,
counterfactual or otherwise, over necessary truths.
So let’s say that an agent S has counterfactual power over whether p is the
case iff (i) if p is true, then S can do something such that, were S to do it, then p
would be false and (ii) if p is false, then S can do something such that, were S to
do it, then p would be true. So Smith has counterfactual power over whether
Jones’s wife will be a widow tomorrow because (i) if she will in fact be a widow
tomorrow as a result of Smith’s killing Jones, then there’s something Smith can
do (namely refrain from killing Jones) such that, were he to do so, then Jones’s
wife would not be a widow tomorrow as a result of Smith’s killing Jones, and (ii)
if she will in fact not be a widow tomorrow as a result of Smith’s killing Jones,
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then there’s something Smith can do (namely kill Jones) such that, were he to do
so, then Jones’s wife would be a widow tomorrow as a result of Smith’s killing
Jones.
Now clearly, causal power implies counterfactual power, for there’s
something Smith can do (namely, pull the trigger) such that, were he to do it,
then Jones would be killed. But it’s not the case that counterfactual power
implies causal power, for (again) even though there’s something that Smith can
do such that were he to do it, then Jones’s wife would be a widow, it doesn’t
follow that Smith causes her widowhood. Her widowhood is a logical
consequence of what Smith does, not a causal consequence.
Taking this back to our original point, we can see that ascribing to Smith
counterfactual power at t over Brown’s correctly believing something at t* (before
t) does not amount to ascribing to him any kind of causal power over the past.
We are merely saying that if, contrary to fact, Smith does not kill Jones at t, then
Brown would not have correctly believed at t* that he would. So we can see that
Smith’s having such power is not any kind of power to affect the past, in the
sense of making the past not to have been. It’s not as if, by refraining from killing
Jones at t, Smith would somehow initiate a causal sequence that would result in
Brown’s holding a false belief at t* instead of a true belief at t*.
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Suppose that, contrary to fact, Smith does refrain from killing Jones at t. In
that case, Brown would not have correctly believed what he in fact correctly
believed, namely that Smith would kill Jones at t. In other words, it seems
perfectly coherent to say that at t, Smith had the unexercised power to do
something such that were he to do it, then the past would have been different,
insofar as Brown would have held a false belief instead of a true belief. But it’s
not as if, by refraining, Smith would have rendered Brown’s belief mistaken;
Brown’s belief would already have been mistaken. Thus we can say that Smith
can ‚bring about the past,‛ not causally but counterfactually. He can (although in
fact he does not) do something at t (namely, refrain from killing Jones) such that
were he to do it, then something that was the case at t* (namely, Brown’s
correctly believing that Smith would kill Jones at t) would not have been the
case.
Richard Taylor (1983) has expressed misgivings (even mystification) about
such counterfactual power. What sort of power is it that has never, in the entire
history of the world, been exercised? You say that Smith had the unexercised
power to do something such that, if he had done it, then Brown’s belief would
have been false. But there has never been a single instance of such power ever
being exercised. In each and every case where it has been true that x will do
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such-and-such, x has inevitably done such-and-such. What sort of mysterious
power is this that never gets used? (Taylor, 1983, pp. 58-61.)
Taylor seems unaware of the fact that his demand for an instance of exercised
counterfactual power is incoherent. Of course there are no examples to be found
of counterfactual power that has been exercised, precisely because it is
counterfactual! It’s logically impossible for any agent in fact to do something
contrary to fact. Taking ‘in fact’ to mean ‘in the actual world,’ Taylor’s demand for
an example of counterfactual power that has been exercised amounts to a
demand for an example of somebody’s having done something in the actual
world that they didn’t do in the actual world. Not being able to provide such an
example hardly counts as a theoretical failure.
It seems to me that the foregoing points are intuitive and unproblematic.
With the addition of a bit of technical language, they are just what an ordinary
‚person on the street‛ would say: just because Brown ‚guessed right‛ concerning
what Smith would do, that doesn’t mean that Smith had to do it. He could have
done something else, in which case Brown would have guessed wrong. Now,
these same points provide a way out of logical determinism as well, by allowing
us to deny premise (14) of MA. Even though it was always true in the past that
(let us say) there will be a sea battle tomorrow, that doesn’t mean that there has to
be a sea battle tomorrow. The naval captains could (although in fact they will not)
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refrain from going into battle, and were they to do so, then it would not have
always been true that there will be a sea battle tomorrow. In terms of the
foregoing distinctions, this is to say that, while the naval captains do not have
causal power over the past truth of the proposition There will be a sea-battle at t
(indeed, one wonders what such causal power could even amount to), they do
nonetheless have counterfactual power over that proposition.

3.4. The Bare Truth about the Future
The underlying motivation for the Master Argument for logical determinism
seems to arise from a very strong notion of truth as correspondence. In other
words, if it is true now that there will be a sea battle tomorrow, then that truth
must correspond to or be ‚grounded‛ in some presently existing state of affairs.
In other words, the world’s ‚furniture‛ or ontological constituents (whatever
those may be) must now be arranged in such a way as to make tomorrow’s sea
battle inevitable, in the same way that things are now arranged in such a way as
to make (say) tomorrow’s weather inevitable, and so it is now true that
tomorrow will be (say) a humid 85 degrees. Another way of putting it is to say
that tomorrow’s sea battle must be ‚present in its causes‛ if it can truly be said
that there will be a sea battle tomorrow. This is what gives rise to MA, for there’s
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nothing that the naval captains will be able to do tomorrow that could possibly
affect how the world was arranged today.
But such a view of truth is simply implausible. What is there about the
arrangement of the world’s current ‚furniture‛ to which the proposition
Brontosauri were herbivores could correspond? There are no currently existing
brontosauri to ‚make‛ that proposition true, nor does it seem that there is
anything else currently existing to which that proposition might ‚correspond,‛
and yet it is nonetheless true. Again, I have no idea whether Julius Caesar
enjoyed his wine at room temperature, but he either did or he didn’t. But what is
there about the way the world is now arranged that makes that proposition either
true or false? There doesn’t seem to be anything to which such a proposition
‚corresponds,‛ other than the state of affairs Julius Caesar’s having enjoyed his wine
at room temperature. But that state of affairs doesn’t involve the world’s presently
existing stock of furniture.
Likewise, there’s no good reason to think that a proposition like There will be a
sea battle tomorrow can be true now only by corresponding to the way the world’s
furniture is now arranged. It’s sufficient that the world’s furniture will be
arranged sea-battle-wise tomorrow for us to truly assert now, ‚There will be a sea
battle tomorrow.‛ As Gaskin puts it, future-tense propositions ‘can be barely true
(i.e., not true in virtue of anything)’ (Gaskin, 1993, p. 425). In other words, if the
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proposition ˹x will ˺ is contingently true, there’s no reason to think that the
world must now be arranged in such-and-such way in order for it to be ‚made‛
true; it’s true simply because of the bare fact that x will .
Therefore, the motivation behind premise (14) of MA is undercut. The reason
why it may have seemed that nothing can ever be done about what was true in
the past is that something’s having been true in the past was understood to be
‚grounded‛ in the way the world’s furniture was arranged in the past. If it was
true that p at some past time t, then things in the world must have been arranged
in such-and-such a way at t. So ‚doing something about the fact that p‛ would
seem to imply the power to do something about the way the world was arranged
in the past.
It is precisely this sort of power over the past that our intuitions tell us we
don’t possess. In this sense, nothing that I do now can ‚bring it about‛ that the
world was arranged in such-and-such a way in the past. Indeed, nothing that I
could have done at t, would have made it the case that the world was arranged
in such-and-such a way before t.
However, given that It will be the case at t that p does not have to correspond to
any arrangement of things before t in order to be true before t, then the ability at
t to act in such a way that p is not true at t does not imply the ability as of t to
bring it about that the world was not arranged in such-and-such a way before t.
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It implies only the ability to bring it about that It will be the case at t that p was not
true before t.

3.5. How Would You Like Your Facts?
We’ve arrived at a distinction that contemporary Ockhamists are wont to call
the ‚hard fact/soft fact‛ distinction. Hard facts are facts that are ‚really‛ about
the past, and are the sort of facts that we have in mind when we talk about the
past being fixed, immutable, ‚accidentally necessary,‛ or what have you. Soft
facts are expressed by propositions that are only ‚verbally‛ or ‚grammatically‛
about the past, but the facts themselves are really about the future. As a result,
soft facts are supposed to be the sort of facts over which we have counterfactual
power, while hard facts are, so to speak, counterfactually inviolate. No one can
act in such a way that, if he were so to act, then a hard fact would not have been
a fact (e.g., there’s nothing I can do now such that, were I to do it, then Caesar
would not have crossed the Rubicon in 49 BC). A soft fact is a fact over which
counterfactual power can be exercised. There is something I can do now such
that, were I to do it, then it would not have been true yesterday that I would
thereafter not drink coffee, namely I can drink some coffee.
All sorts of criteria have been proposed for hard- and soft-facthood, an issue
which I will soon address, but for now a suitable criterion is the one already
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used. A soft fact is a fact over which some agent has counterfactual power; a
hard fact is a fact over which no agent has counterfactual power.
(SF)

f is a soft fact as of t iff f is a fact and for some agent S, S can
perform some action A at t such that, if S were to do A at t, then f
would not have been a fact.

(HF) f is a hard fact as of t iff f is a fact and there is no agent S that can
perform some action A at t such that, if S were to do A at t, then f
would not have been a fact.
An example of a soft fact would Brown’s correctly believing at t* < t that Smith
was going to kill Jones at t, since it was (ex hypothesi) a fact and Smith could have
done something at t, namely refrain from killing Jones, such that were he to do it,
then Brown would not have correctly believed at t* that Smith was going to kill
Jones at t. An example of a hard fact was given above. There’s nothing anyone
can do now such that, were they to do it, Caesar would not have crossed the
Rubicon in 49 BC.
With this distinction in hand, we can articulate the Ockhamist response to the
Master Argument. The Principle of the Fixity of the Past (FP), which functions as
premise (14), to wit,
(14) No one can do anything about what was true in the past
needs to be distinguished insofar as we can understand ‚what was true in the
past‛ to be talking about hard facts or soft facts. If we understand (14) as talking
about hard facts, then it is indeed true. However, since
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(11) It was true in the past that there will be a sea battle tomorrow
arguably expresses a soft fact, then the hard fact reading of (14) results in an
invalid argument, viz. an equivocation on ‚true in the past.‛ In (14) it means
‚true in the hard past‛ while in (11) it means ‚true in the soft past.‛
On the other hand, if we understand (14) as talking about soft facts, then it is
false—as the foregoing discussion was intended to show—in which case MA is
unsound. The naval captains can indeed do something about (11), namely refrain
from engaging in a battle tomorrow, and were they to do so, then (11) will have
been false.

3.6. Ockhamism Applied to ATD
I have given a good deal of attention to the issue of logical determinism and
the Ockhamist’s solution thereto because I think there is an exact analogy
between the MA and ATD. I maintain that the Ockhamist response to the threat
of logical determinism applies with equal success to that of theological
determinism. The crucial inference in ATD is from (4) and (5) to (6):
(4)

No one can do anything about the fact that God knew 1,000 years ago
that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm.

(5)

God’s having known 1,000 years ago that Smith will kill Jones
tomorrow at 5pm entails that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm.

(6)

Therefore, no one can do anything about the fact that Smith will kill
Jones tomorrow at 5pm.
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Let’s make the parallel between logical and theological fatalism explicit:
(4*) No one can do anything about the fact that Brown correctly believed
yesterday that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow.
(5*) Brown’s having correctly believed yesterday that Smith will kill
Jones tomorrow entails that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow.
(6*) Therefore, no one can do anything about the fact that Smith will kill
Jones tomorrow.
As we saw, the Ockhamist would deny (4*). Someone can do something about
the fact that Brown correctly believed yesterday that Smith will kill Jones
tomorrow. Smith, for one, can refrain from killing Jones, and were he to do so,
then Brown would not have correctly believed that he will. The Ockhamist’s next
move is simply to apply this reasoning, mutatis mutandis, to ATD, by denying
premise (4). Someone can indeed do something about the fact that God knew
1,000 years ago that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow. Smith, for one, can refrain
from killing Jones, and if he were to do so, then God would not have known
1,000 years ago what he in fact knew. Given his omniscience, he would have
known instead that Smith would not kill Jones.
In short, the Ockhamist’s strategy is to deny that we must keep God’s past
knowledge fixed in our evaluation of what an agent has it in his power to do at a
given time. The theological determinist insists that, e.g., it must be possible for
Smith to refrain from shooting Jones tomorrow at 5pm holding fixed God’s
foreknowledge that he will do so. Of course there is no such possibility, but as we
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argued before, this is no more a threat to Smith’s acting freely than our holding
fixed the bare truth that he will shoot Jones tomorrow at 5pm. Of course Smith
can’t do anything but shoot Jones on the assumption (or as the medievals put it,
ex suppositione) that he will shoot Jones. But the upshot of that isn’t that Smith
can’t refrain simpliciter, but rather that if he were to do so, then it would not have
been true that he was going to shoot Jones. Likewise, of course Smith can do
anything but shoot Jones on the assumption that God knows he will, but again,
this doesn’t mean that he can’t refrain simpliciter. It means only that should he
refrain, then God would not have known what he in fact knows.
We might put the matter as follows. The determinist (whether theological or
logical) insists that S freely does A at t in w only if there’s a w* absolutely
identical with w up to t (i.e., in which everything true prior to t in w is true prior
to t in w*) such that S refrains from A at t in w. In other words, for the determinist
the only worlds accessible as of t are those that are exactly similar to the actual
world up to t. But a world (call it w1) in which Smith refrains from shooting
Jones at t is not exactly similar to the actual world ( ) up to t, for at all times prior
to t it is true in

that Smith will shoot Jones at t while in w1 it is false at all times

prior to t that Smith will shoot Jones at t. Again, at all times prior to t in

it is

true that God knows that Smith will shoot Jones at t, while in w1 it is false at all
times prior to t that God knows that Smith will shoot Jones at t. Therefore, w1 is
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not exactly similar to

up to t and so is not accessible at t. Smith, therefore, is

not free in shooting Jones at t.
However, such a restriction on what worlds are accessible, and hence on what
actions count as free, is impossibly strong, far stronger than the libertarian view
of freedom discussed at the outset. There it was stipulated that only those worlds
are accessible from

at t that are causally identical to

up to t. As Molina put it,

an action is performed freely only if given the same arrangement of causes its
contrary could have been performed. In other words, to rule out the possibility
that a free action may be causally determined, the libertarian insists that an
action is performed freely only if the actual sequence of causes up to its
performance could also have been followed by its non-performance, which
allows us to infer that the action was not ultimately the product of those causes.
Now if one subscribed to the strong correspondence theory of truth discussed
earlier, according to which It will be the case at t that p is true only by being
grounded in present causal activity, then the absolute identity condition on
accessibility makes sense from a libertarian perspective. But I have argued
against such a view of truth, and hence I see no good reason to adopt such a
restrictive view of accessibility. A world need not be absolutely indiscernible
from α up to t in order to be accessible as of t; it need only be causally
indiscernible up to t.
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3.7. Are God’s Beliefs Hard or Soft Facts?
It may be objected that our assimilation of theological fatalism to logical
fatalism is too quick. It seems that there is an important difference between
Smith’s having counterfactual power over a proposition like Smith will kill Jones
tomorrow at 5pm, which seems innocuous enough, and his having counterfactual
power over a proposition like God has always known that Smith will kill Jones
tomorrow at 5pm, which doesn’t seem quite so innocuous.
The problem may be illustrated by once again considering the case of
Brown’s correctly believing that Smith would kill Jones and Smith’s having
counterfactual power over Brown’s having correctly believed such. Granted,
Smith has the power to do refrain from killing Jones, and if he were to do so,
then Brown would not have correctly believed that he would kill Jones. But the
fact remains that Brown would still have held that belief. In other words, there’s
nothing Smith can do such that, were he to do it, then Brown would not have
held the belief he in fact held. The mental state that Brown was in before Smith
killed Jones just doesn’t seem to be the sort of thing over which Smith can be said
to have counterfactual power. Brown’s correctly believing what Smith will do
may be a ‚soft fact,‛ but Brown’s simply believing what Smith will do seems to be
a ‚hard fact,‛ one over which there is no power after the fact, counterfactual or
otherwise.
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But a similar point can be made, it seems, with respect to theological fatalism.
Smith’s having the power to do something such that, were he to do it, then God
would not have known what he in fact knows, seems to involve more than
ordinary counterfactual power. For since God, classically conceived, is necessarily
omniscient (i.e., omniscient in every possible world), then Smith’s having the
above power implies his having the power also to act in such a way that, were he
so to act, then God would not only not have known what he in fact knows, but
also he would know what he does not in fact know. In other words, the
Ockhamist is saying that Smith has the power to do something such that, were he
to do it, then God would have been in a different epistemic state (viz. knowing
that Smith will not kill Jones) from the one he was actually in (viz. knowing that
Smith will kill Jones).
This same point is brought out more forcefully by the way the theological
determinist’s case has been presented since Nelson Pike’s seminal paper, ‚Divine
Omniscience and Voluntary Action‛ (Pike, 1989). Therein Pike formulates the
problem in terms of what God believes rather than in terms of what God knows.
Again, as classically conceived, God is necessarily omniscient, which, stated in
terms of what God believes, means that, necessarily, God believes everything
that is true (necessarily, if p, then God believes that p). But God must also be
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viewed as necessarily infallible, so that, necessarily, anything that God believes,
he correctly believes (necessarily, if God believes that p, then p).
So if it’s true that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm, then God has always
believed that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm. If Smith has the power to
refrain from killing Jones, then he has the power to do something such that, were
he to do it, then God would not have held the belief he actually held. Why?
Because God is necessarily infallible, so it’s impossible that God should have
believed that Smith would kill Jones and yet Smith not actually do so. So unless
we allow that God could hold a mistaken belief (which is impossible on the
classical conception of God), the Smith’s having the power to refrain from killing
Jones is the power to do something such that, were he to do it, then God would
not have held the belief he actually held. But it’s precisely this power that we
said Smith doesn’t have with regard to Brown’s belief. Whether or not Smith kills
Jones, Brown will still have believed that he would kill Jones. Whether or not
Brown correctly believes this is up to Smith, but Smith can do nothing about
whether or not Brown believes it simpliciter. Why should it be any different with
God’s belief?
I should at first say that I am not entirely at ease with talk about God’s
‚beliefs.‛ As far as I am aware, every discussant in the theological fatalism
debate prior to the 20th century spoke in terms of what God knows, never in terms
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of what God believes. Belief just doesn’t seem to be the sort of epistemic state that
God could ever be in. This point was well argued by William Alston (1986), who
insists that God’s knowledge that p is more adequately construed as a direct,
intuitive awareness of the fact that p, rather than some kind of state in which
belief figures as a component à la the ‚traditional‛ (and now defunct) analysis of
knowledge as ‚justified true belief‛ (Alston, 1986, pp. 294-95). I might add that
the failure of this analysis, along with all of its sundry permutations, should cast
at least some shadow of suspicion on the assumption that belief must be one of
the components even of human knowledge, not to mention divine knowledge.
Second, putting aside these worries and allowing that it may be legitimate to
talk about God’s having beliefs, we should still keep in mind the traditional
doctrine of analogy. That is, even if we predicate having beliefs of God, it by no
means follows that we do so in the same sense as we do of humans. In fact, we
ought not to if we are to avoid anthropomorphism. According to Aquinas, for
one, any predicate that is said of both God and creatures is said only
analogically. So just because we don’t consider Brown’s beliefs as the sort of
thing over which an agent may have counterfactual power, we cannot
immediately infer that the same is true of God’s beliefs, because ‚belief‛ is used
in different (albeit related) senses.
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Now, one way of fleshing out the difference between Brown’s (or any
creature’s) beliefs and God’s beliefs is to note both that God’s belief that p entails
the truth of p and that the truth of p entails that God believes that p (which is to
say, again, that God is both necessarily infallible and necessarily omniscient),
whereas there is no necessary connection whatsoever between any creature’s
beliefs and the truth of those beliefs. Indeed, perhaps the thesis that, necessarily,
God believes that p if and only if it is true that p is one way of understanding the
traditional religious dictum that God is Truth. In any event, the necessary
equivalence between God’s believing that p and it’s being true that p has been
used by some as a reason for classifying God’s past beliefs as ‚soft facts‛ rather
than ‚hard facts.‛
Now, I already put forward a provisional criterion for a fact’s being hard or
soft depending upon whether or not some agent has counterfactual power over
that fact. Unfortunately this will not help settle the issue of whether God’s past
beliefs are soft facts or not because the very question we’re trying to answer is
whether an agent has counterfactual power over God’s beliefs. So we need some
other, non-question-begging criterion for determining whether a fact is hard or
soft.
Apropos of what was just noted about God’s belief that p entailing that the
truth of p, there has been discussed in the recent literature an ‚entailment
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criterion‛ for a fact’s being soft (Fischer, 1989c, p. 35). If p, while true at t, entails
that q is true at some time t* after t, then p expresses a soft fact with respect to t*.
Since Brown’s correctly believing at t* < t that Smith will kill Jones at t entails that
Smith will kill Jones at t, it follows that Brown’s correct belief is a soft fact
relative to t. In like manner, since God’s belief 1,000 years ago that Smith will kill
Jones tomorrow entails that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow (that is, because it
entails that something will be the case), God’s belief is a soft fact relative to the
time of Smith’s action. However, since Brown’s mere belief does not entail that
anything will be the case (in other words, since Brown’s merely believing at t that
such-and-such will happen is consistent with the world’s being annihilated
immediately after t), Brown’s belief itself counts as a hard fact.
J. M. Fischer has argued that this purported criterion ends up collapsing the
distinction between hard and soft facts, since every fact entails something about
the future. Fischer argues as follows:
But there is another sort of problem which afflicts [the entailment
criterion+. Suppose ‚Smith existed at t1‛ is true. It is a necessary condition
of the truth of this statement < that it is not the case that Smith existed for
the first time at t2. It is obvious that Smith’s existing at t1 entails that he
does not exist for the first time at t2.< Thus [according to the entailment
criterion] the statement fails to express a hard fact about t1 (Fischer, 1989b,
p. 92).
Some further examples to illustrate Fischer’s point: Brown’s belief that such-andsuch will be the case entails the future fact that Brown will have held a belief,
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that Brown will have existed, that there will have been such things as beliefs, and
so on. Since Brown’s belief at t entails all these things that will be true after t,
Brown’s belief counts as a soft fact according to the entailment criterion. But, as
Fischer concludes, ‘this is a disastrous result’ for that criterion.
By way of response, it may be countered that Brown’s belief entails no such
things, since they can only be true given that there are times at which they can be
true. So Brown’s belief is a hard fact because it is consistent with the destruction
of time itself immediately upon his having that belief. God can immediately
annihilate the entire created order, including space-time itself, upon Brown’s
forming the belief that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow. Should God do so, then
there would be no future time at which it would be true that Brown once existed,
etc. However, it would be impossible for God to do so upon his having believed
1,000 years ago that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow, because (again) God’s
believing this entails that it will happen.
William Hasker has argued, however, that it would be metaphysically
impossible for God to annihilate the cosmos in this way because it would be
inconsistent with God’s nature. Hasker says,
I propose as a plausible opinion the view that, once God has undertaken
to create a world of contingent beings and, in particular, a world
containing rational spirits capable of communion with himself, it would
be inconsistent with his nature for him to annihilate his creation and allow
it to fall into nothingness. If this is so, then any proposition entailing the
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existence of contingent beings (or, at least, of created rational spirits) will
be non-future-indifferent (Hasker, 1989, pp. 86-87).
So according to Hasker, if we accept the entailment criterion, then we end up
with the result that Brown’s existence at t is a soft fact relative to all times after t,
because it metaphysically entails his existence at all times after t. Why? Because
God could not, given his essential goodness, annihilate Brown, who is a rational
spirit capable of communion with God.
As a result, Hasker suggests that we explicate the hard fact/soft fact
distinction, not in terms of metaphysical entailment but in terms of conceptual
entailment (Hasker, 1989, p. 87). In other words, p expresses a soft fact iff p
conceptually entails that there are times after the time at which p is true. But given
this criterion, he argues that God’s past beliefs come out as hard facts after all,
since God may be referred to by means of the non-connotative proper name
‘Yahweh’. Then a proposition like ‘Yahweh believed 1,000 years ago that Smith
will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm’ does not carry the conceptual baggage of
necessary infallibility that it would were the term ‘God’ used, and so it does not
conceptually entail that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow (even though it does
metaphysically entail that fact, since it is metaphysically necessary that Yahweh is
God). Finally, since ‘Yahweh believed such-and-such’ does not conceptually
entail the truth of what Yahweh believes, it is a hard fact, one over which no
agent has counterfactual power (Hasker, 1989, p. 92).
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Whether or not his argument concerning the non-connotative proper name
‘Yahweh’ is sound, however, is moot, for Hasker has failed to show that the hard
fact/soft fact distinction must be explicated in terms of conceptual necessity. For
his ‚plausible opinion‛ concerning what God could or could not do given his
essential goodness isn’t plausible at all. In fact, it’s arguably false. There doesn’t
seem to be anything inconsistent with the divine nature for God to create
something, even an angel or a human soul, and then annihilate it. God has
perhaps willed that he shall not annihilate any created spirits, so considered de
potentia Dei ordinata it is impossible that a created spirit cease to exist, but
considered de potentia Dei absoluta (which is what is relevant to metaphysical
necessity) God could very well have willed to create and then annihilate
whatsoever he might choose. However the case may be, this is certainly a very
tenuous and questionable claim upon which Hasker has based his argument.
Hasker puts forward a second argument against the metaphysical entailment
criterion:
If God is a metaphysically necessary being (i.e., exists in all possible
worlds) and is also essentially everlasting (as compatibilists suppose),
then we immediately get the result that no proposition whatsoever is
future-indifferent [i.e., expresses a hard fact] for any proposition
metaphysically entails ‚God exists,‛ which in turn entails the existence of
times after the present.< Furthermore, any proposition describing any
event of the past, present, or future entails that God will remember that
event for all time to come—so no such proposition can be futureindifferent (Hasker, 1989, p. 86).
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This argument is doubly defective. For one thing, not all compatibilists suppose
that God is everlasting (by ‚compatibilist‛ Hasker means someone who thinks
God’s omniscience is compatible with libertarian freedom). St. Thomas Aquinas,
for one, would insist that God is not only not essentially everlasting (i.e. existing
at all times) but he’s not even possibly everlasting; rather, he’s essentially
timelessly eternal. Now, although I previously argued that St. Thomas’s Eternalist
view does not provide a way out of the foreknowledge problem, I never argued
that the view itself is mistaken. In fact, I’m inclined to think that a theist ought to
hold that God is timelessly eternal. Be that as it may, for St. Thomas at least, the
proposition that God exists does not entail the existence of any time whatsoever.
Secondly, it simply doesn’t follow from God’s being essentially everlasting
that there exists any times at which he exists nor any future times at which he
will exist. To say that God is essentially everlasting is to say: necessarily, for any
time t, if t exists, then God exists at t. But one cannot validly infer from this that
time exists. William Lane Craig has extensively argued that God exists timelessly
sans creation but temporally with creation (Craig, 2001a), so that even if God
would exist at all times if there were times, it doesn’t follow that there are in fact
times. We might say that God is essentially everlasting (there’s no possible world
in which God exists at some times but not at others) but only contingently in
time (there are worlds in which God does not create and hence in which he exists
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timelessly). Therefore, God’s existence as an essentially everlasting being does
not entail that there will be times after the present. As a result, I conclude that
Hasker has given no good reason to think that the hard fact/soft fact distinction
cannot be explicated in terms of metaphysical entailment.
Unfortunately, in trying to defend the entailment criterion, I have had to
delve into metaphysical issues concerning truth, time and eternity that scream
for further analysis and resolution, issues that I cannot adequately address at
present. Even if I were to do so, anything I say would be so speculative as to call
into question whatever follows, and I would prefer that the success of this essay
not hang on my views concerning the nature of truth and time. I will therefore
try to tack a new course in defending the view that God’s past beliefs are
plausibly construed as soft facts.
First, I think we do have an intuitive grasp of the distinction between hard
and soft facts, even if we lack a definite criterion. I think a fairly uncontroversial
example of a soft fact is Brown’s correctly believing at t* < t that Smith will kill
Jones at t. Second, since God is understood to be infallible, I think it’s plausible to
say that there’s a closer analogy between God’s believing that p and Brown’s
correctly believing that p than between God’s believing that p and Brown’s merely
believing that p. Ergo, since Brown’s correctly believing that p is a soft fact, we
have good reason to construe God’s believing that p as a soft fact.
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J. M. Fischer (1994) is impressed neither by this argument nor by a similar one
put forward by Alvin Plantinga (1986). Whereas I’ve suggested that God’s
believing that p is relevantly similar to Brown’s correctly believing that p,
Plantinga points out that God’s believing that p is, not relevantly similar to p itself
(whatever that may mean,) but is necessarily equivalent to p. So if p expresses an
uncontroversially soft fact, say, ‘It’s being the case at t1 that Smith will kill Jones
at t2’, then ‘God’s believing at t1 that Smith will kill Jones at t2’ is equivalent to
that soft fact. So on the assumption that if p is a soft fact and p is equivalent to q,
then q is a soft fact, Plantinga concludes that God’s believing at t1 that Smith will
kill Jones at t2 should likewise be construed as a soft fact (Plantinga, 1986, pp.
193-94).
Fischer’s response to this argument is extremely difficult to make sense of.
First, he says,
I grant the conclusion of the equivalence argument. Any fact necessarily
equivalent to a soft fact may well be a soft fact. But again I must point out
that this does not entail that the facts are relevantly similar (Fischer, 1994, p.
130).
So, according to Fischer, if two facts are necessarily equivalent, then it doesn’t
thereby follow that one is a soft fact if the other is. The two facts must be
‚relevantly similar.‛ What, then, is the crucial dissimilarity between (say) it’s
being the case at t1 that S will do X at t2 and God’s believing at t1 that S will do
X at t2? According to Fischer, it’s that the latter, while being a soft fact, involves
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what he calls a ‚hard property,‛ namely the property believing at t1 that S will do
X at t2. He says,
Suppose now that H merely believes at t1 that S will do X at t2. The state
of H’s mind that counts as his belief would not count as a different belief
(or no belief at all), if S were to refrain from doing X at t2 < one and the
same state of H’s mind at t1 would count as believing that S will do X at
t2, no matter what S (or anyone else) does at t2. The fact that the particular
state of H’s mind at t1 counts as believing that S will do X at t2 is resilient
to future states of the world.<
I can see no good reason to deny that the property of believing exhibits
this sort of resilience when possessed by God.< Believing a proposition
just is not counterfactually dependent on the future: it is not the case that
one and the same state of mind would count as one belief given one
future, and another belief (or no belief at all) given another future. Of
course, if God believes at t1 that S will do X at t2, then it is (according to
the assumptions adopted here) metaphysically impossible for God’s mind
to be in the same state and S not do X at t2. But this does not show that
‚believing that S will do X at t2‛ is not a hard property relative to t1; at
most it helps to show that ‚God believes at t1 that S will do X at t2‛ is not
a hard fact about t1 (Fischer, 1994, 119-20).
The first paragraph of the quoted passage merely reiterates what I said earlier by
way of introducing the problem we’ve been considering (cf. pp. 103f.). As far as
good reasons go for denying that the property of believing that S will do X at t2
exhibits resilience to future states of the world when possessed by God, there’s
the one we’ve been talking about all along: God’s possessing that property
entails—indeed, is equivalent to the fact—that S will do X at t2, unlike when a
human being possesses that property.
Now Fischer’s response to this—that although God’s believing that S will do
X at t2 may be a soft fact, the property ‘believing that S will do X at t2’ is
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nonetheless what he calls a ‚hard property‛—is perplexing. What else is a fact
but some being’s exemplifying some property? If the property exemplified is one
the possession of which is ‚resilient to future states of the world‛ then how can
the fact that some being exemplifies that property be anything other than a hard
fact?
The answer seems to lie in Fischer’s idiosyncratic use of the terms ‘hard fact’
and ‘soft fact’. For Fischer, what makes a fact hard or soft is solely its ‚temporal
nonrelationality or relationality‛ respectively (Fischer, 1994, p. 112). As a result,
it need not be the case that if f is a fact, then some agent has counterfactual power
over f, it need only be the case that f exhibit ‚temporal relationality.‛ As Fischer
says,
[N]ote that it does not follow from a fact’s being a soft fact about the past
that one can so act that it would not be a fact. Suppose, for instance, that I
am chained to my chair and thus intuitively it is quite clear that I cannot
leave my office. It is a fact about yesterday that it was true then that I went
to the store a day prior to being chained to a chair. Thus, if I were to leave
my office, I would be falsifying this soft fact. Nevertheless, I cannot leave
the office (Fischer, 1994, p. 115).
Again, he says,
It is evident from the above discussion that there are soft facts which are
nevertheless fixed. They may be fixed for reasons other than the fixity of
the past. Consider, for example, the fact that Judy sits at t1 prior to the
sun’s rising at t2. This is a soft fact about t1 which is nevertheless fixed at
t2: there is nothing any human agent can do about this fact at t2 (Fischer,
1994, p. 115).
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The upshot of this, according to Fischer, is that although God’s past belief may be
a soft fact, it does not thereby follow that it isn’t fixed. Any fact that involves the
exemplification of a ‚hard property,‛ even though it may be a temporally
relational fact and therefore a soft fact, is still a fixed fact. And so, Fischer
concludes, given God’s omniscience, ‘*I+t is plausible to say that an agent’s doing
otherwise would require that some hard (temporally nonrelational) feature of the
past be other than it actually was’ (Fischer, 1994, p. 130).
I agree with Fisher that the two facts he mentions are soft facts, but he is
mistaken in claiming that they are nevertheless fixed at future times. We must
keep in mind that whether a fact is hard or soft is not agent-relative. We’ve been
focusing on an agent (Smith, for the most part) having or not having power over
this or that fact because we’re interested in human freedom, but the hard fact/soft
fact distinction goes beyond the issue of human agency. The distinction gets at
those facts that are counterfactually dependent upon what happens in the future
(soft facts) and those that are counterfactually independent of what happens in
the future (hard facts).
Take Fisher’s first example. Granted, given that he is now chained to his
office chair, he can’t now do anything such that, were he to do it, then he would
not have gone to the store a day before he was chained to his office chair, but that
doesn’t mean that the latter fact is fixed. For clearly, someone—namely his
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captors—could have done something such that were they to do it, then Fischer
would not have gone to the store a day before he was chained to his office
chair—namely, they could have refrained from chaining him to his chair.
However, there’s nothing anyone can now do such that, were they to do it, then
Fischer would not have gone to the store yesterday. That fact about the past is
fixed and therefore it is a hard fact about the past.
Nor is human agency in general key to the notion of whether something is
fixed or not. Take Fischer’s second example. It’s not true that there’s nothing
anyone can do at t2 such that, were they to do it, then Judy would not have sat at
t1 prior to the sun’s rising at t2. God, at least, can do something at t2—namely,
destroy the sun—such that, were he to do it, then Judy would not have sat at t1
prior to the sun’s rising at t2. Indeed, even agency simpliciter is not essential to
the notion of fixity. So for all we know, all the atoms in the sun could undergo a
random quantum fluctuation at t2 so that the sun then blows itself apart. If that
were to happen, then (again) Judy would not have sat at t1 prior to the sun’s
rising at t2. However, nothing whatsoever can happen at t2 such that, were it to
happen, then Judy would not have sat at t1. That fact about the past is fixed and
therefore it is a hard fact about the past.
So when Fischer says, ‘Thus, it is very important to distinguish two sets of
issues: first, temporal nonrelationality and relationality (i.e., hardness and
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softness), and second, fixity and non-fixity (i.e., being out of one’s control and
being in one’s control)’ (Fischer, 1994, p. 115), he is simply confused. It is
precisely because some sorts of facts are temporally nonrelational that they are
fixed (hard facts) while other sorts of facts are temporally relational, and
therefore not fixed (soft facts).
Fischer seems to think that if f is not fixed, then any agent whatsoever must
have counterfactual power over f. But as I’ve argued, this isn’t the case. What is
the case is that if f is not fixed, then (assuming God exists) some agent has
counterfactual power over f, while if f is fixed, then no agent whatsoever
(including God) has counterfactual power over f. It’s important to keep in mind
how all this relates to ATD. The Ockhamist isn’t trying to demonstrate that Smith
is free in killing Jones, he’s merely trying to block the inference that says he can’t
be free in killing Jones from the assumption that God already knew he was going
to kill Jones. The Ockhamist does so by denying that God’s already having
known (or believed) that Smith would kill Jones is fixed, insisting that it’s not
true that no agent whatsoever has counterfactual power over God’s already
having known that Smith would kill Jones. Hence, the theological determinist
cannot go on to infer that Smith does not have counterfactual power over God’s
past knowledge (or infallible belief). Smith may be unfree in killing Jones for all
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sorts of reasons, but the Ockhamist need only show is that he is not unfree
because of what God already knew.
So this brings us right back to the question, is God’s believing at t1 that Smith
will kill Jones at t2 a hard fact or soft fact? Fischer thinks it must be a ‚hard-type
soft-fact,‛ but in light of what I have argued, that amounts to nothing more than
saying that it is a hard fact, for someone’s possessing the property believing that S
will do X at t2 is not something over which anyone has counterfactual power.
After all, no matter what Smith (or anyone else, including God) does at t2, Brown
will still have believed at t1 that Smith would kill Jones at t2. So why should it be
different for God? Once again, Fischer ‘can see no good reason to deny that the
property of believing exhibits this sort of resilience [to the future] when
possessed by God’.
Insofar as there is no distinction to be drawn between hard/soft facts and
fixed/non-fixed facts, as I have argued, Fischer therefore cannot grant that
Plantinga’s equivalence argument is sound. If he insists that God’s belief at t1
that S will do X at t2 is a fixed fact, then he must (I maintain) grant that it is a
hard fact. If, furthermore, he thinks that it’s simply being true at t1 that S will do
X at t2 is not a fixed fact, then he must (as indeed he does) grant that it is also a
soft fact. As a result, he must deny that fixity or non-fixity is transferred through
necessary equivalence, for God’s believing that p is necessarily equivalent to p.
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Fischer could simply bite the bullet and deny that if p is a soft fact and p is
necessarily equivalent to q, then q is a soft fact. Indeed, he could argue ad
hominem that the Ockhamist must deny this Transfer through Necessary
Equivalence Principle as well, as follows: that S does X at t2 is necessarily
equivalent to God’s believing that S does X at t2. But while S has causal power
over the former (S can causally bring it about that S doesn’t do X at t2), S has
only counterfactual power over the latter (S cannot causally bring about God’s
beliefs). Therefore, we have a counter-instance to the Transfer through Necessary
Equivalence Principle.
I’m not sure this reply succeeds, but I won’t pursue it. Instead, I would argue
that Fischer’s move from the hardness of H’s believing at t1 that S will do X at t2
to the hardness of God’s believing at t1 that S will do X at t2, on the grounds that
the property believing that S will do X at t2 is a ‚hard property‛, is fallacious. For
the human being, H, and God do not really exemplify the same property. Once
again, they are at best only analogous properties, and to follow up on the
argument I started on earlier, God’s believing that p is more closely analogous to
Brown’s correctly believing that p, which is a soft fact, than it is to Brown’s simply
believing that p.
I would go even further and say that God’s believing that p is even more
closely analogous to Brown’s infallibly believing that p. Now there aren’t very
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many things that a human being can believe infallibly, if any. One possibility that
comes to mind is the Cartesian cogito. I cannot, it seems, be mistaken in believing
that I exist. But this is interesting, for if God’s belief that p is analogous to my
belief in my own existence, at least in as much as both are infallible beliefs, then
the ontological relationship between God and the state of affairs p is in some
manner analogous to the relationship between myself and the fact of my own
existence—a very close relationship indeed. So it seems that much more
plausible to think that if p is a soft fact, then God’s belief that p must also be so.
Once again we’ve entered into some fairly speculative metaphysical territory,
and to that extent my arguments are hardly of the ‚knock-down‛ variety.
Nevertheless, I do think that what I’ve said is sufficient to transfer the burden of
proof onto those who would insist that God’s past beliefs ought to be construed
as hard facts over which there can be no counterfactual power. That burden, I
think, has not yet been met.

3.8. Just Another Kind of Compatibilism?
So then, does Ockhamism then give us a way of maintaining a libertarian
view of freedom in the face of divine omniscience? Strictly speaking, the answer
has to be, ‘Not necessarily.’ For the sorts of things I’ve said so far sound awfully
reminiscent of what a compatibilist would say in regard to causal determinism,
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according to which any event is entailed by the conjunction of some causal laws
and the state of the world at a time. In other words, let L be a statement of all the
laws of nature and let St describe the state of the world at t, where t is any
arbitrary time. Causal determinism then has it that, if p is true, then (St & L)
entails p. If p is ‘Smith will kill Jones tomorrow at 5pm’, then Smith’s action is
entailed by the laws of nature together with the state of the world at a given
time, say, a million years ago. But Smith has absolutely no power over what the
world was like a million years ago or over the laws of nature, and so he should
have no power whatsoever over his actions, if determinism is true. This, in
summary form, is Peter Van Inwagen’s ‚Consequence Argument‛ against
determinism (Van Inwagen, 1983, pp, 94-105). The libertarian, of course, rejects
determinism while the hard determinist rejects the existence of human freedom,
both on the basis of this or similar reasoning.
The compatibilist, however, might respond as follows. Granted, Smith has no
causal power over past states of the world or the power to break the laws of
nature, but he may nevertheless have counterfactual power over one or the other.
In other words, if determinism is true, it doesn’t follow that Smith would cause
the past to have been different or break a law of nature, if he were to refrain from
killing Jones. It follows only that if he were to refrain, then either the past would
have been different or some actual law of nature would not have been a law.

123

(David Lewis prefers the latter alternative since it doesn’t involve ‚backtracking‛
counterfactuals (Lewis, 1981). To me it makes no difference; I reject both forms of
compatibilism.)
As I just sketched it, the compatibilist’s response to the Consequence
Argument sounds only too similar to the Ockhamist’s response to ATD. Given
that (St & L) entails a future contingent proposition, does ‘St & L’ express a soft
fact? I should think than an incompatibilist would be loath to say so. But then the
Ockhamist seems to face a dilemma. Either he sides with the compatibilist and
holds that ‘St & L’ is, like God’s past beliefs, a soft fact and so gives up on being a
libertarian, or he must come up with a plausible reason why ‘St & L’ should be
considered a hard fact while God’s past beliefs should be considered soft facts.
The way out of this problem is to embrace the second horn of the dilemma. It
can indeed be argued that there is a crucial difference between the sorts of facts
over which the Ockhamist says we have counterfactual power, namely God’s
beliefs, and the sorts of facts over which the compatibilist says we have
counterfactual power, namely the laws of nature or past states of the world. The
difference is that there is no causal connection between God’s believing that p is
the case and p’s being the case, while there is, of course, a causal connection
between (St & L) and events subsequent to t, given the truth of determinism. But
simply stating that there is no causal connection between God’s believing that p
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and p’s being the case is not enough; it must be shown how this can be. In the
following chapters I will argue that Luis de Molina has successfully shown this
by means of his theory of divine scientia media or ‚middle knowledge.‛
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CHAPTER 4
MOLINISM AND THE SOURCE QUESTION
4.1. The Source of God’s Foreknowledge
We ended the last chapter having raised a dilemma for the Ockhamist, one
which can only be successfully navigated by denying that any causal connection
need exist between God’s belief that p will obtain and the fact that p will obtain.
But why should this be a problem? Why not just deny any such causal
connection and be done with it? What reason do we have to think that there may
be any such connection in the first place? After all, Brown’s believing, or even
knowing, that p does not cause it to be the case that p, so why shouldn’t it be the
same for God’s believing or knowing that p?
The issue arises when trying to answer what Freddoso calls the source
question: how does God know (or infallibly believe) the contingent future. What
‚epistemic resources,‛ to put it crudely, does God have by which he is able to
know, in the apodeictic sense, what will contingently happen in the created
order? What I think will become apparent is that there’s a very good case to be
made for positing a causal connection between God’s epistemic states and what
God knows as the only way by which God’s knowledge of contingent events
could be secured, at least in a way that’s consistent with the divine nature. The
challenge will then be to argue that such a causal connection need not exist in
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order for God to be able to know infallibly the contingent future, a challenge that
I will argue has been met by Luis de Molina with his theory of scientia media or
‚middle knowledge.‛ But first, let us lay out the problem.
As an interesting historical note, Ockham himself did not think it possible to
give a satisfactory answer to the source question. Or, at any rate, he did not
attempt to give such an answer: ‘It has to be held without any doubt that God
knows all future contingent facts evidently and with certainty. But to explain this
evidently, and to express the manner in which He knows all future contingent
facts, is impossible for any intellect in this life’ (Ockham, 1957, p. 133). In other
words, it must be held as a matter of revealed faith (contra the Open Theism
school) that God knows the contingent future, and it must remain a mystery as to
how he knows it.
The problem with Ockham’s non-solution approach to the source question is
that, it seems, any answer we might give is either inconsistent with the divine
nature, classically conceived, or leads to some form of determinism. We’ve
already met, in chapter two, with one possible answer to the source question,
namely the eternity solution of St. Thomas Aquinas. There I argued that God
cannot know the contingent future simply as a result of its being eternally
present to his epistemic activity, as this theory impugns the doctrine of divine
aseity. Furthermore, even putting that issue aside, such knowledge would afford
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God no providential control over contingent events. Contrary to the doctrine of
divine providence that we discussed at the outset, God’s immediate ‚perception‛
of a future contingent event in its real or actual existence, while it provides one
sort of explanation as to how God knows what will happen, does not help to
explain how God’s intends or permits that the event occur. In other words,
whatever will happen depends in some way or other on the will of God, on God’s
decision to allow it to happen or his actively causally contributing to its
happening. Once again, a provident God is not an eternal observer but an eternal
participant, who actively guides the course of history toward its divinely preestablished outcome.
The problem with the Thomistic approach, as was pointed out very early on
by John Duns Scotus (Langston, 1986, pp. 19f.), is that it tries to explain God’s
knowledge of the contingent future as a kind of purely intellectual knowledge, a
speculative ‚knowledge of vision‛ (scientia visionis)—without, that is, making
any mention of the functioning of the divine will. Future contingent events are
understood to be directly present to the divine intellect which apprehends them
in their real existence. However, the full explanation for any event that occurs in
the created order must include some reference to the divine will, to the fact that
this created order exists because God has willed it to exist. So one factor in the
explanation of how God knows that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow must be the
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fact that God has willed to create a world in which such an event occurs,
presumably because it will be ordered toward the greater good and contribute
somehow to the fulfillment of God’s purposes. Knowing that he has so willed
accounts, at least in part, for the fact that he knows what will happen in it. Had
God willed to create another world, one in which Jones or Smith never existed,
then of course God would not know that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow. So we
might say that the story told by St. Thomas Aquinas begins too late in the game.
For God to have the kind of immediate intellectual apprehension of the
progression of temporal events, whether as ‚present in eternity‛ or not, it must
already be posited that God has in fact willed to create a world in which such
events occur.
So any explanation of God’s foreknowledge (or eternal knowledge of the
contingent order) must refer in some way or other to the divine will. God knows
what will happen in the created order because he knows what he has willed to
bring about in the created order. To be fair to St. Thomas, there are numerous
passages where he suggests just such a role for the divine will in giving rise to
God’s knowledge of vision. He says that the causal relationship between God’s
knowledge and what he knows is the opposite of the causal relationship between
human knowledge and what we know. As said earlier, we know things by being
causally acted upon by them, while God, who is First Cause and purus actus
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knows things because, in willing them to be, he causes them to be. Aquinas says,
‘God’s knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it’
(ST IaIæ, 14, 8). Unfortunately, these two approaches to understanding the
source of God’s knowledge—the one via God’s existence in eternity and the other
via the role of the divine will—never seem to be integrated into a single, coherent
theory in Aquinas’s writings, and when he treats explicitly of the issue of God’s
knowledge of contingent things, he inevitably returns to the eternity solution as
his preferred approach.

4.2. The Role of the Divine Will
We can do no better than to turn to Duns Scotus for a fully articulated theory
of how the divine will functions in giving rise to God’s knowledge of
contingents.1 Scotus suggests that what the divine intellect knows can be divided
into two (non-temporal) stages: what it knows before the divine will has willed
something and what it knows after the divine will has willed something. Scotus
speaks of this progression in terms of ‚instants of nature‛ as opposed to instants
of time, since there are no times apart from creation. Therefore, the language of
‚before‛ and ‚after‛ here should be understood to mean conceptually prior to and
conceptually posterior to. Nevertheless, I find Scotus’s device of ‚instants of
nature‛ to be congenial enough, so what does the divine intellect know in the
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first ‚instant of nature‛? According to Scotus, it knows whatever is knowable as
a result of its comprehension of the divine nature itself, which is ens infinitum or
infinite being, and which is the primary (and at this instant of nature, the only)
object of the divine intellect. To wit, it knows the logical and metaphysical
structure of being, which is to say all logically and metaphysically necessary
states of affairs, as well as the infinite array of possibilities in which being may be
exemplified, which is to say, all contingent states of affairs insofar as they are
possible. In other words, since the metaphysical modality of any state of affairs is
essential to it, God knows in the first instant of nature the metaphysical
modalities of all states of affairs. Since those states of affairs that necessarily
obtain a fortiori actually obtain, God knows that those states actually obtain. But
in the first instant of nature, the actuality of contingent states is not yet settled,
and so, if p is possible but contingent, God does not, in the first instant of nature,
know that p is the case, only that possibly p is the case. Again, since God knows all
the infinite ways in which his essence can be imitated or ‚participated in‛ by
finite creatures, he knows, for each finite creaturely essence E, that E can be
exemplified. Let us call what God knows in the first instant of nature his ‚natural
knowledge‛ (what Aquinas calls his knowledge of ‚simple intelligence‛).
It follows from what has been said that God knows through natural
knowledge which are the maximally consistent sets of states of affairs, i.e., which
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sets of states constitute entire possible worlds. What he does not yet know, in the
first instant of nature, is which world is the actual world. That is settled in the
second instant of nature, when the divine will selects from among the various
compossible states which ones he will causally contribute to bringing about.
Now, to what aspects of a possible world would God’s causal contribution
extend? According to Scotus, it extends to any metaphysically contingent state of
affairs whatsoever. Since contingent states ‘carry no mark of their actuality’
(Langston, 1986, p. 19) it is due solely to the extrinsic determination of the divine
will that they either do or do not actually obtain. Thus we can see why, for
Scotus, the divine will is the sole source of contingency in the created order. The
ultimate reason why there are things that could have been otherwise is because
God could have willed to create things otherwise.
Since a state of affairs like Smith’s killing Jones tomorrow at 5pm is contingent—
it neither has to happen nor has to not happen—the reason it does happen is
because God wills it to happen. This is not to say that Scotus denies the reality of
secondary causation (i.e., it is not to say that Smith himself is not a genuine cause
of his action), but secondary causes do not operate independently of the First
Cause. Indeed, according to Scotus, the activity of any cause is embedded within
an ‚essentially ordered‛ hierarchy of causes, which terminates in the activity of
the First Cause. So if the activity of a secondary cause is to be seen as contingent,
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then the activity of the First Cause upon which it depends must also be
contingent, and the source of contingency in the First Cause (i.e., God) is God’s
will, which is absolutely free.
So in the first instant of nature, God knows what states of affairs are possible;
in the second instant of nature God wills which contingent states of affairs will
actually obtain; and in the third instant of nature God knows which contingent
states he has willed to obtain, which explains his knowledge of the entire
contingent order. God knows that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow because he has
willed that that event should occur and he knows that he has willed it so. The
event is contingent because God could have willed otherwise. If God were a
necessarily acting cause, then the event of Smith’s killing Jones would also be
necessary, but since God is a freely acting cause and would have willed to create
a different world than the one he in fact created, then the effects of his creative
will are also contingent. Thus, for Scotus, God knows future contingents because
they are the effects of his own free, contingently willed creative choices.
All this, of course, sounds crassly deterministic and, as Eef Dekker has
argued, does not adequately represent Scotus’s actual views, which are far more
nuanced (Dekker, 1998). I shall discuss those nuances shortly, but for now, let us
note that we have in the foregoing an answer to the source question, even if it is
not actually Scotus’s answer (it is Scotistic in spirit, though, as it places primary
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importance on the role of the divine will in accounting for God’s prescience). The
source of God’s knowledge of the contingent future is (a) his natural knowledge
by which he knows which states of affairs are possible, and (b) his so-called free
knowledge of his own will, i.e., his being aware of his own choices as to which
contingent states of affairs he, as First Cause, will bring about either directly (as
sole cause) or by moving secondary causes (including human agents) toward
producing this or that effect.
Before I begin to criticize this view, I want to get a little clearer picture of the
causal efficacy of God’s will and how that gives rise to foreknowledge. So, for
example, God knew that (let us say) the Red Sea would be parted because he
knew that he, as sole cause, was going to bring that event about. In this case, God
willed to bring about a state of affairs directly, and knowing that he has so willed,
he knows that the state of affairs will come about. On the other hand, he knew
that, e.g., galaxies would evolve because he created the various substances of
such-and-such natural kinds and situated them in the appropriate initial
conditions that would, given God’s will to sustain them in existence, eventuate in
the formation of galaxies. In this case, God willed to bring about a contingent
state of affairs, and thereby knew that it would obtain, by initiating a sequence of
secondary causes that operate according to necessities of nature.
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But what about states of affairs involving the free decisions of rational
beings? In what way might God’s will be causally efficacious in bringing about a
state of affairs such as Smith’s deciding to kill Jones? Most thinkers, certainly those
in the medieval and late-medieval debate, were agreed in thinking that human
volitions could not be considered free if they were the effects of secondary
causes. Smith’s volition cannot be the terminus ad quem of a causal chain
involving natural kind substances and thus come about by a necessity of nature.
In this regard, medieval thinkers cannot be classified as ‚compatibilists‛ in the
modern sense. No such thinker would hold that a volition can be determined by
natural causes and still be free (Freddoso, 1988, p. 24). So God’s will to bring
about Smith’s volition to kill Jones, which would give rise to his knowledge that
Smith will kill Jones, cannot be akin to his causal influence upon secondary
causes that bring about effects by natural necessity.
Can God’s will concerning Smith’s volition be construed as primary cause of
that volition? I think ultimately this is what Scotus ends up having to say,
although he tries desperately to avoid saying it, and for good reason. Smith’s
volition cannot, by almost any stretch of the imagination, be considered free if
God is the ultimate cause of its coming to be. Certainly, no libertarian could
countenance such a view. But it will be instructive to take a look at how Scotus
himself sees the role of God’s will in regard to free volitions.
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Pace occasionalism, Scotus (along with most other medieval thinkers) thinks
that the human will (or human agent) must be seen as making a genuine causal
contribution to its own volitions, and therefore construes the role of God’s
influence as one of co-causality with the human will in bringing about a
particular volition. Eef Dekker tells us that
Scotus distinguishes between three types of co-causality. The first is
accidentally ordered, like two mules pulling a cart. That is to say,
although neither mule is sufficient on its own to pull the cart, it is
conceivable that an intensification of the power already present in the one
mule would enable it to pull the whole load by itself. So it is about
accidental differences of quantity.
The second type of co-causality is essentially ordered and
participative, like a first cause moving a second cause without the second
cause being able to move itself. As, for example, the hand moves the stick
to move the ball. The stick cannot move unless it is moved by the hand.
The third kind of ordering is the essentially ordered ‘autonomous’
causation. A well-known example is the causality of a husband and wife
in bringing forth offspring. The difference between accidental and
essential autonomous co-causation is brought clearly to the fore by the fact
that a man (or a woman) will not be able by some kind of intensification,
to bring forth offspring by him- or herself. Both are needed to bring about
the effect. It is also clear that an autonomous co-cause is not a participative
co-cause, for the man does not cause the causality of his wife in begetting
offspring (Dekker, 1998, pp. 105-06).
It seems clear that the relationship of co-causality involved in a particular human
volition cannot be of the first kind, viz. accidentally ordered. Both God’s and the
human will’s co-causal contribution are essential, first, because God cannot
possibly produce a human volition by himself, and second, because a human will
cannot do anything apart from God’s conservation.
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Nor, it should be pointed out, is God’s causal influence sufficiently accounted
for just in terms of his conserving the human will in existence, so that the will is
itself the sole and adequate cause of its volition. If the volition were to occur
without God’s particular causal contribution, then God could not know that it
would occur, for again, God knows that a state of affairs will obtain if and only if
he wills it to obtain. Scotus himself argues as much:
God does not foreknow that this will happen unless he knows the
determination of his will, as has been said.< But if the created will were
the complete cause of its volition and of contingent human acts, to
whichever extent God knew the determination of his [own] will, he would
not know that this would happen (Dekker, 1998, p. 106).
But given this view of things, I think Scotus must conclude that the relationship
of essentially ordered co-causality between the human will and the divine will in
producing a particular human volition is of the second, participative kind, that of
instrumental cause to first cause. In other words, God must be seen as causing
the very act of causality by which the human will produces its volition.
The problem with this solution is that it renders impossible the libertarian
view of human freedom the preservation of which has been a desideratum
throughout this essay. Recall that according to that view, an action is free only if
the agent could have done otherwise given the same causal history of the world up to
the time of the action. Supposing that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow, he will do
so freely only if his not doing so does not entail that some past causal event would
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not have occurred; in other words, only if his not doing so does not require the
past causal history of the world to have been different from what it actually was.
Scotus, however, is not without a reply to this objection. He could insist that
it’s not the case that the past causal history of the world would have been
different from what it actually was if Smith were to refrain from killing Jones, for
God’s causality is not in the past relative to Smith’s volition but is simultaneous
with it. The standard example used to illustrate essentially ordered causality—
that of a person moving her arm to move a stick to move a ball—shows this to be
the case. The causality exercised by the person on her arm is simultaneous with
her arm’s causing the stick to move, which in turn is simultaneous with the
stick’s causing the ball to move. Likewise, the causality exercised by God on the
individual will is simultaneous with the will’s eliciting a particular volition,
which in turn brings about a particular commanded act. Therefore there is no
question of Smith’s having counterfactual power over some past causal state of
affairs, in which case it might seem that Smith maintains libertarian freedom
despite the fact that there is a causally sufficient condition for that volition,
namely God’s will, for the latter is a contemporaneous condition, not an antecedent
one.
Nevertheless, despite getting around the issue of the fixity of the causal past, I
think libertarians would still see Smith’s freedom as being compromised if his
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volitions had causally sufficient conditions other than Smith himself, regardless
of the fact that those conditions obtain at the time of his volition rather than prior
to it. Molina, to be sure, rejected such a view. As Freddoso points out,
Libertarians often assume that the indeterminism of free actions can be
epitomized by the simple requirement that a free action be one that is not
naturally determined by the causal history of the world, that is, one that is
not naturally necessitated by causes operative at times before it takes
place.< This condition is one that modern libertarians accept and that
modern compatibilists repudiate. Nonetheless, it is too weak to capture
the causal indeterminism that Molina attributes to free action.< Clearly,
we need an additional clause that focuses on the activity of causes other
than the agent in question at the very moment when the free action takes
place. Consider this:
At t P freely contributes causally to S only if (i) at t P contributes
causally to S and (ii) P’s contributing causally to S does not obtain at t
by a necessity of nature and (iii) the total causal activity at t of causes
other than P is compossible with P’s not causally contributing at t to S
(Freddoso, 1988, pp. 26-27).
Therefore, we need to amend our originally stated necessary condition for
libertarian freedom from the first chapter, (LF), to read as follows:
(LF*) An agent S freely does A at t in w only if (i) S does A at t in w, and
(ii) for some world w*, w* shares the same causal history as w up to
t, and (iii) the causal activity of everything other than S at t in w* is
the same as the causal activity of everything other than S at t in w,
and (iv) S refrains from doing A at t in w*.
Given clause (iii), it is impossible for Smith’s volition to be free if it is the
terminus of a series of essentially ordered causes with God’s willing activity
being the first cause within that series.
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So the dilemma facing the classical theist regarding the source of God’s
knowledge of the contingent future looks like this: if p is a true future contingent
proposition, then God knows that p is true either by means of his natural
knowledge or by means of his free knowledge. If it is by means of his natural
knowledge, then p is not contingent after all but metaphysically necessary, for
God’s natural knowledge is of all necessary truths, as was said above. But if, on
the other hand, God knows p by means of his free knowledge, then again p,
although metaphysically contingent (there are possible worlds in which p is
false), turns out to be causally necessary (there are no possible worlds with the
same causal history as the actual world in which p is false), because its truth
results from God’s own causal contribution to the created order. God would
know that p is true because he wills that p is true and causally contributes to p’s
being true. Duns Scotus seems to ‚bite the bullet‛ and grasp the second horn of
the dilemma. God knows that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow because he wills
that Smith do so. Langston expresses the obvious difficulty with this approach as
follows:
According to Scotus, not only must God directly will the existence of the
actions of agents who are not free, but he must also directly will the
actions of free agents < God determines what acts of free agents are
actual, and these actions are contingent because God could will other
actions than those he in fact wills. Nevertheless, these actions would not
seem to be free since no free agent can act otherwise than as God wills.
Apparently, Scotus’ analysis of omniscience rescues contingency, but it
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does so at the expense of the freedom of free agents—particularly human
beings (Langston, 1986, p. 24).
Langston goes on to argue that Scotus (contrary to the standard view) is
ultimately a compatibilist when it comes to human freedom and so he isn’t being
inconsistent in holding that God knows the future free actions of humans by
causally bringing them about (Langston, 1986, pp. 39f.). Be that as it may, those
classical theists who adhere to a libertarian view of human freedom clearly
cannot embrace Scotus’s theory of divine knowledge. But then the problem
becomes acute: how can God know the causally contingent future if he can know
it only by means of knowing what he himself causally brings about?

4.3. The Theory of Middle Knowledge
Since its ‚rediscovery‛ by Alvin Plantinga in his work The Nature of Necessity
(before that it was hardly known outside of Catholic seminary lectures), Luis
Molina’s theory of scientia media or ‚middle knowledge‛ has been one of the
most discussed theories of divine knowledge in the contemporary literature.
Molina’s insight was to suggest that God has more ‚epistemic resources‛ at his
disposal than just his natural knowledge of metaphysically necessary truths and
his free knowledge of metaphysically contingent truths resulting from his
knowledge of his own causal contribution to the created order. God also has
what Molina calls ‚middle knowledge‛, so-called because it is ‚midway‛
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between God’s natural and free knowledge, insofar as (a) like free knowledge it
has as its objects metaphysically contingent truths, but (b) like natural
knowledge it does not result from God’s awareness of what he himself wills to
bring about in creation. The objects of God’s middle knowledge are true
independently of God’s will, or ‚prevolitionally.‛ As Molina puts it,
[S]uch knowledge should in no way be called free, both because it is prior
to any free act of God’s will and also because it was not within God’s
power to know through this type of knowledge anything other than what
He in fact knew. Second, it should likewise not be said that this
knowledge is natural in the sense of being so innate to God that he could
not have known the opposite of that which He knows through it (Molina,
1988, p. 168).
So we can define middle knowledge as follows. Let us say that God middle knows
that p iff (i) p is contingently true and (ii) God could not have brought it about
that p is false.
Molina’s theory gets its ‚bite‛ from the sorts of propositions that fall within
the scope of God’s middle knowledge, among which are propositions that
specify, for every possible person and each possible circumstance in which that
person may be situated, how that person would act were he or she placed in that
circumstance.
Finally, the third type [of knowledge in God] is middle knowledge, by
which, in virtue of the most profound and inscrutable comprehension of
each faculty of free choice, He saw in His own essence what each such
faculty would do with its innate freedom were it to be place in this or that
or, indeed, in infinitely many orders of things—even though it would
really be able, if it so willed, to do the opposite (Molina, 1988, p. 168).
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In terms of the ontology of individual creaturely essences, if E is the essence of a
creature endowed with free will, then middle knowledge allows God to know,
for every possible circumstance C in which the unique instance x of E might find
itself, what x would do were x to find itself in C, even though x could, if it so
willed, do something else in that very same circumstance. Hence, God knows via
middle knowledge what x would freely do were x in C.
In the current literature such items of God’s middle knowledge are usually
referred to as ‚counterfactuals of freedom,‛ in spite of the fact that, while
subjunctive in form and expressing what an agent would freely do in a given
circumstance, they are not necessarily contrary to fact. For example, according to
Molina, God knew by means of middle knowledge that Adam would freely eat
of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil if he were tempted to do so,
which (so the story goes) he in fact was. Nevertheless, despite the slightly
misleading (and somewhat clunky) nature of the expression, I will follow the
current practice of referring to these objects of God’s middle knowledge as
‚counterfactuals of freedom‛ (hereafter: CFs).
God’s foreknowledge, therefore, ends up being a function of his prevolitional
middle knowledge of the CFs and his postvolitional free knowledge of his own
causal contribution to the created order. For example, in the case of Smith, God
knows by means of middle knowledge that if Smith were to end up in the
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circumstances described, then Smith would freely kill Jones. It could have been
the case that he would not kill Jones were he in those same circumstances, but as
a matter of contingent fact, Smith would indeed do so. God knows this fact about
Smith prior to and independently of any act of God’s creative will. In other
words, even if God chose not to create at all, it would still have been true of
Smith (or, equivalently, of the unique instance of Smithity) that he would have
killed Jones had he ended up in the relevant circumstances.
Furthermore, God also knows what he himself wills to causally bring about in
the created order. To simplify, let’s assume that God’s act of creative will
involves his causally bringing it about that Smith will be in the circumstances
described at the outset. Therefore, God knows that this will be the case because it
is a result of his own freely willed causal contribution to the created world. In
other words, God knows that Smith will be in such-and-such circumstances
because God himself causes him to be in those circumstances.
As a result, God knows what Smith will in fact do in the circumstances in
which he will find himself: for given that Smith would kill Jones were he in suchand-such circumstances (while having the ability to refrain from doing so in
those same circumstances), and given that Smith will be in such-and-such
circumstances, it follows that Smith will, as a matter of contingent fact, kill Jones.
The crucial feature of this theory is that God’s knowledge that Smith will kill
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Jones is not a result of God’s causally bringing about that state of affairs; rather
such knowledge is a by-product of God’s free knowledge that Smith will be in
such-and-such circumstances (which is a result of God’s causal activity) along
with his middle knowledge of what Smith would do were he in those
circumstances. Consequently, Molina need not, unlike Scotus, posit a causal link
between God’s will and human action in order to explain God’s foreknowledge
of that action. Freddoso nicely summarizes Molina’s theory as follows:
On Molina’s view, then, the source of God’s foreknowledge of absolute
future contingents is threefold: (i) His prevolitional natural knowledge of
metaphysically necessary states of affairs, (ii) His prevolitional middle
knowledge of conditional future contingents, and (iii) His free knowledge
of the total causal contribution He himself wills to make to the created
world. By (i) He knows which spatio-temporal arrangements of secondary
causes are possible and which contingent effects might emanate from any
such arrangement. By (ii) He knows which contingent effects would in fact
emanate from any possible spatio-temporal arrangement of secondary
causes. By (iii) He knows which secondary causes He wills to create and
conserve and how he wills to cooperate with them via His intrinsically
neutral general concurrence. So given His natural knowledge, His middle
knowledge, and His free knowledge of His own causal contribution to the
created world, He has free knowledge of all absolute future contingents
(Freddoso, 1988, pp. 23-24) .
‘Conditional future contingents’ is Freddoso’s expression referring to CFs.
As a result, the concerns expressed both at the end of the last chapter and in
the last section are overcome on Molina’s theory. It’s not the case that if Smith
were to refrain from killing Jones, then some causal state of affairs involving a
cause other than Smith himself that obtained either prior to or simultaneous with
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his doing so would not have obtained, which is to say that Smith is able to act in
a causally indeterministic way, or with libertarian freedom, in such
circumstances. Should Smith decide to refrain from killing Jones, the causal
history of the world up to the time of his doing so can be identical to the causal
history of the world up to the time of his actually killing Jones, for each such
history includes merely God’s bringing it about that Smith is in the relevant
circumstances. God’s knowledge of what Smith will actually do is not part of
that causal history and therefore is not part of the ‚hard‛, causally closed past. It
is instead ‚counterfactually sensitive‛ to what Smith decides to do. In other
words, Smith can do something such that were he to do it, then God would not
have known what he in fact knew, even though Smith cannot do something such
that were he to do it, then he would not have been in the circumstances in which,
in fact, he was. But the latter is hardly a limitation on Smith’s freedom to act in
one way or another in the circumstances in which he finds himself.
We should also keep in mind (contrary to my illustration) that God’s causal
contribution need not consist of his causing a particular agent to find itself in a
particular circumstance. That is, we need not think that God causes Smith to be
in the circumstance involving his choice of whether or not to kill Jones. Rather,
the circumstances in which free agents end up could themselves be the result
either of their own free decisions and actions or the free decisions and actions of
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other agents, who themselves were acting in circumstances brought about by the
free decisions and actions of still other agents, and so on. Therefore, God’s own
causal contribution to the created order could, on Molina’s theory, merely consist
of his creating what Linda Zagzebski calls a ‚world-germ‛ (Zagzebski, 1991, p.
129) or a set of initial conditions in which the initial stock of secondary causes act
so as to bring about further circumstances in which to act yet again, and so on. If
those secondary causes are deterministic (such as inanimate substances or nonrational animals), acting out of a necessity of nature, then God knows how they
would act in those initial conditions simply by means of his natural knowledge.
But if they are indeterministic secondary causes (such as free human beings or
even, as Freddoso suggests (1988, p. 29), indeterministic non-rational causal
agents such as sub-atomic particles and the like), then God knows how these
would act in the initial conditions by means of his middle knowledge, since as
indeterministic agents2 they can do otherwise than what they actually do in the
very same circumstances.
Upon willing to create those initial conditions, God would then know how
these secondary causes will act, and therefore in what circumstances they will
subsequently find themselves as a result of their actions, and again, since by
means of his middle knowledge God knows how they would act in those
subsequent circumstances, he knows how they will in fact act given that they will
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in fact be in those circumstances, and so on for the entire history of the created
world. So Molina’s theory results in an exceptionally powerful and
comprehensive doctrine of divine providence yet with God’s own causal activity
(miracles aside) consisting entirely of the acts of creation and conservation.
However, I would follow Freddoso in emphasizing that CFs need not be the
only objects of God’s middle knowledge. It is very often assumed in the literature
that middle knowledge just is the theory that God knows CFs, but this is
mistaken. As I mentioned above, the necessary and sufficient conditions for p to
be an object of middle knowledge are that p be contingent and that p is true
prevolitionally or independently of God’s creative will. Again, as Freddoso
suggests (1988, p. 29), a plausible candidate for such a proposition could be one
that describes, e.g., the indeterministic behavior of a sub-atomic particle. So
although we might have only probabalistic knowledge that a given particle will
decay under certain laboratory conditions, a Molinist might hold that God knows
by means of middle knowledge that the same particle would decay under such
conditions (independently of God’s willing or not willing that such be the case),
although its doing so is contingent and it might have been that it would not
decay under such conditions. While this point is not of direct concern to the issue
of reconciling God’s foreknowledge with human freedom, it is nonetheless of
great importance vis-à-vis the doctrine of providence in a world of
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indeterministic physical laws. Thus, as Lynne R. Baker has pointed out (personal
communication, October 15, 2008), even a compatibilist who might be inclined to
reject Molinism on the assumption that it is designed to reconcile libertarian
freedom with divine providence, may nevertheless have an interest in embracing
the theory insofar as it would, if successful, reconcile such providence with the
indeterministic behavior of matter at the sub-atomic level. That is to say, one
need not be a libertarian to be a Molinist, although I do think that one needs to be
a Molinist if one is to be a libertarian and a classical theist.
Furthermore, it is not only those in the Molinist camp who hold that God
knows CFs. Again as Freddoso (1988, p. 23) makes clear, the 16th century
Dominican theologians Bañez and Alvarez, the most well-known adversaries of
middle knowledge, also held that God knows, for every possible free creature,
what that creature would freely do in any possible circumstance in which it
might find itself. What distinguishes the Jesuit Molinists from the Dominican
anti-Molinists is that the former hold that the CFs are true independently of God’s
will, while the latter hold that they obtain as a result of God’s willing them to
obtain. As far as I can tell, this is identical to the view of Duns Scotus previously
outlined. Thus, Linda Zagzebski is mistaken in saying that ‘both Molinists and
Bañezians accepted the fact of middle knowledge’ (Zagzebski, 1991, p. 127).
Since, for Bañez, the CFs obtain by virtue of God’s decreeing that they do so, they
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would be instead objects of God’s postvolitional free knowledge, not of his
prevolitional middle knowledge. For Bañez, there is no such thing as the latter;
all contingent truths depend on God’s decree.
In this regard, Freddoso introduces the concept of a ‚creation situation‛
(Freddoso, 1988, pp. 47f.), which is the set of propositions that are true prior to
and independently of God’s creative act of will (i.e, in the first Scotistic ‚instant
of nature‛). Formally, for each world w, there is a creation situation CS(w), the set
whose members include all and only those states of affairs that God knows
prevolitionally in w. Thus, a creation situation defines a set of possible worlds
(what is often called a ‚galaxy‛ of worlds), viz. those worlds that are consistent
with every state of affairs p that God knows prevolitionally.
For Bañez and Alvarez, there is exactly one creation situation in which God
could find himself, call it ‘N,’ which is the set of all metaphysically necessary
states of affairs. Thus, God does not find himself in any particular ‚galaxy‛ of
worlds but he instead has access to the entire universe of (broadly) logical space
itself, for all such worlds are consistent with the set of metaphysically necessary
states of affairs. Thus, for any world w, God knows whatever is contingently true
in w postvolitionally. There are no contingent truths that fall outside of God’s
control. Which is to say that, for Bañez (as for Scotus), God has it within his
power to bring about any metaphysically possible world whatsoever.
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For Molina, on the other hand, there are many distinct creation situations in
which God may find himself. Since God has middle knowledge, for any possible
world w, CS(w) includes N, to be sure, but it also includes the set of CFs that are
true in w. Since CFs are contingently true, then which creation situation God in
fact finds himself in depends on which CFs are in fact true. In other words, the
galaxy of worlds to which God has access includes all and only those worlds that
are consistent with the union of N and the set of true CFs.
Thus, for example, since it was true from all eternity that Adam would sin if
he were tempted in the garden, then, even though it was possible for him not to
sin in those circumstances (since he was free)—i.e., even though there are
possible worlds in which it’s false that Adam would sin if he were tempted in the
garden—God could not bring about such a world. God could have created a
world in which Adam didn’t exist, or a world in which Adam was never tempted
in the garden, or even a world in which Adam is tempted in the garden and is
preserved from sinning by a special act of divine grace, but God could not have
created a world in which Adam is tempted in the garden and yet freely refrains
from sinning, given that the CF ‘If Adam were tempted in the garden, he would
freely sin’ was in fact true. That CF was part of God’s creation situation, and so
no world in which it is false was within the galaxy of worlds that God could have
brought about.
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To recapitulate, God’s having always known (or having known from eternity)
that Smith will kill Jones tomorrow comes about as a result of his middle
knowledge of what Smith would do were he in such-and-such circumstances and
his free knowledge that Smith will in fact be in those circumstances.
(1)
(2)

If Smith were in circumstance C, he would freely kill Jones.
Smith will be in circumstance C.

(3)

Smith will freely kill Jones.

Even though Smith finds himself in C as a result, ultimately, of God’s willing that
he be in C (but keep in mind what was said above about C itself possibly being
the result of Smith’s or some other agent’s free actions), with the result that (2) is
not something that Smith can do anything about—there are no worlds accessible
to Smith in which he does not end up in C—nevertheless (1) is, on Molina’s
theory, contingently true. Consequently, there is no basis on which to infer that
Smith’s action is in any way necessitated or determined. He can freely refrain
from killing Jones, and if he were to do so, then it would have been false that
were he in C, then he would have killed Jones; the opposite would have been
true instead.
Again, God knows (1) by means of middle knowledge and as such it is simply
given to God as a parameter delimiting the class of possible worlds that he can
see to being actual. Given that (1) is true, there is nothing God can do such that,
were he to do it, then Smith would not freely kill Jones were Smith to find
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himself in C (even though there’s something Smith can do in that regard, namely
freely refrain from killing Jones in C). Of course, given God’s essential goodness
he wants Smith to refrain from killing Jones, and indeed given his omnipotence
can compel Smith to refrain from killing Jones in C, but he cannot compel Smith to
freely refrain from killing Jones, since that implies a contradiction.
Yet again, God knows (2) by means of free knowledge, that is, by knowing
that he himself will causally bring it about that Smith is in C (or will causally
bring about the initial conditions which, given what else God knows through his
natural and middle knowledge, will eventuate in Smith’s being in C). As a result,
God knows (3), with infallible certitude, not because he brings it about causally
(as on Scotus’s view) but because he causally brings about the circumstances in
which Smith kills Jones (and thereby counterfactually brings about the truth that
he was going to kill Jones), with God knowing that Smith would indeed do just
that were he in those circumstances.

4.4. The Reconciliation Question Revisited
Having outlined Molina’s answer to the source question, it is worthwhile to
take a look at his answer to the reconciliation question, if only to dispel what I
think are some confusions on the matter, confusions into which Molina himself
seems to have fallen.
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So how exactly does middle knowledge bear on the reconciliation question?
In terms of our discussion thus far, how does middle knowledge serve to
undermine ATD? The manner in which I have presented the theory is as a way of
severing the causal connection between God’s knowing that p and p’s being true
in order to allow that God’s past beliefs might not belong to the ‚hard‛ causally
closed past, thus paving the way for an Ockhamistic solution to the reconciliation
question. Stripped down to its bare bones, ATD looks like this:
 (If God knew that p, then p)
t God knew that p
t p
The Ockhamistic solution advanced in the previous chapter denies the second
premise: God’s foreknowledge that p, although a logically sufficient condition for
p, is not a causally sufficient condition for p, and so were the agent referred to in p
to bring it about at t* > t that ~p (as she can if she is free), then it would not have
been the case that God knew (at t) that p. Again, my argument is that Molina’s
theory of middle knowledge is what makes such a move possible. By severing
the causal connection between p and God’s knowing that p, Molina makes it
possible to say that God’s knowledge is not part of the hard (i.e., counterfactually
inviolate) past relative to the time at which p obtains, so that the agent need not
be seen as having the sort of counterfactual power that is illegitimate from the
libertarian point of view.
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Molina himself, however, insists that this very move is illicit, insisting that
God’s foreknowledge is indeed part of the causally closed past and hence ‚fixed‛
for all future times. Consequently, Molina thinks, the Ockhamistic solution
involves the kind of power over the past that is intuitively understood to be
impossible. He says,
We must now examine the thesis by means of which a good many
thinkers reconcile our freedom of choice with divine foreknowledge and
predestination, and by virtue of which they think that these things cohere
well with one another. For they maintain that if, for instance, Peter, who,
let us assume, is going to sin at some future time, did not sin at that time
(which he is capable of because of his freedom), then God would bring it
about [emphasis mine] that He had never known that Peter was going to
sin, but that instead He had always known from eternity that Peter was
not going to sin.< Thus, they maintain that the proposition ‘Peter’s sin,
which is foreknown by God, is able not to occur’ is true in the divided
sense, not only because (i) if Peter were in fact not going to sin, as is
entirely possible, then God would never have foreknown his sin, but also
because (ii) if he does not sin, as is possible, God will at that moment bring
it about that from eternity He foreknew nothing other than that Peter was
not going to sin (Molina, 1988, p. 145).
Molina thus ascribes to the Ockhamist the belief not only in counterfactual power
over the past but also causal power over the past, at least in regard to divine
power. God is supposed to have the power to bring it about at the time of Peter’s
act that he always knew beforehand what Peter’s act was going to be.
Molina’s own response to ATD is to deny the logical principle according to
which the inference is drawn, viz. the so-called ‚Transfer Principle‛ (If  (
and t , then t ). Molina argues as follows:
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For in such a case, even if (i) the conditional is necessary (because in the
composed sense these two things cannot both obtain, namely, that God
foreknows something to be future and that the thing does not turn out
that way), and even if (ii) the antecedent is necessary in the sense in
question (because it is past-tense and because no shadow of alteration can
befall God), nonetheless the consequent can be purely contingent (Molina,
1988, p. 189).
Now, as I said in the first chapter when outlining ATD, if we interpret ‘t’ as I
have, viz. as ‘true in all possible worlds accessible as of t’, then (assuming the
primitive notion of ‚accessibility‛ that I’ve invoked is a coherent one) there is
just no denying the Transfer Principle. One might as well deny modus ponens. As
Edward Wierenga notes (1991, pp. 428-29), if ‘t’ is a ‚well-behaved‛ modal
operator, then it will yield a valid thesis according to Kripke’s ‚K‛ axiom
schema, as does any other modal operator. It will, in other words, be closed
under entailment.
Of course, Molina wouldn’t have had in mind any such notion as ‘true in all
accessible worlds.’ He instead worked with the notion of ‘accidental necessity’,
which, Freddoso tells us, is that modality which ‘has to do < with the mere
passage of time. For some metaphysically contingent states of affairs become
necessary simply by virtue of being fixed unalterably as part of the history of the
world’ (Freddoso, 1988, p. 13). So, given that God’s knowing (or infallibly
believing) that p will obtain at t is past relative to t, Molina insists that it must be
construed as accidentally necessary relative to t. Now, if ‘p’ concerns an agent’s
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free action or decision, then ‘p’ cannot be accidentally necessary, and since God’s
infallibly believing that p will obtain at t entails that p will obtain at t, it follows
(argues Molina) that accidental necessity must not be closed under entailment.
It turns out, I think, that the dispute between Molinists and Ockhamists on
this issue is merely a verbal one without any real substantive disagreement.
Freddoso says,
In opposition to the Ockhamists, Molina holds that God’s past beliefs are
just as necessary in the sense in question [i.e., accidentally necessary] as
are any other truths about the past. And, of course, there is no possible
world in which God once believed that Peter would sin at T and in which
Peter does not in fact sin at T. Yet if this alleged condition on freedom is
meant to capture the sense in which free action is indeterministic, then
Molina himself has what seems to be a wholly adequate alternative
condition. For he can distinguish what is accidentally necessary at a given
time from what belongs, strictly speaking, to the causal history of the
world at that time, where the world’s causal history includes only past
exercises of causal power (Freddoso, 1988, pp. 58-59).
In a key footnote to that passage, Freddoso goes on to say,
The notion of the causal history of the world may well be equivalent to the
conjunction of what Ockhamists are wont to call ‘hard’ facts about the
past. In this sense, Molina is not rejecting the claim that there is some
distinction to be drawn between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ facts about the past.
What he rejects is instead the claim that agents can have causal power
over the soft facts about the past (Freddoso, 1988, p. 59, n. 79).
The difference, therefore, between Ockhamists and Molinists is supposed to be
that Ockhamists think we have causal power over (at least some) soft facts about
the pasts, while Molinists admit no such causal power but only counterfactual

157

power. But this is emphatically not the case. Ockhamists do not subscribe to any
kind of causal power either over the hard past or over the soft past.
This is easily seen in how Ockhamists deal with Diodorus Cronus’s ‚Master
Argument‛ for Logical Determinism, discussed in the previous chapter. Suppose
I finish this dissertation in August of 2009. Suppose further that in August of
2007 you said to me, ‘You’ll finish your dissertation in two years.’ Thus, your
prediction was correct, and so we have a fact about the past: you correctly
predicted in August 2007 that I would finish my dissertation in two years. Does
that mean that I’m not free not to finish my dissertation this coming August? Of
course not. I could easily decide to put it off for another month. If I were to do so,
then your prediction would have been incorrect, but I wouldn’t thereby have
caused your prediction to have been incorrect. The correctness of your prediction
is a logical consequence of my finishing in August 2009, but it is surely not a
causal consequence of my doing so. Causes, whatever else they may be, must
precede (or at most be simultaneous with) their effects in time. Therefore, there’s
nothing I can do in August 2009 that would cause anything to have been true
prior to 2009, even though if I were to refrain from finishing my dissertation in
August 2009, then your prediction that I would finish in August 2009 would
have been false. The correctness of your prediction is counterfactually dependent
on my finishing, not causally dependent.
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In this respect, the Ockhamist and the Molinist are in agreement: if by
‘accidentally necessary’ Molina means something like the following:
p is accidentally necessary as of t =df. p is metaphysically contingent and
no one can, as of t, causally bring it about that ~p,
then the Ockhamist would have no difficulty is saying that such accidental
necessity is not closed under entailment. For the following entailment is certainty
true: your having correctly predicted in August 2007 that I will finish my
dissertation in August 2009 entails that I finish my dissertation in August 2009.
And as I just argued, neither I nor anyone else can, as of August 2007 or anytime
thereafter, causally bring it about that you didn’t correctly predict in August 2007
that I will finish my dissertation in August 2009. But it does not follow that no
one can, as of August 2007 or anytime thereafter, causally bring it about that I do
not finish my dissertation in August 2009. I certainly can.
What the Ockhamist would insist is that ‚hard-facthood‛ is closed under
entailment. Recall that a hard fact is one over which there is no counterfactual
power. If I have no counterfactual power over p, and p entails q, then I have no
counterfactual power over q (and since counterfactual power is weaker than
causal power, it follows a fortiori that I have no causal power over q). But Molina
insists that we do have counterfactual power over God’s past beliefs, as clause (i)
from the passage quoted earlier makes clear, and on this point too the Ockhamist
concurs. Thus, I see no real disagreement between Molinists and Ockhamists on
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this crucial point of the reconciliation question. Both would agree that God’s past
beliefs are ‚accidentally necessary‛ when that notion is understood in Molina’s sense
(a sense which, I think, is different from how the Ockhamist would understand
it), and both would agree that God’s past beliefs are ‚soft‛ facts about the past
over which free agents do indeed have counterfactual power.
Consequently, I do not see Ockhamism and Molinism as competing theories,
as they are generally presented among discussants in the foreknowledge debate.
To the contrary, I see them as complementary, insofar as Molinism, as an answer to
the source question, is what allows for a viable Ockhamistic answer to the
reconciliation question.

4.5. Objections to Molinism
Numerous objections have been advanced against Molina’s theory, too many
to be addressed in a single treatise. I will therefore discuss the three that I
consider to be the strongest, these being (i) the argument based on David Lewis’s
semantical analysis of counterfactual conditionals, (ii) the so-called ‚grounding
objection,‛ and (iii) William Hasker’s argument that Molinism is incompatible
with libertarian free will. I will try to show that none succeed in undercutting the
theory of middle knowledge.
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4.5.1. ‚Not True Soon Enough‛
This objection arises from David Lewis’s possible worlds analysis of the
truth-conditions of subjunctive conditionals (cf. Lewis, 1973). According to
Lewis, the conditional If

were the case, then

true in the actual world just in case either (i)
or (ii) if

is false in the actual world, then

would be the case is non-vacuously
and

are true in the actual world,

is true in all the ‚closest‛ -worlds,

i.e., those worlds that are most similar to the actual world and in which

is true.

The intuitive idea is that a counterfactual claim is true just in case it requires
less of a departure from the way the world actually is for both the antecedent
and consequent to be true than in does to have a true antecedent and false
consequent. For example, the claim If this sugar cube were dropped in this cup of
boiling water, then it would dissolve is true, even if the sugar cube isn’t dropped in
the cup of boiling water. For it requires less of a change to the way things
actually are to verify both antecedent and consequent—a mere change in the
spatial location of the sugar cube—than it does to verify the antecedent and
falsify the consequent; that would require both moving the sugar cube and
changing the laws of nature.
This is supposed to raise a problem for Molinism because, on that theory,
God is supposed to use his knowledge of certain counterfactual conditionals, viz.
the CFs, in deciding which world will be the actual world, i.e., in deciding which
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world to create. In other words, it is supposed to be the relations of comparative
similarity among possible worlds relative to the actual world that determines
which counterfactuals are true in the actual world, so that it must already
determined which world is the actual world before it can be determined which
counterfactuals are true in the actual world. But what determines which world is
actual is God’s creative act of will, his decision to create this world rather than
any other world. As a result, it would seem that CFs can play no role as prevolitional guides to God’s creative decision making; they can’t be evaluated as
true or false in the actual world until there is an actual world against which to
measure the comparative similarity among possible worlds, and there’s no actual
world until God decides which world to create. Anthony Kenny states the
objection forcefully as follows:
Prior to God’s decision to actualize a particular world those
counterfactuals cannot yet be known: for their truth-value depends ... on
which world is the actual world. It is not simply that God’s knowledge of
these counterfactuals cannot be based on a decision which has to be taken
subsequent to knowledge of them.< The problem is that what makes the
counterfactuals true is not yet there at any stage at which it is undecided
which world is the actual world.< The difficulty is simply that if it is to be
possible for God to know which world he is actualizing, then his middle
knowledge must be logically prior to his decision to actualize; whereas, if
middle knowledge is to have an object, the actualization must already
have taken place. As long as it is undetermined which action an
individual human being will take it is undetermined which possible world
is the actual world—undetermined not just epistemologically but
metaphysically (Kenny, 1979, pp. 68-71, as quoted in Kvanvig, 1986, pp.
139-40).
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I think there are two responses to be offered to this argument. First of all, the
‚picture‛ of God’s relation to logical space presented here is a most implausible
one, indeed an impossible one. It is assumed that, prior to creation, God is
somehow entirely outside of logical space surveying the array of possible worlds
in order to select which one will be the actual world. The upshot being that there
is no actual world until God decides which one from among the set of all possible
worlds it will be. But this simply cannot be so. There is, indeed there must be, an
actual world even prior to the moment of creation. Had God chosen not to create,
then the actual world (construed as a set of propositions) would have consisted
only of the set of metaphysically necessary propositions and (assuming Molinism
is true) of the set of contingently true CFs and other prevolitionally-yetcontingently true propositions. Since he did create, the actual world consists
further of all other contingently true propositions. The point being, however, that
some world must have been actual even prior to God’s decision to create. Thus,
creation is not so much the complete actualization of an entire world but of a
further determination as to how the already existing actual world will unfold.
Kvanvig (1986) makes the same point as follows:
Kenny’s objection rests on a simple confusion. He claims that what an
account like mine [viz. a Molinist account] must posit is that there are true
subjunctives of freedom before the actualization of any world by God. The
confusion is that it is simply not possible that there is no actual world;
though it is possible that the actual world is one in which God has not
(yet) created anything. But that is quite a different matter from there being
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no world at all. Kenny wishes to claim that subjunctives in question lack a
truth value until some world is actual. That can be granted; without an
actual world, there would be no truths at all. All that shows, however, is
that it is not possible that there fails to be an actual world, for it is simply
not possible that there fails to be some true propositions (Kvanvig, 1986, p.
140).
Second, and more fundamentally, the assumption that the Lewisian analysis
of counterfactual conditionals is adequate for CFs seems to me highly dubious.
As far as I can tell, Lewis’s motivation for developing his possible worlds
analysis of counterfactuals was to offer, within a nominalistic metaphysics, truthconditions for the kinds of counterfactuals involved in the expression of laws of
nature. Whereas Hume tried to analyze laws as supervening on the earlierthan/later-than relations that hold among concrete events (or ‚local matters of
particular fact‛), Lewis sees them as supervening on the similarity relations that
hold among the concrete individuals that exist in logical space, i.e. possible
worlds.
However powerful his analysis may be in that regard (and it has indeed
proven extremely powerful), I see it as having nothing to offer in terms of the
truth conditions of counterfactuals of freedom. For one thing, Lewis was himself a
compatibilist and therefore would have seen no need to construct an analysis
that could have accommodated the sort of indeterministic freedom to which
libertarians subscribe.
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This is not to say, however, that Lewisian semantics cannot give truthconditions for counterfactual claims about indeterministic events. It just cannot
give truth-conditions for indeterministic events that would happen. For if an
event e happening in situation h is truly indeterministic, then there are some hworlds in which e happens and some equally close h-worlds in which e does not
happen. As a result, it’s not the case that e happens in all the closest h-worlds,
and so the counterfactual ‘If it were that h, then it would be that e’ comes out
false. What is true is ‘If it were that h, then it might be that e.’ Thus, we see that for
Lewis, ‘would’ imports a kind of necessity into the logic of counterfactuals: if it’s
true that e would happen on h, then e happens in all the closest h-worlds, and so,
effectively, e is what would have to happen on h. This stands to reason, as in
standard modal logic, necessarily is treated as a kind of universal quantifier
ranging over possible worlds.
But a counterfactual of freedom describes what an agent would do freely (i.e.,
indeterministically) in a given situation, not what she would have to do in that
situation. Thus, if S does A freely in C, then there are some worlds, equally close
to the real world with respect to C, in which S refrains from doing A. In other
words, there are some C-worlds that are A-worlds (viz., the real world) and some
equally close C-worlds that are not A-worlds. Nevertheless, the Molinist will insist
that ‘If it were that C, then it would be that A’ was still true as a matter of

165

contingent fact. Thus, for the Molinist, it makes perfect sense to say that S would
do A in C, even though S might not do A in C. For the Lewisian, on the other
hand, this is a flat-out contradiction, since ‘would’ and ‘might’ are interdefined
in much the same way as ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’ are interdefined in standard
modal logic (Gaskin, 1993, p. 421).
Peter Van Inwagen (1997) thinks the foregoing considerations amount to a
refutation of the theory of middle knowledge. His argument may be summarized
as follows:
(1)
(2)

If Lewisian semantics cannot accommodate CFs, then middle
knowledge is impossible.
Lewisian semantics cannot accommodate CFs.

(3)

Middle knowledge is impossible.

But there are two possible responses to this argument. The minor premise is
supported by the considerations outlined above, but are they conclusive?
Plantinga (1974b) has given us reason to think not. It was said that ‘If it were
that C, then it would be that A’ comes out false on Lewisian semantics because if
A is done freely, then there must be an equally close ‘C & not-A’ world. But as
Plantinga suggests, ‘one feature determining the similarity of worlds is whether
they share their counterfactuals’ (Plantinga, 1974b, p. 178). For example, we can
imagine a world w that has physical laws that are vastly different from those of
the actual world and yet, perhaps due to constant divine intervention, is made to
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be identical to the actual world with respect to all ‚local matters of particular
fact.‛ Is w more or less similar to the actual world that another world w*, which
has all the same physical laws as the actual world but different initial conditions,
resulting in vastly different ‚local matters of particular fact‛? I’m inclined to say
that w is less similar to the actual world than w*, in which case counterfactuals do
count in the similarity metric, for physical laws are expressed in terms of
counterfactuals. Thus, it’s possible that all the closest worlds are worlds in which
S freely does A in C, not because S would have to do A in C but because all such
worlds share the actually true CF, ‘If S were in C, S would freely do A’.
Whether Plantinga’s response is plausible or not as an attempt to ‚fit‛ CFs
within the framework of Lewisian semantics is open to debate. The usual charge
is that it is somehow a ‚circular‛ move (Wyma, 2001, p. 6), insofar as he wants to
maintain the valuation of counterfactuals in terms of comparative similarity
among worlds while also holding that comparative similarity must be measured
in terms of the truth of shared counterfactuals. What I think has been overlooked
is that Plantinga’s argument actually reveals a systematic commitment to
Humeanism built into Lewisian semantics, insofar as physical laws (which,
again, are expressed as counterfactuals) are understood not to be fundamental
features of the actual world and its constituents but to supervene on the more
fundamental ‚matters of particular fact‛ concerning the constituents of logical
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space. Why is it a physical law that sugar dissolves in water? Not because of any
necessary connection between the essential nature of sugar and the essential
nature of water, but merely because all the closest ‚sugar-in-water‛ worlds are
also ‚dissolved sugar‛ worlds (just as, for Hume, it’s a law because there’s a
constant conjunction between ‚sugar-placed-in-water‛ events and ‚sugar
dissolved‛ events). Therefore, those philosophers who take a realist stance in
regard to physical laws should think twice about the assumption that Lewisian
semantics is the ‚only game in town‛ when it comes to the evaluation of
counterfactual conditionals. If I am right, it may be a game that only Humeans
can play.
On the other hand, if I am wrong about the implicit Humeanism of Lewisian
semantics, I don’t think it follows that the theory of middle knowledge stands or
falls depending on whether or not CFs can be accommodated within the
Lewisian framework. In other words, I reject the major premise of Van Inwagen’s
argument. Explanatory scope is indeed a virtue and it would be very nice if all
instances of subjunctive reasoning could be accommodated within a single,
unified semantic theory. But surely the behavior in a given situation of a rational
agent endowed with libertarian free will is something radically different from
the behavior, say, of a sugar cube dropped in water, and so the truth-conditions
for the counterfactuals underlying the laws that govern the behavior of non-
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rational, ‚material‛ causes ought not, it seems to me, be seen as adequate for
those describing the behavior of free, personal, ‚agent‛ causes. The phenomena
are just too different to be subsumed under a single account. Thus, it is only to be
expected that the peculiar sorts of conditionals that are postulated by the theory
of middle knowledge will be found intractable from the standpoint of a semantic
theory designed for altogether different purposes.

4.5.2. The Grounding Objection
One persistent complaint against Molinism is the Grounding Objection,
which has it that CFs, the purported objects of God’s middle knowledge, are
without ‚adequate metaphysical grounds.‛ Since a proposition’s having such
grounds is taken by the objector to be a necessary condition for its truth, it
follows that the propositions God is supposed to know via middle knowledge are
not true—indeed, cannot be true—and hence God cannot have middle
knowledge. This objection was first voiced in the contemporary debate by Robert
Adams (1977) and, according to Thomas Flint, is seen by many as the major
stumbling block in the way of adopting Molinism (Flint, 1998, p. 123).
What exactly is the grounding objection? Robert Adams puts it in the form of
a question: ‘Counterfactuals of freedom < are supposed to be contingent truths
that are not caused to be true by God. Who or what does cause them to be true?’
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(Adams, 1985, p. 232) I think we can restate Adams’ question in the form of an
argument:
(1)
(2)

Contingent propositions are, if true, caused to be true.
CFs are contingent propositions that are not caused to be true.

(3)

CFs are not true.

Recall that, as Duns Scotus put it, contingent propositions ‘carry no mark of their
actuality.’ For this reason, Freddoso, one of Molina’s ablest defenders, seems to
agree with the major premise of this argument, saying, ‘[M]etaphysically
contingent propositions < require causal grounding in order to be true. That is,
they must be caused to be true by some agent or agents, since it is not of their
nature to be true’ (Freddoso, 1988, p. 70).
Several possibilities have been suggested as to what might constitute
adequate causal grounding for a CF, but each is to be wanting. First, it might be
that the agent himself causes those CFs about him that are true to be true. For
example, perhaps it is Adam himself who causes the CF ‘If Adam were tempted
in the garden, he would freely sin’ to be true by actually sinning upon finding
himself tempted in the garden. But this approach fails for three reasons. First, it
would require backward causation, for God makes use of his middle knowledge
in deciding which world to create. God knows the CF ‘If Adam were tempted in
the garden, he would freely sin’ long before Adam finds himself in that
circumstance. Thus, if Adam causes that CF to be true by virtue of his sinning at
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t, then at t he causally brings about an effect before t. Second, Adam might never
have been tempted; God might have wanted a world in which Adam never
sinned in those circumstances and so brought it about that Adam was never
tempted in the garden. Yet, on Molina’s theory, it still would have been true that
if Adam were tempted, he would have sinned. That fact is part of the ‚creation
situation‛ in which God finds himself, even though Adam might never do
anything to cause it to be true, since he might never find himself in the relevant
circumstances. Third, Molinism must allow that there are true CFs concerning
agents who could have existed but in fact do not exist. Surely God could have
created Schmadam instead of Adam. If Molinism is true, then God must know
what Schmadam would have done if he were tempted in the garden, but such a
truth cannot be grounded in Schmadam’s causal activity since Schmadam
doesn’t exist and therefore can’t cause anything.
Might CFs be grounded in an agent’s character, his or her behavioral
dispositions or inclinations toward acting this way or that? No, argues Adams
(1977), for if the agent is free in the libertarian sense, then it must be possible for
her to do A and refrain from doing A in identical causal circumstances. Even if
her character inclines or disposes her to do A, it must nevertheless be possible for
her to act out of character and refrain from doing A. Unless libertarianism is false
and our actions are determined by our character, by our beliefs and desires, then
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an agent’s character can at best provide causal grounding for what we are likely
to do or what we would probably do in such-and-such circumstances. Molinism,
however, requires that God know what each and every agent would definitely do
in such-and-such circumstances. As Adams puts it, ‘It is part of their *the
Molinists’+ theory that God knows infallibly what definitely would happen, and
not just what would probably happen or what free creatures would be likely to
do’ (Adams, 1977, p. 111).
As a result, absent any further possibilities as to what might provide causal
grounding for the truth of CFs, it seems that the minor premise of Adams’
argument is also true, and indeed I would concur. However, I am not convinced
that the major premise is true. I see no good reason to think that contingent
propositions must be caused to be true, for I don’t at all know what it even means
for a proposition to be caused to be true. Propositions, being abstract entities, are
just not the sorts of things that can stand as terms in causal relations. Since the
time of Hume, causation has generally been understood to be a relation between
events, while for Aristotelians it’s construed as a relation between primary
substances, and propositions fall into neither category.
It’s possible, of course, that I’m being too wooden and literal in my
understanding of what Adams et al. mean by ‘cause’. Perhaps they are thinking
in terms of truth-maker theory (Craig, 2003, pp. 339f.), according to which every
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contingent truth p has its truth-maker, some entity by virtue of which p is true.
But it just doesn’t seem to be the case that all contingent propositions have such
truth-makers, at least when they are taken to be concrete objects. For example,
consider the proposition ‘The Great Pumpkin does not exist.’ Surely there could
be such a being that appears in the pumpkin patch on Halloween each year,
although in fact there is no such being. So then what is the truth-maker for the
contingent proposition ‘The Great Pumpkin does not exist’? It can’t be the Great
Pumpkin, of course, since it does not exist. But what other object could it be? I
can think of no other plausible candidate.
Now, we could allow that a truth-maker need not be a concrete object but
instead be a fact or state of affairs. Thus, the proposition that the Great Pumpkin
does not exist could have as its truth-maker the fact of the Great Pumpkin’s nonexistence or the state of affairs the Great Pumpkin’s being non-existent. But once we
admit that possibility, then there’s no reason to think that CFs lack such truthmakers. For we could then say that the proposition that S would do A if S were
in C has as its truth-maker the state of affairs S’s being such that she would do A
were she in C. As William Lane Craig puts it, ‘I should say that if true
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom have truth-makers, then the most obvious
and plausible candidates are the facts or states of affairs disclosed by the
disquotation principle’ (Craig, 2001b, p. 346).
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This latter approach, I think, constitutes an adequate response to Steven
Cowan’s recently advanced version of the grounding objection, which he thinks
‘provides a powerful refutation of middle knowledge’ (Cowan, 2003, p. 94). To
set the stage for his argument, let us recall that a CF of the form ‘If S were in C,
then S would freely do A,’ where ‘freely’ is understood in the libertarian sense,
implies that S, upon ending up in C, would do something for which there are no
sufficient antecedent casual conditions. S’s action is radically indeterministic, as
the world could be identical in all causal respects up to the time of the action
regardless of whether S does A or refrains from doing A. Again, according to
Molinism, God knows what S would do in such circumstances.
It is this last claim that Cowan finds untenable. As Cowan sees it, it is the
Molinist’s commitment to libertarianism that leads to the grounding objection:
The grounding objection just is the view that there simply is no fact of the
matter as to what an agent with libertarian freedom would do in a given
hypothetical (or even actual) circumstance.< [T]he problem revolves
around the nature of agents who have libertarian freedom. It is because
middle knowledge requires that God knows counterfactuals of freedom <
that gives rise to the grounding objection (Cowan, 2003, p. 96).
He argues that given the kind of freedom previously mentioned, there can be no
‚fact of the matter‛ as to what an agent would freely do in a given circumstance.
Since what an agent does freely (in the libertarian sense) must be undetermined,
it must also be undetermined what an agent would do freely, and hence there are
no ‚grounds‛ for truths about what an agent would do freely in a given
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circumstance. ‘For,’ as he puts it, ‘if S is free to do x or refrain from doing x in C,
there simply is no fact of the matter to what S would do.< [A]ny claim as to what
S would (counterfactually) do is neither true nor false’ (Cowan, 2003, p. 94).
Cowan sets out his argument by first stating what he calls the Molinist’s
libertarian assumption: ‘Given any set of circumstances C, S is free in C with
respect to an action x if and only if S is not determined to do either x or ~x in C.’2
He then proceeds to offer his generic grounding objection to the theory of middle
knowledge: ‘If S is not determined to do x or ~x in C, then there is no fact of the
matter to what S would do in C.’ Cowan thus concludes, ‘The truth-value of any
and every counterfactual of freedom, then, is indeterminate. And since they are
indeterminate, God cannot know them’ (Cowan, 2003, p. 94), in which case God
cannot have middle knowledge.
Clearly enough, the key player in Cowan’s argument is the generic grounding
objection (hereafter: GGO), the claim that an agent’s being undetermined with
respect to an action in a given circumstance rules out the possibility of saying
(truly) that the agent would or would not do that action in that circumstance, there
being no ‚fact of the matter‛ in that regard. It seems to me, however, that Cowan
has given us no good reason to accept GGO. It strikes me more as an assertion
than an argument, in the absence of which the Molinist can simply assert the
contrary. Some such argument may proceed along the following lines:
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(1)
(2)
(3)

If it is undetermined prior to t whether p obtains at t, then there is no
fact of the matter prior to t as to whether p will obtain at t.
What S would freely do in C is, prior to the time of C, undetermined.
There is no fact of the matter prior to the time of C as to what S
would do in C.

The characteristic Molinist response to this argument is to deny (1) and
would proceed in some such way as follows. Assume that S will freely do X at
some future time t. If S is free in the libertarian sense with respect to doing X,
then S is not determined either to do X or not to do X. That is. S’s being such that
he will do X at t is, prior to t, an undetermined states of affairs, insofar as there are
no antecedent causal conditions sufficient for that state of affairs. But that gives
us no good reason to say that there is no fact of the matter as to whether S will or
will not freely do X. Even if there are no causally sufficient antecedent conditions
for S’s doing X, it is nevertheless true that S will in fact do X; unless, that is, one
is an anti-realist about the future. But if one can be both a realist in regard to the
absolute future as well as a libertarian, then one is free to maintain that there is a
fact of the matter as to whether S will do X despite S’s being undetermined with
respect to X. Therefore, absolute future contingent states of affairs are
counterexamples to (1)—the general principle that there can be no fact of the
matter as to undetermined states of affairs—and so the argument is unsound. If
one can be a realist in regard to the absolute future, then there’s no good reason
why one cannot be a realist in regard to the conditional future as well, so that ‘S
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would do X were S in C’ can be true despite S’s being undetermined with respect
to doing X.
However, Cowan is not impressed by this response. According to him, ‘The
parallel between anti-realism about counterfactuals of freedom and anti-realism
about future-tense contingents is only superficial’ (Cowan, 2003, p. 96). The
difference between them, it seems, is that absolute future contingents are (or can
be) ‚grounded‛ in a way that counterfactuals of freedom cannot be. Now, as I
indicated earlier, it’s not at all clear to me what it means for a proposition to be
grounded or have grounds, nor does Cowan, unfortunately, provide an explicit
criterion for a propositions having grounds. He does, however, say that in the
case of counterfactuals of freedom ‘there are no actual states of affairs to which
such propositions correspond in order to provide truth conditions for their truth
or falsity’ (Cowan, 2003, p. 93). So perhaps we can use this as an implicit criterion
for a proposition’s having adequate metaphysical grounds, and say that a
proposition p has grounds if and only if there is some actual state of affairs Z to
which p corresponds. Presumably, by ‘actual state of affairs’ we are to
understand a state of affairs that actually obtains (as opposed to a state of affairs
that actually exists, for according to the actualist ontology that I accept, all states
of affairs actually exist; only some, however, actually obtain, the maximal
consistent set of which constitutes the actual world). We therefore have the
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following criterion for a proposition’s having adequate metaphysical grounds:
(AMG) p has adequate metaphysical grounds as of t iff for some state of
affairs Z, Z obtains at t and p corresponds to Z.
Interestingly, Cowan allows that a categorical future-tensed proposition such
as ‘S will do X’ can be true, and hence grounded.3 But to what actual state of
affairs does such a proposition correspond? Cowan has this to say:
The truth-value of a future-tense statement such as
(B) Jesus will return bodily in 2010
is grounded here and now because, assuming that it is true, there will
obtain, in 2010, the categorical state of affairs Jesus returns bodily in 2010
(Cowan, 2003, p. 95).
It seems, therefore, that for Cowan a proposition can be grounded now by a state
of affairs that does not yet actually obtain. For if (B) is true, it is true now, but the
state of affairs Jesus’ returning bodily in 2010 does not actually obtain now but, if it
obtains at all, will obtain (or will be actual) in 2010. On the other hand, as we
have seen, Cowan asserts that for propositions to be grounded, there must be
some ‘actual state of affairs to which such propositions correspond in order to
provide truth conditions for their truth or falsity,’ from whence I have derived
(AMG). So to what actual state of affairs does (B) correspond? Again, it can’t be
Jesus’ returning bodily in 2010, for that state of affairs is not yet actual. As Cowan
says, it will (let us assume) obtain in 2010, but it does not now obtain, in which
case, according to (AMG), (B) cannot now be true. Unless, that is, we allow that
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(B) can be true by corresponding to the now actual state of affairs Jesus’ being such
that he will return bodily in 2010. But if that’s unproblematic, then there’s no good
reason why we shouldn’t allow that a proposition like ‘If S were in C, then S
would freely do X’ is true by corresponding to the now actual state of affairs of S’s
being such that he would freely do X were he in C.
Put slightly differently, Cowan says that (B) is now grounded because there
will obtain, in 2010, the categorical state of affairs Jesus’ returning bodily in 2010.
But to say that there will obtain the state of affairs Jesus’ returning bodily in 2010 is
to say (albeit in a very stilted way) nothing more than that Jesus will return
bodily in 2010, so that ‘Jesus will return bodily in 2010’ is now grounded simply
because it is now the case that Jesus will return bodily in 2010. So by Cowan’s
own thinking, it seems that to discover what grounds a proposition we need
apply nothing more than simple disquotation (cf. Craig, 2001b, p. 346). Therefore,
‘If S were in C, then S would freely do X’ is now grounded because there would
obtain the state of affairs S’s freely doing X were there to obtain the state of affairs
S’s being in C, which is to say that ‘If S were in C, then S would freely do X’ is
now grounded because it is now the case that if S were in C, then S would freely
do X.
What Cowan would say in response to this maneuver is that the state of
affairs S’s being such that he would freely do X were he in C is a hypothetical or
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conditional state of affairs, whereas he thinks that a proposition can only be
grounded by a categorical state of affairs. He quotes William Hasker’s statement
on the issue with approval.
William Hasker puts it this way: ‘In order for a (contingent) conditional
state of affairs to obtain, its obtaining must be grounded in some
categorical state of affairs. More colloquially, truths about ‚what would be
the case … if‛ must be grounded in truths about what is in fact the case’
(Cowan, 2003, p. 93).
However, Cowan fails to mention that Hasker is here expressing what he himself
considers an intuition. The closest thing Hasker gives to an argument on behalf of
this intuition is as follows:
This requirement seems clearly to be satisfied for the more familiar types
of conditionals. The truth of a material conditional is grounded either in
the truth of its consequent, or the falsity of its antecedent, or both. More
interestingly, the truth of causal conditionals, and their associated
counterfactuals, are grounded in the natures, causal powers, inherent
tendencies, and the like, of the natural entities described in them. The lack
of anything like this as a basis for the counterfactuals of freedom seems to
me to be a serious problem for the theory (Hasker, 1989, pp. 30-31).
The claim seems to be that because CFs are not grounded in the way that
material conditionals and causal conditionals are grounded, they are therefore
ungrounded and hence untrue. Interestingly, in a footnote to his remark about
material conditionals, Hasker observes, ‘Some would deny that these are
genuinely conditionals, in the interesting sense of that term’ (Hasker, 1989, p. 30,
n. 21). But if there’s a question about whether material conditionals really are
conditionals, then it can’t count for very much against CFs if they’re not
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grounded in the way that material conditionals are. So the argument boils down
to the claim that there’s something wrong with CFs because they’re not
grounded in the way causal conditionals are grounded. But what else ought we
to expect? If there is such a thing as libertarian freedom (as both Hasker and
myself think there is), then it works in a way that is radically different from the
active and passive potencies of inherent natures. It should come as no surprise
that statements concerning what an agent with libertarian freedom would freely
do in such-and-such circumstances are ‚grounded‛ (if at all) in a way that differs
radically from the way in which statements about what would happen, say, to a
piece of salt were it placed in water.
Nor does it seem to me that the criterion that conditional states of affairs be
grounded in categorical states of affairs is satisfied even in cases other than CFs.
Consider the future-oriented indicative conditional
(a)

If you go to the movies, I will go with you.

Let’s suppose that you end up not going to the movies, and so neither do I.
Presumably (a) could nevertheless have been true (assuming I wasn’t lying). But
what categorical state of affairs would then have grounded the truth of (a)? It
surely can’t just be, as the truth-table for the material conditional would have it,
the fact that you didn’t go to the movies. (a) is just not a material conditional.4
Nor is it plausible to think that, as with causal conditionals, there is any kind of
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necessary connection between antecedent and consequent which grounds (a). If
you go to the movies, I remain perfectly free (metaphysically, if not morally) to
go or not to go. Furthermore, it is not my intentions that provide grounds for (a).
As we already noted in discussing Adams’ objection, my intentions can at best
ground a claim about what I might do or what I would probably do. But (a) does
not say that I’ll probably go to the movies if you go; it says that I will definitely go
if you go. Rather, it seems to be that (a) would have been grounded simply in the
conditional fact that I will go to the movies if you go. Therefore, the general claim
that conditional statements must be grounded in categorical states of affairs
seems false.
Consequently, if (a) can be grounded in conditional states of affairs, it seems
plausible to think that a statement like
(b)

If you were to go to the movies, then I would go with you

not only can but must be similarly grounded in a conditional state of affairs,
namely the fact that I would go to the movies were you to go. Semantically, (a) and
(b) seem indistinguishable (Gaskin, 1993, p. 415). So if (a) can be true without
being grounded in any categorical state of affairs, then so too can (b). More
pointedly, I would say that if (b) cannot be true, then neither can (a). Now,
opponents of middle knowledge may say, ‘So much the worse for (a),’ and
simply consign all future-oriented indicative conditionals involving free actions
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to the same fate as CFs. But this comes at a high price, for if statements like (a)
cannot be true, then we cannot make true conditional promises. I cannot
successfully make the promise to someone, ‘I will do X if such-and-such is the
case,’ if my statement is automatically false.
Determinists may nonetheless say that the real crux of the issue here is
libertarian freedom. They may insist that if I am free in the libertarian sense to go
to the movies, then all I have a right to say is
(c)

If you go to the movies, I might go with you,

which hardly allows you to make very definite plans for the evening. Only if
your going to the movies is (together with other conditions) somehow causally
sufficient for my accompanying you (perhaps by causing me to have the
appropriate desires, upon which I act of necessity, can (a) be genuinely
grounded. Compatibilists will maintain that my going to the movies can still be
free, just not in the libertarian sense. The claim, therefore, would be that if (a)
(and [b]) can be true, and hence grounded, then libertarianism must be false.
At this point I think we reach a fundamental clash of intuitions that no
amount of argument will ever adjudicate. The compatibilist’s intuitions favor (a)
as not being grounded in the libertarian sense, and so since (a) can be true, then
libertarianism must be false. My intuitions against the compatibility of free
choice with determinism strongly outweigh any hesitation I might have over (a)
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and (b) lacking adequate grounds if construed in accordance with libertarianism.
Therefore, since I think that compatibilism is false and that (a) can be true, I
accordingly think that (a) is sufficiently grounded in the conditional state of
affairs My being such that I will accompany you if you go to the movies. I just don’t see
it as needing any more basic grounding. Likewise, I think that (b) is adequately
grounded in the conditional state of affairs My being such that I would accompany
you, were you to go to the movies.
In light of the foregoing considerations, I think that the grounding objection
has little if any probative merit. Depending on how the ‚grounding‛ criterion is
understood, either propositions that are obviously true end up being without
adequate grounds or CFs have just as adequate grounds as any other adequately
grounded proposition. In short, the grounding objection to middle knowledge is,
so to speak, groundless.

4.5.3. Hasker’s Anti-Molinist Argument
In its original historical setting, the theory of middle knowledge was subject
to vehement criticism for granting too much in the way of freedom and
independence to human beings (insofar as CFs are contingently true propositions
that are nonetheless independent of the divine decree), thereby compromising
God’s sovereignty. In the current debate, however, the pendulum has swung to
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the other extreme, and now Molinism is accused of depriving human beings of
their freedom of choice, at least from the standpoint of libertarianism. This is the
view of William Hasker (1986, 1989, 1995, 1999a), who has surely been one of the
most consistent and formidable opponents of the theory of middle knowledge. In
this last section, I want to consider his most developed argument that Molinism
is inconsistent with libertarian human freedom.
Hasker’s argument has seen several incarnations, the first few of which
involved crucial assumptions and concepts that proved to be their undoing. With
his latest effort, however, he puts forth an argument that, he says, ‘is concise and
comparatively easy to grasp, and it avoids employing some of the difficult
primitive terms and contestable premises of those earlier efforts’ (Hasker, 1999a,
p. 291). In what I will henceforth call ‚Hasker’s Anti-Molinist‛ argument (HAM),
the crucial notion of ‚bringing something about‛ is once again involved, for
which Hasker provides his own stipulative definition (Hasker, 1999a, p. 291):
(BA) A brings it about that Y iff: For some X, A causes it to be the case
that X, and (X & H) Y, and ~(H Y), where ‘H’ represents the
history of the world prior to its coming to be the case that X,
where ‘ ’ symbolizes metaphysical entailment. So Smith brings about the death
of Jones iff Smith causes something to be the case (say, that a bullet fired from his
30-06 rifle hits Jones in the head) and the bullet hitting Jones in the head together
with the history of the world prior to the bullet hitting Jones in the head
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metaphysically entails the death of Jones, and that same history of the world
alone does not entail the death of Jones. This seems to me an acceptable
understanding of the concept of ‚bringing something about.‛
With (BA) in hand, and assuming that
(1)

Agent A is in circumstances c, the counterfactual of freedom ‘C
is true of her, and she freely chooses to do z

Z’

(where ‘ ’ expresses counterfactual implication), HAM amounts to a reductio ad
absurdum, insofar as Hasker attempts to derive a contradiction from some
assumptions that are essential to Molinism, the contradiction being that
(2)

It is in agent A’s power to bring it about that (C

(3)

It is not in A’s power to bring it about that (C

~Z)

and
~Z).

As it turns out, Thomas Flint has shown in his rejoinder to Hasker’s article that
Hasker’s argument can be considerably simplified (Flint, 1999, pp. 299-300), and
so it is Flint’s helpful reconstruction that I will present here.
To show that (2) is true, it needs to be shown (given *BA+) that there’s some X
such that:
(2.1) A has the power to cause it to be the case that X,
(2.2) [(X & H) (C ~Z)]
and
(2.3) ~[H

(C

~Z)].
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As libertarians, Molinists would certainly assume that, although A does z in c,
she has the power to do ~z, and so (2.1) is satisfied by
(2.1a) A has the power to cause it to be the case that ~Z.
Furthermore, Molinists typically assume that the circumstances specified in the
antecedent of a CF are complete circumstances, involving the entire causal history
of the world up to the time of the action specified in the consequent (we’ll return
to this point in the next chapter). Hasker also exploits this assumption, saying
that ‘The full specification of the circumstances may best be thought of as
including the entire previous history of the actual world; in effect, then, C = H’
(Hasker, 1999, p. 293). That being the case, (2.2) will be satisfied by
(2.2a) (~Z & H)

(C

~Z)

As Flint says, ‘If H = C, then no Molinist would doubt that (~Z & H) entails (C
~Z)’ (Flint, 1999, p. 300) since, on the hypothesis that ~z is performed in c,
Molinists will naturally infer that ~z is what would have been performed were
the agent in c.
Finally, again on the assumption that H = C, the Molinist cannot think that a
given circumstance would entail a particular action, for that would be
inconsistent with the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, viz. that in the very
same causal circumstances, the agent may either perform the action or not
perform the action, if the action is to be performed freely. As such, the Molinist
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would embrace
(2.3a) ~[H

(C

~Z)]

as well. Again, Flint says, ‘*N+o Molinist worth her salt would think that H
entails (C

~Z)’ (Flint, 1999, p. 300). Thus, given (1) and (BA), the Molinist will

accept (2) without hesitation, and so the first part of HAM seems a success.
On the other hand, the derivation of (3) is an entirely different matter. Hasker
gives only one premise in support of (3), viz.
(4)

It is not in an agent’s power to bring about the truth of the
counterfactuals of freedom about her,

and it is not clear how (3) follows validly from (4). For one thing, (4) is
ambiguous and can be understood in one of two ways. For one, it may mean
(4.1)

If ˹(

)˺ is true of A, then A cannot bring it about that (

But (3) does not follow from (4.1), for (1) effectively tells us that ‘C
true of A by explicitly telling us that ‘C
(4.2)

If ˹(
(

).

~Z’ is not

Z’ is. On the other hand, (4) may mean

)˺ is not true of A, then A cannot bring it about that
).

But the argument for (2) shows precisely the opposite: ‘C

~Z’ is assumed not

to be true of A, and it is then shown that A can bring it about that (C

~Z).

On the face of it, therefore, HAM lacks the savor of a compelling argument.
However, it seems to me that (4.2) can provide the basis for another argument
that Molinism is inconsistent, one that captures the spirit of Hasker’s thinking, if
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it does not match up exactly with its letter. What Hasker really intends to argue, I
think, is that the argument for
(2)

It is in agent A’s power to bring it about that (C

~Z)

is unsound, as it relies crucially on the claim that the truth of a given CF is not
entailed by the past history of the world. In other words, Hasker wants to deny
(2.3) ~[H

(C

~Z)],

for even though (again to quote Flint), ‘*N+o Molinist worth her salt would think
that H entails (C
entails (C

~Z),’ Hasker insists that the Molinist must think that H

~Z), which is to say that Molinists cannot consistently think that

(2.3) is true. What Hasker seems to want to say is that the Molinist is really
committed to the following:
(5)

(C

Z)

[H

(C

Z)],

which is to say that if a given CF is true, then its truth is entailed by the past
history of the world; indeed by the past causal history of the world. For if it is
true, then the theory of middle knowledge has it that God made use of his
knowledge of that truth in his decision to create the world as it is; in other words,
the truth of ‘C

Z’ had causal consequences in the past history of the world,

namely at the moment of creation when God made use of it in his creative
decree. Hasker puts it as follows:
But divine middle knowledge, unlike foreknowledge, is not causally
impotent. On the contrary, God’s middle knowledge is part of the
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‘prevolitional’ knowledge by which, prior to deciding upon his act of
creative will, God knows what the full consequences of any particular
decision on his own part would be.< Our point is simply that middle
knowledge, unlike divine foreknowledge of the actual future, is an
integral part of the causal process that has made the world what it is
today.< Contrary to the Molinist claims considered above, ‘H’ does entail
‘(C Z)’, where ‘(C Z)’ is a true counterfactual of freedom. But if this is
so, then we created free agents do not bring about the truth of
counterfactuals of freedom about us; there is no possible world in which we
do this (Hasker, 1999a, p. 296).
What HAM really amounts to, it seems to me, is something very much like ATD,
only this time it is not what God foreknows that is supposed to, as Hasker puts
it, ‘partake of the necessity of the past, or ‘accidental necessity’’ (Hasker, 1999a, p.
295), it is what God knows by way of middle knowledge. Beginning once again
with Hasker’s (1), I think the argument can be formulated as follows (let us call it
‚Hasker’s Anti-Molinist argument Revised,‛ or ‚HAMR‛ for short):
[HAMR] (1) Agent A is in circumstances c, the counterfactual of freedom
‘C Z’ is true of her, and she freely chooses to do z
(6) If A freely chooses to do z, then A can bring it about that ~Z.
(7) If A can bring it about that ~Z, then A can bring it about that
(C ~Z)
(8) Therefore, A can bring it about that (C
(9) ‘C
(4.2) If ˹(
(

~Z).

~Z’ is not true of A.
)˺ is not true of A, then A cannot bring it about that
).

(10) Therefore, A cannot bring it about that (C
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~Z).

Since (8) and (10) are an explicit contradiction, Molinism will have been shown to
be incoherent if HAMR is a sound argument. Is it? (6) is a libertarian assumption,
while (7) is a crucial Molinist assumption. Since (9) follows from (1), it follows
that the only premise that can be questioned is (4.2), and it is the argument for
(4.2) that amounts to a revised ATD, as follows:
(11) If ˹(

)˺ is not true of A, then ˹(
(

~ )

(14) Therefore, t (

~ )

(12) (
(13) t (

~ )

~ )˺ is true of A.

~ )

(15) Therefore, t ~( & )
(16) If t ~( & ), then A cannot bring it about that (
(4.2) Therefore, if ˹(
that (
).

).

)˺ is not true of A, then A cannot bring it about

We can see the crucial ‚transfer of accidental necessity through entailment‛
move, characteristic of ATD, in the inference from (12) and (13) to (14). (11)
follows from the Principle of Conditional Excluded Middle, which Molinists
accept, while (12) is a logical truth. The truth of (16) should also be evident: if all
worlds accessible to A are worlds in which it’s not the case that ( & ), then A
cannot bring it about that

counterfactually implies , since the only way in

which she can do so is by being in the circumstances described in

and then

bringing it about that . The success of Hasker’s argument thus hangs on (13).
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Why should we think that (13) is true? Precisely because of (5), i.e., because if
˹(

~ )˺ is true, then God would have made use of his knowledge of that truth

in deciding which world to create, and so its being true that (

~ ) would

have had causal consequences as a result of the divine causal activity itself, the
act of creation. For this reason, we can give a fairly precise value for the time
index t in (13), which would be the ‚t=0‛ of modern cosmology, the moment of
God’s ‚fiat‛ bringing into existence the created order.
This may very well be the most powerful anti-Molinist argument, one that
seems to suggest that Molinists must simply give up on any pretense of being
libertarians and admit to being closet compatibilists. While I think this
conclusion is unwarranted, the reason why it is unwarranted does force the
Molinist to adopt a slightly different understanding of libertarian freedom than
the one hitherto expressed as (LF).
But before I deal with the latter issue, I shall follow Thomas Flint in pointing
out why Hasker has not given adequate justification for (13). For as Flint reminds
us, if Molinism is true, then there are good reasons to think that something’s
being a part of the past causal history of the world—i.e., something’s having had
past causal consequences—does not thereby render it a ‚hard fact‛ about the
past, one over which there can be no counterfactual power. Framed in the
language of accessibility, if a state of affairs p obtained in the past and thereby
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had causal consequences, it does not follow—given the truth of Molinism—that
there are no accessible worlds thereafter in which p does not obtain. As Flint
says, ‘For it also seems extremely plausible to suppose that if something which is
a fact about the past would not have been a fact about the past had I exercised
my power to act in a certain way, then that something is not a hard, fixed settled
fact about the past’ (Flint, 1999, pp. 302-03). He recalls Alvin Plantinga’s famous
story of Paul and the ants to illustrate this point:
Suppose that Paul freely refrains from mowing his lawn today.
Unbeknownst to Paul, his garden has recently been graced by a colony of
ants, a colony whose continued existence is (for some reason) important to
God. Had God known that Paul would mow today, God would have
prevented any harm from coming to the ants by seeing to it that they
moved onto the land of some less industrious gardener. But, being free,
Paul genuinely has the power to mow. So he has the power to do
something (mow) such that, were he to do it, the ants would not have
moved into his garden last week. Hence ... it follows that their having
moved in is not a fixed fact about the past. But clearly, the fact that the
ants moved in has had lots of causal consequences; mounds of dirt, blades
of grass, other insects, and the like have all been causally affected by the
arrival of the ants (Flint, 1999, p. 303).
Clearly, Plantinga’s story is possible only if God possesses middle knowledge,
i.e., only if he knows what Paul would freely do in those circumstances. Given
that he knew what Paul would do (namely, not mow), God allowed the ants to
proceed with their colonization of Paul’s garden. But since Paul is free, he could
have mowed; had he done so, then God would have known that he would mow,
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and so God would have prevented that past fact about the ants (which again, as
Flint emphasizes, had numerous causal consequences) from being a fact.
Thus, both Hasker and the Molinist will agree with the following implication:
(17) If Molinism is true, then it’s possible that we have counterfactual
power over past facts that have had causal consequences.
Where they will differ is on how to complete the inference. Hasker denies the
consequent, and so infers that Molinism isn’t true. But, to vary a traditional quip
only slightly, one philosopher’s modus tollens is another philosopher’s modus
ponens, and the Molinist will affirm the antecedent to infer that, perhaps
surprisingly, we may very well have such counterfactual power over facts which,
at first glance, may have been thought to be counterfactually inviolable.
But far from being a thorn in the side of Molinism, this implication is
precisely what allows it to deal with one of the thorniest problems related to the
issue of foreknowledge, namely the problem of divine prophecy. Alfred
Freddoso (1988) has shown that it is this feature of Molinism that enables us to
say that Peter freely denied Christ even though Christ infallibly prophesied that
he was going to do so (cf. Mark 14.30) . That prophecy, being a vocal utterance,
had causal consequences, e.g., on the hearers (Peter and the other disciples), on
Christ’s vocal chords and central nervous system, on the surrounding air, etc.
Given that God has middle knowledge, God knew that Peter would deny Christ,
but had God known that Peter would not deny Christ (as was possible, given
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Peter’s freedom), then he would have not allowed Christ to utter that prophecy,
and so the Molinist can say that Peter had the power to do something (namely,
refrain from denying Christ) such that, had he done it, then Christ would not
have made the prophecy that he in fact made. So both the infallibility of Christ’s
prophecy as well as Peter’s freedom are preserved on the Molinist account
(Freddoso, 1988, pp. 60-61).
Flint has also shown that the implication expressed in (17) allows Molinists to
give a coherent account of retrospective prayer (i.e., praying for something to
have happened) (Flint, 1997) and papal infallibility (Flint, 1998, p. 179f.), while I
will show in the appendix that (17) also undergirds a Molinist way of dealing
with a dilemma concerning Christ’s atonement. Therefore, we may conclude
with Flint,
Molinists seem to have powerful reasons for rejecting [(13)], and with it
Hasker’s new anti-Molinist argument. Indeed, I think that even those who
are genuinely undecided concerning the Molinist controversy should have
their doubts about [(13)]. If they are both well-informed and honestly
uncommitted, then presumably they will see the force and to some extent
feel the attraction of the Molinist arguments concerning ants, prophecy,
and retrospective prayer; hence they should realize that Molinism
precludes its knowledgeable adherents from accepting [(13)]. Given their
own neutrality in the debate, one would think they could hardly be left
with any firm convictions concerning the status of [(13)] (Flint, 1999, p.
304).
Once again, the issue seem to boil down to one’s intuitions. Do all these
instances of putative counterfactual power over past facts that have had causal
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consequences make Molinism a more or less attractive theory? Are these cases
consistent with one’s prior theoretical commitments, or are they too taxing on
what one is willing to grant in terms of an agent’s power to act? Hasker would,
I’m sure, argue the latter, and so insist that his is the more intuitively plausible
view, but unless he’s speaking to those who already share his intuitions, then I
cannot see how he can further argue his case on behalf of (13) without already
assuming that Molinism is false, and thus begging the question against the
Molinist.
Nevertheless, Hasker has succeeded in showing that the Molinist still has
some fancy footwork left to perform. For if we are to maintain, say, that Peter
acted freely in denying Christ, even though had he not done so, then Christ
would not have made the prophecy—and thus that a fact that has had causal
consequences would not have been a fact—we must then give up on the
formulation of libertarian freedom assumed thus far and propose an alternative.
For that formulation went as follows:
(LF*) An agent S freely does A at t in w only if (i) S does A at t in w, and
(ii) for some world w*, w* shares the same causal history as w up to
t, and (iii) the causal activity of everything other than S at t in w* is
the same as the causal activity of everything other than S at t in w,
and (iv) S refrains from doing A at t in w*.
According to (LF*), Peter does not freely deny Christ, for there is no possible
world that shares the same causal history as the actual world in which he refrains
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from denying Christ, for any world that shares the same causal history is one in
which Christ infallibly prophesies that Peter would deny him (assuming that
Christ is essentially infallible).
The Molinist, however, is not without a plausible way around this problem.
For there is no direct causal connection between Christ’s prophecy and Peter’s
denial. It’s not as if Christ’s prophecy initiates a causal sequence of events that
issues in Peter’s denial. Rather, Christ’s prophecy and Peter’s denial are, as it
were, ‚triangulated‛ through God’s middle knowledge of the relevant CF
concerning Peter. Consequently, we should be able to stipulate a suitable
reformulation of (LF*) that adequately maintains the core intuition of
libertarianism—viz. that our actions, if they are free, cannot be the causal
consequences of states of affairs that are ultimately not under our control—while
also making room for the kind of counterfactual power that Molinists suppose
Peter to have vis-à-vis Christ’s prophecy. (LF**) represents my attempt at such a
reformulation:
(LF**) An agent S freely does A at t in w only if (i) S does A at t in w, and
(ii) there is no time t* before t such that the total state of w at t* is a
causally sufficient condition for S’s doing A at t in w, and (iii) the
causal activity of everything other than S at t in w is consistent both
with S’s doing A at t in w and with S’s not doing A at t in w.
On (LF**), Peter’s denial at t satisfies the necessary conditions for being a free
action, for although Christ’s infallible prophecy at t* is a logically sufficient
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condition for Peter’s denial at t (recall, too, that the mere truth that he was going
to deny Christ is also a logically sufficient condition for his doing so), it is not a
causally sufficient condition for Peter’s denial. Nor is there any reason to think
(assuming, of course, that causal determinism is false) that the state of the world
at any time before t is causally sufficient for Peter’s denial. Clause (ii) thus
captures the core insight of libertarianism as an ‚anti-determinist‛ view while
also allowing for the kind of counterfactual power over past events that have had
causal consequences discussed earlier. Clause (iii) is meant to rule out the
Scotistic (and Bañezian, as we’ll see in the next chapter) idea that a free action
can ultimately be the result of God’s synchronic causal activity at the time of the
action.
If we apply (LF**) to the case involved in HAMR, I think we get a similar
result. The issue in that case was that agent A is supposed, on Molinist
assumptions, to have the power to bring it about that (C

~Z), which is in fact

false. (13) implies that A has no such power since the falsity of ‘(C

~Z)’ is

embedded in the causal past. But given that there is no causal connection
between the fact that (C

Z), even when conjoined with God’s will to create

partly on the basis of his knowledge that (C

Z), and A’s doing z in c, then the

latter satisfies clause (ii) of (LF**), and so A’s doing z in c may be considered free
from the libertarian standpoint after all. In other words, as there is no ‚line of
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causation‛ tracing backward from A’s doing z in c to the fact that God created
partly on the basis of his knowledge that (C

Z), then we need not countenance

any sort of ‚backward causation‛ in order to maintain A’s ability to bring it
about that (C

~Z). Molinists, therefore, are securely within the parameters of

the libertarian view of freedom.
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CHAPTER 5
THE MYSTERY OF MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE
Mention has already been made several times of what Alfred Freddoso calls
the ‚source question‛ regarding God’s providential knowledge of the contingent
future. How does God come to know what will happen in the world when what
will happen is, at least in part, characterized by the sort of indeterministic
contingency that libertarians take to be essential to human free choice? Pace Eef
Dekker,1 I take Molina’s theory of middle knowledge to be an attempt at
answering this question.
According to Molina, God’s knowledge that (say) Adam will sin freely (in the
libertarian sense) is explained by the fact that God knows, as a matter of
contingent fact, that Adam would sin if he were to be tempted in the garden.
Because this fact about Adam (viz. that if he were tempted in the garden he
would freely sin) is both metaphysically contingent (Adam could have been such
that he would not sin were he in such circumstances) and pre-volitional (i.e., its
truth is not explained by God’s willing it to be so but is antecedent to and
independent of God’s will), it falls within the scope of God’s middle knowledge,
as being ‚mid-way‛ between God’s natural knowledge of all metaphysically
necessary states of affairs and his free knowledge of those states that will actually
obtain as a result of his choice to create this or that order of things. In short, the

200

source of God’s providential foreknowledge is his middle knowledge coupled
with his knowledge of which set of creatures he chooses to create in which
circumstances.
Although Molina’s theory is an answer to the source question, it is admittedly
only a partial answer. The question that must then be faced by the theorist of
middle knowledge is obvious: how does God come to know that Adam would
freely sin if he were placed in the garden? What, in other words, is the source of
God’s middle knowledge? Even granting the theory’s assumption that there are
such ‚middle facts‛ (Van Inwagen, 1997, p. 226) about free creatures, how does
God’s knowledge of such facts come about? In his review of Thomas Flint’s
masterful defense of Molinism, Divine Providence (Flint, 1998), William Hasker
notes that Flint fails to address precisely this question (Hasker, 1999b, p. 249),
which can only be seen as a conspicuous lacuna still in need of being dealt with if
the theory is to be considered viable.
In this chapter I will offer my own way of handling the question regarding
the source of God’s middle knowledge. To anticipate my answer, I will argue
that an adequate characterization of the ontological relation in which creatures
stand to God as their Creator provides an explanation, not for why God has
middle knowledge, but for why we cannot possibly understand how his middle
knowledge comes about. In other words, we cannot answer the source question
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regarding middle knowledge, and that is what should be expected given the
Creator-creature relationship.

5.1. Middle Knowledge and Individual Essences
The problem of the source of middle knowledge is made more acute by the
crucial Molinist claim that God knows not only know what his actually existing
creatures would do in the various circumstances in which they might find
themselves, but he also knows the middle facts about those creatures that might
have existed but never in fact do. As I said in the previous chapter, God could
have created Schmadam instead of Adam, and if Molinism is true, then God
must know what Schmadam would have done if he were tempted in the garden.
But how can there be true CFs concerning non-existent entities?
Fortunately, there is a convenient solution to this part of the problem. We
need only commit to an actualist ontology of individual creaturely essences or
haeccaeities, as outlined by Alvin Plantinga in The Nature of Necessity (Plantinga,
1974b, pp. 70f.), which was already employed in the previous chapter. Since
Plantinga gives independent reasons for adopting such an ontology (basically as
a way to avoid ontological commitment to possible but non-existent entities) it is
no ad hoc maneuver to adopt it here, and so I will eschew an extended defense of
it. Accordingly, the Molinist can provide an ontological basis for God’s
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knowledge of what a non-existent Schmadam would have done if he were
tempted in the garden without having to maintain that non-existent objects can
have properties, even the property of non-existence. Rather, it is Schmadam’s
actually existing but unexemplified haeccaeity or essence (‚Schmadamitas,‛
perhaps, or the property of being identical to Schmadam) that has the property
of being such that its necessarily unique exemplification would do such-andsuch were he to be tempted in the garden.
In general, we can say that God, by means of his natural knowledge, knows all
the infinite ways in which his essence, which is Infinite Being, can be imitated or
‚participated in‛ by finite creatures.2 Hence, for every finite creaturely essence E,
God knows through his natural knowledge that E can be exemplified. If E is the
essence of a creature endowed with free will, then middle knowledge allows God to
know, for every possible circumstance C in which the unique instance x of E
might find itself, what x would do were x to find itself in C. If C is a situation
which calls for a free decision, then God knows via middle knowledge what x
would freely do were x in C.
This is the approach advocated by Jonathan Kvanvig, who writes:
*W+hen God creates he makes individuals that exemplify essences.< *I+t
must be claimed that essences are such that, even before they are
instantiated, they reveal what an instantiation of them would be like.<
*E+ach free individual’s essence includes a maximal subjunctive of
freedom (Kvanvig, 1986, pp. 122, 124).
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A ‚maximal subjunctive of freedom‛ amounts to the set of all and only true CFs
concerning the particular creature in question. Now, if such an approach is
viable, it would a fortiori provide a basis for God’s knowledge not only of how
non-existent agents would have behaved had they existed, but also of how
actually existing agents would have behaved in circumstances in which they
never in fact end up. For example, because God is immediately acquainted with
Adamitas, he not only knows what Adam would do were he tempted in the
garden (what Robert Adams calls a ‚semi-factual‛ (Adams, 1977, p. 115) because
Adam does in fact find himself in those circumstances), but also what Adam
would have done were he were the one tempted first by the serpent instead of
Eve (a literal ‚counterfactual‛ of freedom, since Adam was never in such
circumstances).
The classical theist, however, will insist that such individual creaturely
essences do not exist separately from or independently of the divine essence.
They are not, as it were, ‚Platonic Forms‛ of individual creatures that subsist in
their own right. Rather, the classical theist will posit them as ideas within the
divine mind, the content of which represent finite, imperfect ‚reflections‛ or
‚imitations‛ of God’s infinite being. St. Thomas speaks of such ideas as likenesses
(the technical Latin term that he uses is species).3 As such, Molina would seem to
agree with the view that God knows the middle facts about creatures by way of
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his acquaintance with their (as we are calling them) individual essences or (as the
medieval calls them) the ideas of such creatures. Indeed, he says as much:
It is absolutely true that the ideas (or, the divine essence known as the
primary object) are the firm and certain explanation for the fact that God,
who comprehends in the deepest way both Himself and the things that He
contains eminently, knows future contingents. Thus, besides St. Thomas
< it is also the case that St. Bonaventure and, in general, as many as
adopted this way of speaking held this very position, even if they did not
explicate the matter satisfactorily (Molina, 1988, p. 142).
The reason why Molina finds their explications unsatisfactory is that they failed
to mention the role of middle knowledge in God’s knowledge of future
contingents, which Molina points out also has its source in God’s seeing in his
own essence (i.e., in the ideas of creatures) what such creatures would do in any
given circumstances.
But this only returns us to the question of how God ‚sees‛ this. What explains
the fact that God knows, prior to the exemplification of a given creaturely
essence E, that the unique instantiation x of E would freely do A in circumstance
C if x were to be found in C? It is all well and good to insist, as Kvanvig puts it,
that essences ‚reveal‛ the middle facts about a particular possible creature, but it
is not easy to see how they can do so without eliminating the very contingency of
these middle facts.
Let me restate the question in order to show just how perplexing a problem
this really is. We have to imagine (to the extent that we're able) God alone in his

205

own self-sufficient glory prior to the fiat of creation (whatever sense it makes to
speak of anything "prior to" the creation of the temporal order) contemplating
what world he wants to create. Suppose he wants to create a world in which (for
whatever inscrutable reason) his incarnate Son is thrice denied, and freely so, by
his best friend, Peter. Peter does not yet exist but his individual essence does, as
contained within the divine Essence, and so God scrutinizes the individual
essence that would be uniquely exemplified by Peter if God were to create him
(let's call that individual essence P*, so that: necessarily, x exemplifies P* iff
x=Peter), in order to see what Peter would freely do in those circumstances. The
question is, what is there in P* that allows God to know, infallibly, that Peter
would freely deny Christ if he were in the relevant circumstances?
Keep in mind that it cannot be something essential to P* since the objects of
middle knowledge are supposed to be contingently true. Unlike, say, the
property being human, with which P* must be co-exemplified (necessarily: if x
exemplifies P* then x exemplifies being human), it's not the case that the property
being an x such that if x were in C, then x would thrice deny Christ is necessarily coexemplified with P*. If it were essential to Peter that he deny Christ in the
relevant circumstances, then he cannot be said to do so freely. So, given only
Peter's individual essence, how does God come to know something about Peter
that is contingent, something that could have been otherwise?
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The answer to this question offered by Domingo Bañez, a 16th century
Dominican and one of the most well-known critics of Molina’s theory, is that
God knows it because God wills it (Zagzebski, 1991, p. 127); it is thus a piece of
free knowledge and not middle knowledge at all. God knows that if x were in C,
then the causal contribution that God would make toward x's doing A would be
not only necessary but sufficient for x's doing A. As Freddoso (1988) points out in
his excellent discussion of the 16th century controversy, God's causal contribution
(his ‚general concurrence‛) is, according to Bañez and his ilk, intrinsically
efficacious. Again, if it were the case that x would not do A if x were to be found in
C, God would know that because his general concurrence with x's not doing A
would be intrinsically inefficacious; it would not only be a necessary condition of
x's not doing A but a sufficient condition as well. Ultimately, the source of God's
knowledge of what an agent would do in a given circumstance is his knowledge
of what causal contribution he wills to make toward what the agent does in that
circumstance (Freddoso, 1988, pp. 17-19).4
Clearly, the Bañezian answer—which is essentially a compatibilist answer—is
not acceptable to those who take the libertarian view of human free choice and
hence would be (and was) rejected by Molina and his school. For an action to be
free in the libertarian sense, there can be no antecedent (or even simultaneous)
causal factors outside of the agent that are sufficient for that action. The agent
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must be able both to do and refrain from doing that action given the same
antecedent causal conditions. If God's general concurrence were, as the
Bañezians have it, intrinsically efficacious or inefficacious, then given that God
wills to make such-and-such a causal contribution toward a given action, the
agent must act in that manner.
Molina therefore rejects the notion that God's general concurrence is either
intrinsically efficacious or inefficacious, claiming instead that it is intrinsically
neutral (Freddoso, 1988, p. 18). It is indeed a necessary condition for a given action
to be performed (God is, after all, the First Cause and nothing is altogether
independent of his causal influence), but it is not a sufficient condition for such an
action. It also requires the agent's own free causal contribution. Once again,
Molina's theory is that God knows what that free causal contribution would be if
the agent were to be found in the relevant circumstances, but once more, how
does God know this?

5.2. Molina’s Problematic Approach
Molina's own answer to this question is, at least on the face of it, not
altogether satisfying. Molina suggests that we look not to Peter's individual
essence for something that might explain the appropriate ‚middle fact‛ about
Peter (viz. that he would freely deny Christ were he in the relevant
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circumstances), but rather that we look to God himself. What accounts for God’s
middle knowledge is nothing other than God’s absolute and utter perfection, in
particular the perfection of his epistemic faculties. Because God has such a
marvelous and incomprehensibly keen and penetrating insight into each of his
rational creatures (not only those he does create but even those he can create but
doesn’t), he is able to know how each such creature would freely act in any given
circumstance in which it might be found. This marvelous and keen insight into
each creaturely essence is what has come to be called God's supercomprehension (a
term that Molina himself never uses). It is not mere comprehension, which
would be impressive enough as affording God a complete understanding of a
creature’s essential properties. But because God infinitely surpasses in perfection
each of his finite creatures, his knowledge of each creature somehow surpasses
what is contained in the essential being (esse essentiae) of each creature and
includes even those things about it that are contingent (esse existentiae). Molina
puts it this way:
Middle knowledge [is that] by which, in virtue of the most profound and
inscrutable comprehension of each faculty of free choice, [God] saw in His
own essence what each such faculty would do with its innate freedom
were it to be placed in this or that or, indeed, in infinitely many orders of
things—even though it would really be able, if it so willed, to do the
opposite.< But this sort of knowledge concerning created things is
attributed to God < because He is God and for this reason comprehends
each created faculty of choice in a certain absolutely profound manner.<
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[W]hat is required is an absolutely profound and absolutely preeminent
comprehension, such as is found only in God with respect to creatures
(Molina, 1988, pp. 168, 170-71).
And again:
It is by reason of *God’s+ perfection that just as it falls under God’s
omnipotence to be able to bring into existence creatures who are endowed
with free choice and who have control over their acts (as we discern by
experience in our very own selves), so too it falls under His immense and
altogether unlimited knowledge, by which He comprehends in the deepest
and most eminent way whatever falls under His omnipotence, to penetrate
created free choice in such a way as to discern and intuit with certainty
which part it is going to turn itself to by its own innate freedom (Molina,
1988, p 141).
In short, it is God’s unlimited cognitive perfection that accounts for his
possession of middle knowledge.
In spite of the rhetorical impact of the foregoing, involving as it does such
expressions as ‚most profound,‛ ‚inscrutable‛ and ‚absolutely preeminent,‛ the
explanatory power of Molina's notion of supercomprehension is questionable.
Does it really amount to anything more than saying, ‘God just knows such
things,’ together with a little bit of hand-waving?
However, Molina’s way of handling the question is even more problematic
than mere mystification and seems to veer into incoherence. I noted above that
God’s supercomprehension of a creature affords him knowledge not only of the
essential properties of that creature but even of those things about it that are
contingent. But Molina goes even further and says that supercomprehension
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allows God to know things about a creature that are, in and of themselves,
uncertain. As Freddoso describes it, ‘More precisely, one who supercomprehends
must be able to have epistemic certitude regarding states of affairs that do not (at
least as yet) have metaphysical certitude’ (Freddoso, 1988, p. 52). Indeed, contra
my own efforts in the previous chapter urging that CFs can and do have definite
truth-values (that they are, in medieval parlance, ‚determinately true‛ or
‚determinately false‛), Molina seems to deny this! Consider the following
reiteration of the notion of supercomprehension:
We claim that the certitude of this middle knowledge has its source, in
turn, in the depth and unlimited perfection of the divine intellect, a
perfection by which God knows with certainty what is in itself uncertain
[emphasis mine], and this because of an absolutely eminent
comprehension, in His divine essence, of every faculty of choice that He is
able to create by His omnipotence (Molina, 1988, p. 248).
The phrase that I have italicized seems to indicate that Molina thinks of CFs as
neither true nor false but indeterminate. What else could it mean for a CF to be ‘in
itself uncertain’? But isn’t this to cut the legs right out from under the theory of
middle knowledge? How can Molina assert on the one hand that God knows
what Adam would do were he tempted in the garden and then on the other hand
insist that what Adam would do were he tempted in the garden is indeterminate
and uncertain? Molina’s answer is supercomprehension. Even though, prior to
his being tempted in the garden, what Adam would do in that situation is
indeterminate (because Adam is free and can either sin or not sin), the power of
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God’s intellect is so vast and the depth of his cognitive perfection so profound
that he is nevertheless able to know what Adam would do in that situation.
Insofar as Molina’s approach involves abandoning the extremely plausible
epistemic principle that S knows that p only if p is true, it is clearly defective, and
Robert Adams is surely correct to insist on its incoherence. As Adams writes,
[T]o comprehend something is already to understand about it everything
that is there to be understood, and it is absurd to suppose that anyone,
even God, could understand more than that. Molina seems to want to say
that what free creatures would do under various possible conditions is not
there, objectively, to be known, but that God’s mind is so perfect that He
knows it anyway. But that’s impossible (Adams, 1977, p. 111).
I concur with Adams here. Molina’s notion of supercomprehension as God’s
ability to know what is in and of itself uncertain and indeterminate proves fatal
to the theory of middle knowledge and must be rejected. Molina is quite correct
to say that ‘our *human+ knowledge and cognition do not have more certitude
than there is certitude in the object considered in its own right,’ but I fail to see
how the same cannot be said of God as well. If a proposition is in itself uncertain,
then no knower, no matter how perfect, can know it.
It could be, of course, that I am misinterpreting Molina. After all, to saddle
him with so obviously an incoherent view on the basis of a single passage seems
less than charitable. It may be that when he speaks of the objects of God’s middle
knowledge as things which God knows with certainty despite their being in
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themselves uncertain, he could mean merely that they are metaphysically
contingent rather than uncertain or indeterminate.
Indeed, this would be similar to the manner in which Freddoso handles
Molina’s way of talking about future contingent statements, which he also says
are neither determinately true nor determinately false. On Freddoso’s
interpretation, for a future contingent statement to be ‚determinately true‛
according to Molina’s usage is for it to be not only true but unpreventable or
‚present in its causes,‛ which is to say, accidentally necessary (Freddoso, 1988, p.
165, n. 4). Thus the asymmetry between God’s knowledge of the future and ours:
we can know a future state of affairs only if present causes are so arranged as to
issue in that future state, and therefore we cannot know future contingent (nondeterministic) states of affairs. God, on the other hand, can know the future not
by inferring it from the operation of prior deterministic causes but via the
mechanisms of middle knowledge. Hence, God’s knowing that p will be the case,
while entailing that ‘p will be’ is true, does not entail that ‘p will be’ is
determinately (i.e., unpreventably) true, whereas if we know that p will be the case,
that can only be because ‘p will be’ is determinately true, i.e., accidentally
necessary.
However, Richard Gaskin has argued convincingly that this interpretation of
Molina is mistaken. When Molina denies that future contingent statements are

213

determinately true (or determinately false), he means to say nothing less than
that they are neither true nor false simpliciter. In other words, he is adopting the
view of future contingents put forth by Aristotle in De Interpretatione, discussed
in chapter two, where Aristotle (as the standard interpretation has it) avoids
fatalism by restricting the principle of bivalence as not applying to future
contingent statements. Thus Gaskin summarizes his case:
Repeatedly in this part of his commentary [on De Interpretatione], Molina
has Aristotle endorse the fatalist’s case, expressed in terms of an inference
from determinate truth to necessity. And of course Molina himself
endorses (what he takes to be) Aristotle’s endorsement of that case. So
whether or not Molina has understood Aristotle correctly, he (Molina)
must be equating determinate truth with simple truth, not necessity
(Gaskin, 1994b, p. 559).
In other words, because Molina agrees with Aristotle that the accidental
necessity of p can be inferred from the determinate truth of p, it just makes no
sense to think that Molina equates something’s being accidentally necessary with
its being determinately true. Instead, as Gaskin maintains, when Molina uses the
expression ‘determinately true’, he means nothing more than what contemporary
philosophers mean by ‘true’ simpliciter.
As a result, the claim that I am committing a hermeneutical howler in
interpreting Molina as denying that CFs have definite truth-values despite the
fact that God knows them with certainty loses a good deal of its bite. If Gaskin is
correct, then Molina is committed to a similar inconsistency in regard to future
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contingent statements. For unlike Aquinas, whose doctrine is that God knows the
future as eternally present and hence can deny that future contingents are either
true or false (à la Aristotle), Molina emphatically asserts that God knows the
future as such. As Freddoso says,
Molina’s strong adherence to the doctrine that God is eternal does not
deter him from using tensed language when speaking of God’s
knowledge of and causal influence on temporal creatures.... So, it seems,
according to Molina it is perfectly correct to assert, pace St. Thomas, that
God knows future contingents with certainty as future (Freddoso, 1988, pp.
33-34).
So, again, I think I am on good grounds in maintaining that Molina holds an
incoherent view, insofar as he thinks that CFs are not determinately true (i.e.,
true simpliciter) even though they are known by God by way of middle
knowledge.
Nevertheless, even if a Freddoso-like interpretation of Molina is the correct
one, so that his actual view is that there are genuine ‚middle facts‛ about free
creatures (i.e., determinately true CFs) that can therefore be known by God with
certainty because they are in themselves either true or false, albeit not
‚determinately‛ (i.e., necessarily) so, that returns us to the problem of how a
creature’s individual essence can ‚reveal‛ such contingent facts, even to a
cognitively perfect being.
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5.3. Idea-Models
A novel approach has been recently proposed and defended by Keith Wyma,
following a suggestion of Calvin Normore as to how God might ‚model‛ the
behavior of a given creature, prior to its creation, by means of a kind of ideal
simulacrum of that creature. Normore writes:
Imagine that God’s mind contains a perfect model of each possible thing–a complete divine idea of a particular or, if you like, an individual
concept. Imagine that God simulates possible histories by thinking about
how the being which is A would behave under circumstances C—i.e., he
simulates C and ‘sees’ how A behaves. Now if there is a way in which A
would behave in C, a perfect model should reflect it (Normore, 1985, p. 15).
Picking up on Normore’s suggestion, Wyma develops this approach as follows:
Suppose God forms ideas of free creatures and then puts these ideas
through their paces in various experiential scenarios, as if running a
simulation on a model—like, for instance, testing a model plane in a wind
tunnel. God could know what an idea-model does, and that could
constitute the hypothetical middle knowledge, prior to (or without ever)
creating and watching the creaturely agent.<
I argue that not only could God know counterfactuals of freedom
through such modeling, the very modeling process itself provides the
actually occurring states of affairs needed to make those counterfactuals
true in the first place. If anyone could create an accurate model of a free
creature, it would be God; God would know every relevant detail,
including the content of the agent’s character, dispositions, quirks, odd
impulses, and so on.< Suppose further that God puts this model through
an ideal scenario, this ideal situation being accurate in every
corresponding phenomenological detail to physical-world experience.<
Further, if God’s model really is accurate, what it does in its idealscenario state of affairs should correspond exactly to what the real agent
does do—or even would do—in its physical world state of affairs. The
truth of what the model does can be prior to what the creature does
without the former entailing or determining the latter, because what
makes the actions correspond is not some relation spreading from
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whomever acted ‚first,‛ but rather the essential similarity between the
two doers. The model, if accurate, would not perform a given action
unless the creature would, and vice versa (Wyma, 2001, pp. 8-9).
Thus, Wyma sees himself as having provided answers both to the grounding
objection, discussed in the previous chapter, and to the question regarding the
source of middle knowledge. What ‚grounds‛ the truth of CFs is the behavior of
the idea-models: if the idea-model of A is situated in circumstances that are
phenomenologically indistinguishable from circumstance C and it then does X,
then that grounds the truth of the CF, If A were in C, then A would do X.
Furthermore, God’s knowledge of this middle fact about A arises from his
observation of the experimental scenario.
I think there are a number of problems with Wyma’s suggested approach.
First of all, it’s not clear that such ‚idea-models‛ of free creatures are possible,
even for God. Wyma says that such an idea-model is to exhibit ‘every relevant
detail’ of a given creature, ‘including the content of the agent’s character,
dispositions, quirks, odd impulses, and so on.’ But on the traditional (i.e.,
Aristotelian) understanding of how character traits like virtues and vices are
acquired, it’s not possible for a person simply to be created ex nihilo with this or
that virtue or vice; it must be acquired through a period (however long) of
habituation. Thus, God cannot simply create an idea-model with a whole array of
virtues or vices ‚built in‛ and then see how that idea-model behaves in a given
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scenario. Those virtues or vices can only be acquired through the performance of
virtuous or vicious actions, which eventually form stable, settled dispositions of
character. Therefore, in observing the behavior of the idea-models, God would
not be able to infer what a person with (say) the virtue of courage would do in a
given situation, for the idea-model itself cannot have the virtue of courage. It
exists, as Wyma says, ‘not as a true person perduring from one event to the next,
but as a person-slice covering one action-event’ (Wyma, 2001, p. 10) and therefore
cannot possibly have been habituated in such a way as to acquire the virtue of
courage.
Secondly, if there is no necessary connection between the actual behavior of an
idea-model and what the creature being modeled would do if it were created,
then I cannot see how such modeling could afford God infallible knowledge of
the appropriate middle facts concerning that creature. Wyma’s suggestion is that
the qualitative indiscernability between an agent and his or her idea-model as
well as the phenomenological indiscernability between the situations in which
the idea-model is actually placed and in which the agent might be place ensures
that what the idea-model actually does in that situation is what the agent would
do in that situation. But how can the connection between the two be anything
more than probabalistic? After all, given a libertarian understanding of free will,
it is possible for numerically the same agent in numerically the same circumstances to
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perform different actions, i.e., if A is free with respect to doing X in C, then
there’s a possible world in which A is in C and does X and a possible world in
which A is in C and refrains from doing X. Thus, the fact that the idea-model of A
does X in a situation phenomenologically indistinguishable from C can at best
make it likely that A would do X in C, but it cannot guarantee it.
In fairness, Wyma is aware of this criticism, but insists that despite the fact
that there is no necessary connection between the action of the idea-model and
the action of the agent, the former nonetheless affords God knowledge of what
the latter would be. He says,
[W]e do not ground the counterfactual of freedom merely on
psychological and character traits present in the agent—all of which the
model shares—but we can also appeal to the fact that from those traits, in
the specified situation the model does do the action counterfactually
ascribed to the agent. Moreover, I want to stress again that the similarity
between model and agent must reside in their exact, essential similarity, as
determined by God. That is, God—who makes both agent and model—
ensures their similarity to such a degree that the model’s actions, for all
relevant considerations, exactly represent the agent’s actions. Upon
observing the model freely doing x in situation y, we can justifiably regard
that as effectively observing the agent freely doing x in situation y (Wyma,
2001, pp. 13-14).
But this strikes me as, at best, a completely circular explanation. It seems that
God would already have to know what the agent would do in a given situation in
order to construct a model that behaves in exactly the same way. At worst, it’s an
impossible explanation for, once again, if the model is free, then God cannot
ensure that it will behave in any particular way (unless God has middle
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knowledge of how the model would behave, but that lands us in an infinite
regress) and if the agent is free, God cannot ensure that the agent would behave
in exactly the same way as the model behaves. That’s simply the nature of
libertarian freedom.
Lastly, assuming the ontology of individual essences as mentioned earlier,
not even God can make a model that bears and exact, essential similarity to an
actual agent, for the agent exemplifies an essential property—viz. its haecceity—
that the model cannot possibly exemplify. Ultimately, if an agent possesses
libertarian freedom, then nothing other than the agent himself or herself—no
matter how qualitatively indistinguishable—can provide the metaphysical ratio
for what that agent would do in a given situation.

5.4. The Suarezian Solution
Perhaps we should simply dispense with trying to answer the question
concerning the source of God’s middle knowledge and instead see it simply as a
consequence of his general omniscience. This seems to be the approach of
Molina’s fellow Jesuit Francisco Suarez, who asserts, ‘*T+he whole controversy
comes back to this, that we should see whether those conditionals [i.e., CFs] have
a knowable determinate truth’ (quoted in Adams, 1977, p. 110). So long as they
do, then a fortiori they would be known by an omniscient being. Suarez goes on
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to assert that they must have a truth-value by virtue of what is known as the
principle of Conditional Excluded Middle (either: if it were that , then it would
be that , or: if it were that , then it would be that ~ ), which he takes to be
valid, and so God would know which of the two disjuncts is true as a result of
his knowing all truths.
But this approach was criticized both in Suarez’s own day and in more recent
times by Robert Adams (1977), who argues that the contradictory opposite of If it
were that , then it would be that

is not If it were that , then it would be that ~ , but

is instead It’s not the case that if it were that , then it would be that , which is
equivalent to If it were that , then it might be that

and it might be that ~ . The

latter, of course, does not afford God the requisite certainty for complete
providential control over creation (Adams, 1977, p. 110).
Counter-examples to Conditional Excluded Middle have been put forward in
the recent literature—most notably by David Lewis (1973, pp. 79f.)—supporting
Adams’s contention. Thus, neither of the following seem to be true:
(a)

If Reagan and Chernenko had been compatriots, then Reagan would
have been a Russian,

(b)

If Reagan and Chernenko had been compatriots, then Reagan would
not have been a Russian.5

Rather, the most that can be said is that if Reagan and Chernenko had been
compatriots, then Reagan might have been a Russian. Then again, Chernenko
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might have been an American, or both might have been Venezuelan, or what
have you. It all depends on how the vagueness regarding the similarity relations
among possible worlds relative to the actual world is resolved. Is a world in
which Reagan and Chernenko are both Russians more or less similar to the
actual world then a world in which both are Americans? Consequently, given
that Lewisian semantics evaluates the truth of all counterfactuals on the basis of
comparative similarity among possible worlds, the same sort of vagueness will
seem to infect any such pair of counterfactuals If it were that , then it would be that
and If it were that , then it would be that ~ .
However, when it comes to CFs, the objects of middle knowledge, the
situation is crucially different. Molinists stipulate that the circumstances
described by the antecedent of a CF involve not simply the immediate conditions
in which the agent acts but also the entire causal history of the world up to and
including the time of the action. As a result, it is difficult to see why the law of
Conditional Excluded Middle wouldn’t be valid for these special kinds of
counterfactual claims. As William Lane Craig puts it,
Molinists need not and should not endorse [the Law of Conditional
Excluded Middle+ unqualifiedly.< But it is plausible that counterfactuals
of the very specialized sort we are considering must be either true or false.
For since the circumstances C in which the free agent is placed are fully
specified in the counterfactual’s antecedent, it seems that if the agent were
placed in C and left free with respect to action A, then he must either do A
or not do A. For what other alternative is there? (Craig, 2001b, p. 338).
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We can use Lewis’s putative counterexample to illustrate this point. If the
antecedent of (a) were suitably strengthened by conjoining a proposition ‘H’ fully
describing a possible history of the world, then that antecedent would have to
specify Reagan’s birthplace, in which case (a) would have to be either true or
false and, if false, (b) would then have to be true. So it must be that one or the
other of the following is true:
(a*)

If Reagan and Chernenko had been compatriots & H, then Reagan
would have been a Russian,

(b*)

If Reagan and Chernenko had been compatriots & H, then Reagan
would not have been a Russian.

Thus, it seems that Suarez is on good grounds in holding that God’s having
middle knowledge with respect to free created agents follows from his being
omniscient.
Unfortunately, the Suarezian approach raises another problem of which
Molina himself seems to have been well aware, viz. why then doesn’t God then
have middle knowledge with respect to himself? In other words, if middle
knowledge simply follows from God’s essential omniscience, then why doesn’t
he have middle knowledge of what he would do were he to find himself in a
given situation? It is, after all, part of the Molinist picture that God can indeed
‚find himself‛ in this or that situation, namely creation situations, as discussed in
the previous chapter, and there seems no reason why there wouldn’t be truths
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about what God would do (i.e., what world God would create) in this or that
creation situation. If God, by virtue of his essential omniscience, has middle
knowledge of what his creatures would do in any given situations in which they
might find themselves, then ought he not, by the same token, have middle
knowledge of what he would do in any given situation in which he might find
himself? The Suarezian approach would seem to be committed to saying he does
indeed have such knowledge.
However, as Molina himself argued, this would seem to threaten God’s own
freedom of action. For middle knowledge is prevolitional knowledge or
knowledge of states that obtain independently of God’s will. What God knows by
means of middle knowledge is not up to him. If it is true of a particular agent A
that if A were in C, then A would do X, it would be impossible for God to bring it
about that A is in C and A doesn’t do X. But if the particular agent in question is
God himself, then it would be impossible for God to bring it about that God is in
C and God doesn’t do X, i.e., that God is unfree with respect to doing X in C.
Thus, Molinists have a clear-cut reason for maintaining that, although God
has comprehensive middle knowledge of what free creatures would do in any
possible circumstances in which they might find themselves, God does not have
such middle knowledge of what he would do in the various creation situations in
which he might find himself, as such prevolitional knowledge would fatally
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compromise the divine freedom. Such knowledge must instead be considered
free knowledge that follows upon God’s deciding what he would do in the various
possible (as well as the actual) creation situations.
Unfortunately, the Suarezian approach to dealing with the source of God’s
middle knowledge provides us with no explanation as to why there should be
any such distinction between God’s having middle knowledge regarding
creatures and his not having middle knowledge regarding himself. If the mere
truth of a given CF is sufficient for God to know it by means of middle
knowledge, as the Suarezian approach has it, then the mere truth of something
like If God were in the actual creation situation, he would choose to create the present
world would be sufficient for him to know that by means of middle knowledge as
well. But as we just saw, that would mean he was unfree in creating the present
world. Some explanation must therefore be given for why God has middle
knowledge of creatures but not of himself.

5.5. The Metaphysics of Participation
In spite of my earlier criticisms of Molina’s approach to the present question
by way of ‚supercomprehension,‛ I think it ultimately points us in an interesting
direction—not of an understanding as to how God's middle knowledge comes
about, but as to why we cannot possibly understand how it comes about.
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Molina’s discussion recalls us to a consideration of one of the fundamental issues
of natural theology, that concerning the relationship between the Creator and his
creation. In an already quoted passage, Molina notes, first, that middle
knowledge ‘is found only in God with respect to creatures,’ and second, that it
arises from a ‘comprehension in His essence of each created faculty of free
choice.’ But what is it about the Creator-creature relation that could provide a
basis for such knowledge? How is a created faculty of free choice related to God
so that God could know anything about it through his own essence? As we saw,
there is little promise for understanding this by virtue of the fact that God is
more perfect—even infinitely more so—than creatures. Rather, I suggest that such
a basis may be found in the fundamental ontological relationship between God
and creatures, i.e., in terms of their being, and I believe that the metaphysics of St.
Thomas Aquinas is probably the most sophisticated articulation of the Creatorcreature relationship—one that, in turn, is helpful in regard to middle knowledge
as well.
It is all too easy to fall into the trap of talking about God as if he were one
being (albeit ‚supreme‛) among all other beings, one ‚element‛ or ‚object‛ in the
domain of quantification, one ‚value of a variable,‛ as Quine might have put it.
Nevertheless, even though this is an easy temptation to give into, it is one that
must be resisted and has been resisted by theologians from both classical and
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medieval times as well as our own. Thus, instead of talking about God as a being,
Paul Tillich refers to him as the ground of all being (Tillich, 1967), while Karl
Rahner speaks of God as the horizon of being (Rahner, 1994). St. Thomas himself
considers Exodus 3:14, where God reveals himself as He who is, to be the key to
understanding the principle name of God, viz. Being Itself (esse), or the very act of
existing (ST IaIæ, 13, 11; SCG I, 22).
St. Thomas was adamant in holding that there is no univocal sense in which
being may be predicated of God and creatures. The concept of being as used in
‘God is’ or ‘God exists’ is only analogous to the way it is used in ‘creatures exist’
(ST IaIæ, 13, 5). The reason is that, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, God
is ipsum esse subsistens or ‚subsistent being itself‛ (ST IaIæ, 4, 2). God does not
simply exist but rather, as a supremely simple being, he is identical to his
existence; God’s essence is to exist (ST IaIæ, 3, 4). Creatures, on the other hand,
have their being (habens esse) ‚from outside,‛ as it were. The creature’s act of
existing is thus something ‚added on‛ to its essence (Owens, 1963, pp. 103f.).
This is Aquinas’s doctrine of the real distinction between essence and
existence: in creatures, essence and existence are distinct metaphysical principles
that are related as potency to act, entering into composition to constitute a
substance of a certain kind, depending on how its act of existence (actus essendi)
is ‚contracted‛ or limited by the degree of potency of its essence. But since God
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is pure actuality, his act of existence is altogether unlimited, and thus does not
enter into composition with his essence but is identical to it (SCG I, 22). Thus, to
say that God exists is to say that God is his being while to say that a creature
exists is to say that it has its being.
What, then, is the relationship between divine being and creaturely being?
Toward answering this question, I would first point out just how similar the
foregoing account of St. Thomas’s metaphysics of being is to certain aspects of
the metaphysics of Plato. Recall that for Plato it is the Forms that are the true
ousiai, ‚beings‛ in the strictest sense, while individual objects of sense-experience
are not genuinely ‚beings‛ but instead ‚come to be‛ and ‚pass away‛ and are
thus derivative beings. For example, the Form of the Good is perfect goodness
while individual good things are good only imperfectly and for a time, deriving
their limited goodness by way of their relationship to the Form of the Good.
That relationship, crucially, is what Plato called participation (Gk. methexis).
This-worldly things participate or ‚share‛ in the true being of the Forms. An x
that is F is so only to the extent that it participates in the Form of F-ness. But since
they are finite, imperfect and temporal, particular objects do not exhaust the
being of the Forms, whether individually or taken altogether, and therefore Fness cannot simply be identified with the set of all things which are F.
Nonetheless, for any particular F, its own being or substance (ousia) is the Form
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of F-ness. As Gyula Klima puts it, a Form is supposed to ‘constitute the substance
of its particulars’ (Klima, 2008).
In a similar manner, St. Thomas sees the being (actus essendi) of individual
beings (entia) as somehow participating in the infinite, self-subsistent Being of
God, the divine esse. To be a creature is simply to have some finite ‚share‛ in the
Being of God. God himself is his own being, indeed he is Being Itself (ipsum esse
subsistens)—just as the Platonic Form of the Good is Goodness Itself—while
creatures have their being (habens esse) from God—just as, for Plato, individual
good things derive their goodness by way of participation in the Form of the
Good. Thus Aquinas says, ‘God is essential being, whereas other things are
beings by participation’ (ST IaIæ, 4, 3, ad. 3). Here are some further passages that
reiterate the same points:
God is being itself, of itself subsistent. Consequently, He must contain
within Himself the whole perfection of being.< Since therefore God is
subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to
Him. Now all the perfections of all things pertain to the perfection of all
being; for things are perfect precisely so far as they have being after some
fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection of no thing is wanting to
God. This line of argument, too, is touched upon by Dionysus when he
says that God exists not in any single mode, but embraces all being within
Himself, absolutely, without limitation, uniformly; and afterwards he adds
that He is very being to subsisting things (ST IaIæ, 4, 2).
And again:
That which has being, but is not being, is a being by participation. But
God is His own essence.< If, therefore, He is not His own being, He will
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be not essential, but participated, being. He will not therefore be the first
being—which is absurd. Therefore, God is His own being (ST IaIæ, 3, 4).
And again:
< it is absolutely true that there is something first which is essentially
being and essentially good, which we call God.< Hence from the first
being, essentially being and good, everything can be called good and a
being inasmuch as it participates in the first being by way of a certain
assimilation, although distantly and defectively (ST IaIæ, 6, 4).
It is to some extent ironic that St. Thomas, who is often thought to be the
consummate ‚medieval Aristotelian,‛ has at the very heart of his doctrine of
being the undeniably Platonic notion of participation. As Leo Elders puts it, ‘The
question of participation is of great importance in Aquinas’ metaphysics. We
may even say that, to a certain extent, his doctrine of the participation of being
determines the character of his philosophy’ (Elders, 1993, p. 218). While it is only
speculation on my part, it is plausible to think that it offered Aquinas a way of
maintaining both God’s transcendence vis-à-vis the created world as well as his
immanence within it. For it has been pointed out that Plato too saw the Forms,
insofar as they are eternal, immutable and perfect, as belonging to a transcendent
order, yet they are nevertheless ‚within‛ the realm of becoming insofar as they
provide for whatever intelligible stability there is within the domain of temporal
flux. Again, Elders puts it this way,
The Ideas [Forms] are separated from the world of becoming but
nonetheless present in it. The concrete thing has something of the Eidos
(Idea) in itself. Plato describes this relationship to the Ideas as a presence
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of the latter in the concrete things and in this way he acknowledges a
certain immanence of the Ideas. But he also frequently points out that the
Ideas are outside things and belong to a sphere of being of their own (the
world of Ideas) (Elders, 1993, p. 219).
Likewise for Aquinas, God is the being who is ‚wholly other‛ (totaliter aliter),
altogether sovereign and independent of anything outside of himself, and yet
present to everything within creation, as he puts it, by his power, presence and
essence. That is, the being of God is present everywhere within creation while also
transcending creation. As such, the Platonic notion of participation seems to be a
way of accounting for these apparently conflicting desiderata, insofar as God’s
otherness vis-à-vis creation is affirmed by way of the identification of God with
his being (i.e., God alone is essential being whereas in creatures there is a real
distinction between being and essence), while God’s immanence is affirmed
insofar as the very being of creatures is had by way of a ‚sharing‛ or
participation in the nature of Being Itself, which for Aquinas is the most
adequate name for God. As Aquinas himself puts it,
God fills every place, not indeed as a body, for a body is said to fill place
in so far as it excludes the presence of another body; but by God being in a
place, others are not thereby excluded from it; rather indeed He Himself
fills every place by the very fact that He gives being to the things that fill
that place (ST IaIæ, 8, 1).
Note well the inference that because God gives being to created things it follows
that God himself is present wherever there are created things. It seems that this
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can be so only if the being of created things is in some way a sharing or
participation in the being of God.
It must be stressed, however, that St. Thomas in no way means to imply that
creatures somehow possess a ‚part‛ of God, nor does God’s being enter into
creatures as a formal constitutive principle. Instead, St. Thomas’s notion of
participation in this context is entirely on the level of efficient causality—i.e., God
gives being to creatures or makes them be—and thus it’s a relation between two
substantial entities and not a relation between an entity and one of its
metaphysical principles, as with formal or material causality. Nonetheless, it is a
sort of efficient causality to which that found amongst natural kind substances is
only analogous. For whereas the latter involves the introduction of form into an
already existing subject (i.e., into something that already has an act of being), the
divine efficient causality that is creation (and conservation) involves a direct
communication of being, an actualizing of an essence and conserving it in
actuality.
I realize that at this point analytic philosophers would have a difficult time
avoiding becoming glassy-eyed and finding nothing but incoherence in such
vague, speculative and metaphorical language. While Etienne Gilson considers
Aquinas’ metaphysics of esse as his most profound contribution to philosophy
(Gilson, 1993), Anthony Kenny struggles to find any sense in it (Kenny, 1969).
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But I must insist that something like Aquinas’ approach to the Creator-creature
relation cannot be avoided. Classical theism is not deism, with God conceived as a
being altogether distinct from and outside of creation (the Watchmaker God of
17th and 18th century mechanism), nor is it pantheism, according to which God is
altogether identical with creation (Spinoza's deus sive natura). Classical theism
maintains that God is both transcendent to creation, which exists solely because
God freely wills it to exist, while also holding that God is present within creation,
indeed within each and every created thing at the very core of its being.
There is ample support for this view from both the biblical and mystical
traditions. Thus we read in the Acts of the Apostles that God is the one ‘in whom
we live, move and have our being’ (Acts 17:28). Our very existence, therefore, is
something ‚in‛ God, something contained within God’s own being. The great
mystics of the Western tradition are also, to the best of my knowledge, almost
unanimous in asserting the ‚oneness‛ of God and creation, yet without their
being strictly identical. The height of the mystical experience is often described as
an intuitive awareness of the all-pervading presence of the Divine throughout
creation, or conversely of the unity of all things with the Divine. As far as I can
see, the only way to maintain this view without falling into a pantheistic
identification of God with creation is to adopt something like the Thomistic view
outlined above, viz. that the Creator-creature relation is what we might call
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‚entitative participation,‛ or the participation of creatures in the being of the
Creator.6

5.6. Entitative Participation and Supercomprehension
Returning now to the issue of middle knowledge, what does the Thomistic
metaphysics of participation have to offer to the Molinist? Well, there are two
things that can be said about metaphysical participation that I think are relevant
to the discussion.
First of all, as creatures we cannot possibly understand or even begin to
conceive of what it is like for another entity to participate in our own being; nor,
therefore, can we possibly understand what it’s like to cognize things as would a
being in which those things participate. As was famously pointed out by Thomas
Nagel,36 we can’t even understand what it’s like to know the world in the way
some our fellow creatures do, like bats. How much less, therefore, can we know
what it’s like to know things in the way God knows them, given that the way in
which things are related to God is a relation with which we have, and can have,
no experience whatsoever? Is it implausible to think that God’s middle
knowledge of creatures might arise due to that unique relation in which
creatures stand to their creator, namely as beings that participate in the very
substance of God? More pointedly, can we say that God cannot know what a
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given creaturely agent would freely do in a given situation without that creature
standing in the same relation to us as it does to God?
I would go even further and insist that I might not even be able to know what
I would freely do in any given situation. Contra the examples of Plantinga,7
Gaskin8 and Wyma,9 which are supposed to be instances of true counterfactuals
of freedom that we can know to be true, I’m not sure that we don’t ultimately
know them on the basis of our character. For example, I do know with certainty
that I would not kill my best friend were I to be offered any sum of money.
However, I know this to be true because of the kind of person I am, and hence I
would not consider myself to be acting freely in refusing to kill my friend in such
a situation. I must act that way given the kind of person I am. On the other hand,
there are all sorts of situations which, were I to end up in them, I just don’t know
what I would freely do. Moreover, I’m not convinced that I can ever know what I
would freely do in any given situation. I just don’t have the epistemic resources
available to make such a judgment about what I would freely do, only what I
might or might not freely do.10
However, just because I cannot know any ‚middle facts‛ about myself, it
does not follow that God cannot know such facts, for I do not stand in the same
relation to myself as I do toward God: I do not participate in my own being, I
have my being from God by way of participation in his being. Thus, we can
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explain the traditional religious dictum that ‘God knows us better than we know
ourselves’11 because of the metaphysical relation of participation in which we
stand to God but not to ourselves. My argument, therefore, can be summarized
as follows:
(1)
(2)

If creatures are related to God by way of participation, then we
cannot know that God does not have middle knowledge.
Creatures are related to God by way of participation.

(3)

We cannot know that God does not have middle knowledge.

With respect to premise (2), admittedly it involves commitment to an entire
metaphysical scheme that is, to say the least, not obviously true or even
obviously coherent. I am not in a position to offer an extended study of the
Thomistic metaphysics of participation that I am here advocating; I must leave
that as an exercise for the reader. But for an objector who takes exception to that
metaphysics, some other metaphysics must be offered to replace it that doesn’t
risk collapsing the Creator-creature relation into either deism or pantheism. That
being so, I am confident that any such alternative will have to articulate a
Creator-creature relation such that, were that relation to hold, then again we as
creatures would not be in a position to deny to the Creator the sort of knowledge
posited by Molinism, for the simple reason that we as creatures could not
possibly stand in that relation to anything whatsoever.
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With respect to premise (1), the general assumption underlying it would be
something like, ‘If x stands in R to y, and z cannot possibly stand in anything like
R to anything whatsoever, then z cannot know x’s epistemic situation with
respect to y.’ Thus, since God stands in the relation of being participated in to
creatures, and human beings cannot possibly stand in anything like the relation
of being participated in to anything whatsoever, then human beings cannot know
what God’s epistemic situation is with regard to creatures, in particular, we
cannot know that God lacks middle knowledge concerning free creatures.
Now, if middle knowledge is in itself impossible (i.e., if it involves some kind
of contradiction), then of course God couldn’t possibly have middle knowledge,
and we could know that whether or not we can understand the ‚God’s eye‛ view
of the world. But that then shifts the burden of proof onto the anti-Molinist.
Unless she can show that middle knowledge is incoherent, then for all we know,
God could have middle knowledge, despite the fact that we cannot explain how
he has it. Since in the previous chapter I already responded to the most serious
objections to middle knowledge, viz. the grounding objection and Hasker’s
argument, then there’s prima facie reason to think that middle knowledge is not
an incoherent theory. Other arguments may be put forward that have not yet
come to light, but again, the burden is on the objector to put forth such an
argument; the burden is not on the Molinist to explain how God’s middle
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knowledge comes about, given that it may, for all we know, result from that
unique relation of metaphysical participation in which creatures stand to God
and which we cannot possibly understand.
The second way in which the metaphysics of participation is relevant to the
theory of middle knowledge is in regard to the issue of why God does not have
middle knowledge concerning himself. Even though the relation of participation
is not a very well defined one, we can specify at least some of its formal
properties. Whatever else the relation amounts to, it is one that is asymmetrical (if
x participates in the being of y, then y does not participate in the being of x) as
well as irreflexive (x does not participate in the being of x).
As such, if God’s middle knowledge of creatures is, as I am suggesting,
somehow attributable to the fact that creatures participate in the being of God,
i.e., if middle knowledge is a consequence of entitative participation, then God
cannot have middle knowledge regarding himself. God does not participate in
his being, since nothing ‚self-participates;‛ rather, he is his being. As St. Thomas
says, ‘Therefore it is impossible that in God His being should differ from His
essence’ (ST IaIæ 3, 4). Consequently, God does not stand in the proper sort of
relation to himself that would give rise—with respect to himself—to that
‚absolutely profound and preeminent comprehension‛ known as middle
knowledge. Thus, the argument may be summarized in the following way:
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(1)
(2)

x has middle knowledge concerning y only if y participates in the
being of x.
God does not participate in his own being.

(3)

Therefore, God does not have middle knowledge concerning himself.

Premise (1) echoes Molina’s own claim that middle knowledge ‘is found only in
God with respect to creatures,’ and I am speculating that the crucial aspect of the
Creator-creature relation in that regard is the participation of being.
Thus, unlike the Suarezian approach, which eschews any inquiry into the
source of God’s middle knowledge and so leaves open the question of why God
does not have middle knowledge concerning himself (which, if he did, would
threaten God’s own freedom), my approach—to wit, that God’s middle
knowledge concerning creatures somehow arises due to the fact that creatures
have their being by way of participation in the divine essence—at least explains
why God cannot have middle knowledge concerning himself.

5.7. Objections and Replies
I believe I have already touched upon one possible objection to my approach
to dealing with the source of God’s middle knowledge, viz. that the metaphysical
theory I’m deploying is so speculative and not easily formulated in a clear and
coherent way. I grant that the Thomistic metaphysics of esse and the correlative
notion of the participation of being are not on the face of it tractable within an
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analytic framework, in which the concept of being is generally expressed through
the device of existential quantification. As Anthony Kenny once quipped, St.
Thomas’ doctrine of God as ‚subsistent being itself‛ could only be expressed by
means of an existentially quantified variable not followed by a predicate
parameter, which, far from being a profound metaphysical insight, isn’t even
intelligible (Kenny, 1969, pp. 82, 95). But this could just as well be taken to
indicate the lack of expressive flexibility within a philosophical tradition that
limits itself to a logical language designed originally for investigating the
foundations of arithmetic.
There is a strong line of tradition going back to Plato that would see the most
important philosophical truths as expressible only by way of analogy and
metaphor. Plato himself, when it came to his most central doctrine, the theory of
Forms, gave us only analogies and metaphors—such as the Intelligible Sun, the
Divided Line, and the Cave—in discussing that doctrine. Likewise, the Thomistic
notion of participation is inherently metaphorical and I have no clear definition up
my sleeve to precisify that notion. But when dealing with the fundamentally
mysterious relationship between Creator and creature, nothing much more than
metaphor can be realistically expected.
It may also be claimed that my argument is ultimately one from ignorance:
because we’re unable to understand God’s ‚epistemic situation‛ with respect to
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creatures, and therefore cannot know that God doesn’t possess middle
knowledge concerning creatures, does it follow that he does possess such
knowledge? For all we can tell, the relation of metaphysical participation might
not afford God any such knowledge after all.
But this is to misunderstand the Molinist endeavor, which is not to put forth a
positive argument that God does possess middle knowledge. Rather, it is to put
forth a putative explanation for how God can have certain and infallible
knowledge of the contingent future. As William Lane Craig insists, ‘The Molinist
is under no obligation to provide warrant for that assumption [viz. that God has
middle knowledge], since he is merely proposing a model which is intended as
one possible solution to the alleged antinomy of divine sovereignty and human
freedom’ (Craig, 2001b, p. 339). Again, the burden of proof lies on the objector to
show that such knowledge is impossible, which I contended in the previous
chapter has not been shown. Finally, if the objector should insist that the Molinist
owes an explanation of how God comes to possess such knowledge, my
argument is that even if no such explanation can be given, that can be accounted
for in terms of the necessarily mysterious nature of the Creator-creature relation.
The situation is analogous to the introduction of a novel scientific theory.
Such theories are never ‚proven;‛ they are proposed to explain various
phenomena, usually anomalies for which previous theories could not adequately
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account, and they are considered successful to the extent that the can provide a
simpler, more economical, more aesthetically pleasing explanation than previous
theories. Likewise, there are phenomena in the theistic framework—viz. free
human actions under the guidance of divine providence—that previous theories
(Boethian-Thomistic, Scotistic, Bañezian, etc.) cannot adequately explain and that
Molinism can explain.
Furthermore, just as scientific theories must not only explain a given
phenomenon but also receive experimental confirmation, so too Molinism can be
seen as ‚confirmed‛ inasmuch as it has been successfully applied to a whole
array of theological issues that heretofore have proven intractable. Thus, Alvin
Plantinga gave a Molinist ‚Free Will Defense‛ to the problem of evil (Plantinga,
1974b, pp. 164f.), Alfred Freddoso showed how Molinism successfully deals with
the problem of predictive prophecy (Freddoso, 1988, pp. 60-61), Thomas Flint
deployed Molinism in giving an account of petitionary prayer (Flint, 1997) and
papal infallibility (Flint, 1998, pp. 179f.), and William Lane Craig has offered a
Molinist account of Christian Exclusivism (Craig, 1989). Molina’s theory of
middle knowledge must therefore be considered one of the most powerful and
successful theories in the history of Western philosophical theology.
Lastly, any scientific theory will have its theoretical postulates that cannot be
given any further explanation. For example, in the Special Theory of Relativity,
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the speed of light is simply assumed to be constant; there is no theoretical
explanation for why it must be so. Likewise, in Molinism, God is simply assumed
to have middle knowledge, with no explanation as to why he has it or how such
knowledge comes about. What I tried to do in this chapter is argue that the
necessarily mysterious nature of the Creator-creature relationship, whatever
metaphysics one uses to articulate that relationship, gives us good reason to
think that we should not be able to explain why God has such middle knowledge.
For a theological theory to end up with an ineliminable note of mystery is, it
seems to me, no vice.
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NOTES
Preface
A form of prayer for the visitation of prisoners (Episcopal Church, 1795, p. 234).
All biblical citations are from Catholic Biblical Association of America (1970).
3 While this essay will be predominantly Christian in ‚tone,‛ my intention is that my arguments
should be amenable to any classical theistic scheme. I see no reason why, e.g., a Jew or Muslim
could not be an advocate of the views for which I shall be arguing.
4 E.g., as the New Testament has it: In all wisdom and insight, [God] has made known to us the mystery
of his will in accord with his favor that he set forth in him as a plan for the fullness of times, to sum up all
things in Christ, in heaven and on earth (Ephesians 1.8-10).
5 ‘*God+ will pronounce the final word on all history. We shall know the ultimate meaning of the
whole work of creation and of the entire economy of salvation and understand the marvelous
ways by which his Providence led everything towards its final end. The Last Judgment will
reveal that God’s justice triumphs over all the injustices committed by his creatures and that
God’s love is stronger than death’ (Catechism of the Catholic Church [hereafter=CCC], §1040). All
citations of CCC are from United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (1997).
6 ‘God is the sovereign master of his plan. But to carry it out he also makes use of his creatures’
cooperation. This use is not a sign of weakness, but rather a token of almighty God’s greatness
and goodness. For God grants his creatures not only their existence, but also the dignity of acting
on their own, of being causes and principles for each other, and thus of cooperating in the
accomplishment of his plan’ (CCC, §306).
7 ‘To human beings God even gives the power of freely sharing in his providence by entrusting
them with the responsibility of ‚subduing‛ the earth and having dominion over it. God thus
enables men to be intelligent and free causes in order to complete the work of creation, to perfect
its harmony for their own good and that of their neighbors’ (CCC, §307).
8 ‘With creation, God does not abandon his creatures to themselves. He not only gives them
being and existence, but also, and at every moment, upholds them and sustains them in being,
enables them to act and brings them to their final end. ... [T]he solicitude of divine providence is
concrete and immediate; God cares for all, from the least things to the great events of the world and
its history. The sacred books powerfully affirm God’s absolute sovereignty over the course of
events’ (CCC, §§301, 303).
9 ‘*M+en, as intelligent and free creatures, have to journey toward their ultimate destinies by their
free choice and preferential love’ (CCC, §311).
10 Or, perhaps, the authority of divine revelation as recorded in either the Bible or the Koran.
1
2

Chapter 1
In this essay I will not assume any particular ontology, and so I will make indiscriminate
mention of such entities as ‚propositions,‛ ‚states of affairs,‛ ‚events,‛ ‚possible worlds,‛ etc.
Where my arguments depend crucially upon certain metaphysical assumptions, I will address it
in the text.
2 In fact, I would argue that God's being maximally provident entails that God has foreknowledge
only because it already entails that God has middle knowledge, which itself entails
foreknowledge. Cf. chapters 4 and 5 for my full discussion of middle knowledge.
1
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It must be at all times before t because it is impossible for God to acquire knowledge that he
didn’t already possess. Such a change would involve the actualization of a potentiality, which is
inconsistent with God’s being pure and complete actuality.
4 ‘*T+he belief in divine foreknowledge < derives its lofty theological status from its intimate
connection with the absolutely central doctrine that God is perfectly provident’ (Freddoso, 1988,
p. 2).
5 The ‘only hope of avoiding muddle is to stick to the simple formalities of omniscience, whereby
God knows that p if and only if p’ (Geach, 1977, p. 43).
6 ‘The human person participates in the light and power of the divine Spirit. By his reason, he is
capable of understanding the order of things established by the Creator. By free will, he is
capable of directing himself toward his true good.< By virtue of his soul and spiritual powers of
intellect and will, man is endowed with freedom, and outstanding manifestation of the divine
image’ (CCC, §§1704, 1705).
7 I realize that I am here rather egregiously begging the question against those (notably in the
Reformed tradition) who hold that one’s ‚alignment with God,‛ which is to say one’s
justification, is sola gratia, by God’s choice alone. This is not an issue I can enter into here, so I
will let the Catholic tradition speak on its behalf: ‘*W+hile God touches the heart of man through
the illumination of the Holy Ghost, man himself neither does absolutely nothing while receiving
that inspiration, since he can reject it [my emphasis], nor yet is he able by his own free will and
without the grace of God to move himself to justice in His sight. Hence, when it is said in the
sacred writings: Turn ye to me, and I will turn to you, we are reminded of our liberty; and when
we reply: Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be converted, we confess that we need the
grace of God’ (Council of Trent (1545-1563), session VI, chapter 5, Decree concerning Justification
[Schroeder, 1978, p. 32]). So according to the Catholic tradition, the grace of God is an absolutely
necessary condition for one’s justification, but is not in and of itself sufficient, for the person must
freely assent and accept that justifying grace, which he or she may also freely reject.
8 I’m assuming here an ontological commitment to events as particular entities of some sort. The
argument can easily be rewritten to avoid such talk.
9 An assumption we will have to revisit later on.
10 All citations of ST are from Aquinas (1945).
11 Van Inwagen refers to this principle as ‘( )’. The term ‘Transfer Principle’ comes from John
Martin Fischer (Fischer, 1994, p. 8).
12 An argument against the validity of the Transfer Principle: if it is valid then its converse is
valid, so that if p entails q and someone has a choice about whether p is the case, then someone
has a choice about whether q is the case. Counterexample: My making you laugh entails that you
have the capacity to laugh. I have a choice about whether I make you laugh, but I do not have a
choice about whether you have the capacity to laugh. But cast in terms of accessible worlds we
end up with a true statement: my making you laugh entails that you have the capacity to laugh. I
have access to a world in which I make you laugh, therefore I have access to a world in which
you have the capacity to laugh.
3

Chapter 2
This too is an unacceptable definition of omnipotence, but I needn’t enter into that debate here.
For an excellent discussion of action theory from the medieval point of view, see Donagan
(1982).
3 All citations of Aristotle are from Aristotle (1984).
1
2
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This is Aristotle’s own reasoning, to which a compatibilist has a ready reply, namely that one’s
deliberation may be a part of the causal nexus that would prevent a sea battle.
5 Indeed, the claim that such-and-such a statement isn’t now true or false but will come to be true or
false is itself a future contingent statement, and so the Aristotelian solution seems self-defeating.
6 ‘Furthermore, since the being of what is eternal does not pass away, eternity is present in its
presentiality to any time or instant of time. We may see an example of sorts in the case of a
circle.< *T+he center of the circle, which is no part of the circumference, is directly opposed to
any given determinate point on the circumference. Hence, whatever is found in any part of time
co-exists with what is eternal as being present to it, although with respect to some other time it be
past or future’ (Summa Contra Gentiles [=SCG] 1, 66). All citations of SCG are from Aquinas (1975).
4

Chapter 3
As is evident from the fact that Aquinas discusses this sort of response to ATD in ST IaIæ, 14, 13,
ad. 2, well before Ockham was born.
2 For Ockham’s own views, see Ockham (1969).
1

Chapter 4
I am here following the presentation of Scotus's views by Langston (1986).
As providing both necessary and sufficient conditions for an action’s being performed freely,
Cowan’s statement of the ‚libertarian assumption‛ is problematic. I may move my arm as the
result of an indeterministic neuronal event, but that doesn’t seem sufficient for my having moved
my arm freely.
3 As a determinist, Cowan thinks ‘that agents always act on the basis of their desires, so that what
grounds their future actions is quite literally present states of affairs’ (Cowan, 2003, p. 101, n. 8).
But, at least for the sake of argument, he seems to grant that such future-tense statements can be
grounded indeterministically.
4 Unfortunately, I don’t have an argument for this intuition either, but Cowan seems to agree with
me on this point. He says,
Take the conditional proposition
(F) If the moon is made of green cheese, then the individual we take to be Alvin
Plantinga is really an android.
Now, both the antecedent and the consequent of this conditional are false.< But as you
know, on truth-functional logic, this proposition turns out to be true! Clearly, however,
something has gone amiss (Cowan, 2003, p. 100).
It seems equally clear to me that something has gone amiss if we consider (α) true simply because
its antecedent is false. Your not going to the movies cannot be what ‚grounds‛ the truth of my
statement that if you go to the movies, then I will accompany you.
1
2

Chapter 5
‘*Molina+ must be interpreted as having worked on the reconciliation question, not on the source
question’ (Dekker, 1998, p. 110).
2 ‘Inasmuch as God knows His own essence perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in
which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can be participated
in by creatures according to some kind of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species,
according to which it participates in some way in the likeness of the divine essence. Therefore, as
1
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God knows His essence as so imitable by such a creature, He knows it as the particular model
and idea of that creature: an in like manner as regards other creatures’ (ST IaIæ, 15, 2).
3 ‘As ideas, according to Plato, were the principles of the knowledge of things and of their
generation, an idea, as existing in the mind of God, has this twofold office. So far as the idea is the
principle of the making of things, it may be called an exemplar, and belongs to practical
knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a likeness, and may
belong to a speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it is related to everything
made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it is related to all things
known by God, even though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows
according to their proper likeness, in so far as they are known by Him in a speculative manner’
(ST IaIæ, 15, 3).
4 ‘Ita in præsentia dico, quod hæc propositio, Antichristus erit, simpliciter loquendo, contingens
est, quoniam iste effectus ex natura sua et ex proximis suis causis, habet intrinsecam
contingentiam. Est autem necessaria illa propositio secundum quid, id est, per respectum ad
dispositionem divinæ scientiæ et determinationem divinæ voluntatis, quæ efficaciter, licet
suaviter, ut explicui, determinat omnes causas secundas ad suos effectus. Itaque ille modus
necessitatis, qui convenit effectui per ordinem ad primam causam, compatitur secum modum
contingentiæ, qui convenit effectui ab intrinseco et ex proximis suis causis. Et quamvis non plene
possimus a priori explicare, quo pacto concursus primæ causæ efficax sit et necessarius, et simul
conformetur cum natura causæ contingentis et liberæ, id tamen a posteriori constat nobis esse
certissimum. Quoniam si concursus primæ causæ non esset efficax ad determinandum omnes
causas secundas, nulla secunda causa operaretur suum effectum: quia nulla secunda causa potest
operari, nisi sit efficaciter a prima determinate’ (Bañez, 1964, p. 363). God’s general concurrence is
thus supposed to be efficacious (efficaciter), but in such a ‚subtle‛ way (suaviter) as not to
compromise the freedom of those choices for which it is a necessary and sufficient condition. I
leave it to the reader to decide upon the coherence of this view.
5 These examples are taken from Kvanvig (1986, p. 132).
6 Meister Eckhart, one of the great representatives of the Western mystical tradition, seems to
hold something like the view of ‚entitative participation‛ that I am advocating: ‘I am as sure as I
live that nothing is so near to me as God. God is nearer to me than I am to myself.< The whole
Being of God is contained in God alone. The whole of humanity is not contained in one man, for
one man is not all men. But in God the soul knows all humanity, and all things at their highest
level of existence, since it knows them in their essence’ (Meister Eckhart, 2007, pp. 19, 23).
7 ‘I believe, for example, that if Bob Adams were to offer to take me climbing at Tahquitz Rock the
next time I come to California, I would gladly (and freely) accept’ (Plantinga, 1985, p. 373).
8 ‘If you had asked me the way, I would have told you.< It seems to me that we use conditionals
like *this+ all the time, and regard their < truth as quite unproblematic’ (Gaskin, 1993, p. 421).
9 ‘It seems to me to be true, for example, that I would not, upon discovering that my address had
been given to a junk-mailing list, write an angry letter to the list-making organization’ (Wyma,
2001, p. 1).
10 Note well that I am simply making the epistemological point that I cannot know the middle facts
about myself, not that there are no such facts. To infer the latter on the basis of the former is, it
seems to me, is the crucial fallacy that plagues the grounding objection. On the other hand, I’m
not averse to saying that I can know some middle facts about myself after the fact. For example, I
think it’s true that if I were given the chance to return to graduate studies at UMass to finish my
dissertation, I would freely do so, simply because I was given that chance and did return.
11 Cf. n. 6 above.
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APPENDIX:
MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE AND THE SUFFERING OF CHRIST
Orthodox Christian theology has it that Christ, by his suffering and death,
atoned for the sins of humankind, thereby accomplishing the reconciliation of the
human race with its Creator. Although there are many different theories as to the
precise nature of the atonement, the most straightforward is that because human
beings had offended God by means of their sins, they had incurred a debt of
punishment. Since God is all-merciful, he desired to forgive mankind and
reestablish the bond of friendship that once existed betwixt he and pre-lapsarian
humanity. However, as God is also perfectly just, the sins of each person could
not go unpunished.
To satisfy the desires of the divine mercy as well as the demands of the divine
justice, Christians believe that Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ, freely took upon
himself the guilt of all humankind and suffered the punishment that was due to
each for his or her sins. As a result, God’s justice was indeed satisfied.
Furthermore, since Christ is himself the second Person of the Trinity and thus
‚true God of true God,‛ his passion was also an act, indeed the supreme act, of
divine mercy, reconciling God and creation.
Unfortunately, it is also a part of orthodox belief that not all human beings
will necessarily avail themselves of the mercy of God, choosing to remain in their
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sins and thus separating themselves eternally from their supernatural end.
Although there are those who espouse the view of ‚universal salvation,‛ holding
that all people will eventually be reconciled to God, it is surely heterodox to
think that universalism must be true. The possibility of eternal damnation is well
entrenched in the tradition of orthodox belief, and so long as it is even possible
that some persons will prove reprobate, that seems to raise a serious problem
concerning the scope and efficacy of Christ’s atonement.
Imagine, for simplicity, that the sum total of moral evil due to human
sinfulness in the actual world amounts to 1030 units of moral turpitude (or
‚turps‛ for short). Let us further stipulate that for each turp, Christ had to suffer
one ‚dolor‛ (unit of suffering). Thus, for Christ’s suffering to be sufficient for the
salvation of all humankind, he had to have actually suffered 1030 dolors.
However, if (as is supposed to be possible) not all humans are saved, then if
Christ suffered the full 1030 dolors, then some measure of his suffering will have
been inefficacious and, as it were, ‚wasted;‛ he will have suffered for more sins
than were actually forgiven, namely the sins of those who never repent and are
thus never reconciled to God. It would seem, therefore, that if only some (or even
most) but not all humans are saved, then justice would demand that Christ
should have suffered only enough for those who actually are saved, for
otherwise (again) some of his suffering will have been in vain. If, that is to say,
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only 1020 turps are actually repented of and forgiven, then Christ ought not to
have suffered more than 1020 dolors.
On the other hand, if Christ did not suffer the debt of punishment due to all
humans because of their sins—i.e., if he did not suffer the full 1030 dolors—then it
would seem that some human beings must be damned, as the following scenario
suggests. Imagine that our old friend Smith is one of those unfortunate
individuals who never repents of his sins and thus dies unreconciled to God. By
the above reasoning, it should follow that Christ did not suffer for Smith’s
specific sins, for had he done so, his suffering would have been in vain as Smith
never availed himself of the fruits of that suffering.
Now, was it possible for Smith to have repented of his sins and receive
forgiveness, or was he, in effect, fated to damnation? The latter would seem to be
the case, for if we assume that Smith had the ability to repent, then he would
have had the ability to bring it about that Christ suffered more than he actually
did. But that would mean that Smith had the power to do something today
(repent of his sins) such that, were he to have done it, then some past fact (that
Christ suffered, say, 1020 dolors) would not have been a fact (he would have
suffered more than 1020 dolors, perhaps due to an extra lash from the Praetorian
guard’s whip, an additional hammer stroke to the nail in his feet, or what have
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you). Since Smith is not supposed to have such counterfactual power, it would
seem, then, that he had not the power to repent of his sins and be forgiven.
From the discussion in chapter four, it should be evident how a Molinist can
respond to this argument. For if God has middle knowledge, then he knew from
all eternity that Smith would not repent of his sins; indeed, he would know
exactly who would repent of their sins and who would not. Since Smith freely
remained in his sins and refused to repent, then he could have done otherwise;
he could have repented. Were he to have done so, then God would have known
the CF, ‘Were Smith in such-and-such circumstances (i.e., the circumstances in
which he actually found himself), then he would repent of his sins.’ Were God to
have known that, then Christ would have suffered more of a dolorous passion
than the one he actually suffered, and thereby would have provided sufficient
atonement for the sins of all who would have repented, but not more than would
have been necessary in that counterfactual scenario. In the actual scenario, Christ
did not suffer for Smith’s unrepented sins, for such suffering would have been in
vain. But as the foregoing Molinist picture shows, that does not imply that Smith
could not have repented and been forgiven.
To sum up, the theory of middle knowledge provides a promising means of
navigating between the Scylla of necessary salvation for all and the Charybdis of
necessary damnation for some. Salvation would seem to be necessary for all if
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Christ suffered for the sins of all humankind; if not all were saved, then some of
Christ’s suffering would have been in vain. On the other hand, if Christ only
suffered for the sins of those who are actually saved, then those who are actually
damned would seem to have been fated to damnation from the moment when
Christ’s passion was completed. Molinism, as was argued above, allows us to
maintain that Christ in fact suffered only for the sins of those who are actually
saved—so that none of us suffering was in vain—while also maintaining that
those who are actually damned could have been saved, had they freely chosen to
repent of their sins. Had they done so, then (so the Molinist can insist) Christ
would have suffered for their sins as well.
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